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The actions of two assailants who shot and killed 10 people and wounded three 
others, including a student, in the region around Washington, D.C., in October 2002, 
provides the backdrop for a qualitative study of the emergency response by school district 
leaders in Montgomery County, Maryland.  The study explores and describes the 
experiences of the district’s superintendent and a group of leadership staff, including the 
author as a participant researcher, and two elected officials and a union president who 
contributed to the decisions and actions.  A non-evaluative study, based on portraiture in 
the form of case study, the narrative report provides often minute-to-minute detail of the 
events of the case and a unique perspective of crisis management and decision making at 
the school district level.  The study revealed aspects of the case regarding implementation 
of an emergency response plan, involvement of principals, management style, political 
extremes, and phases of the crisis.  The study also illuminated targeted objectives for 
decision and actions, including a central focus on mental health and communications. The 
study reflects a subject area that is largely overlooked in the research of education 
leadership.  Implications from the study are that school district leaders need specific 
training and experience necessary to manage a crisis, make decisions under crisis 
circumstances, and improve their performance through practice.  The study identifies 
licensure for school district leaders as a way to attain a standardized level of competency 
in crisis management and decision making skills.  The study also provides an entry point 
for further research in educational crisis management and decision making.  In particular, 
the study explores a unique blend of research encompassing critical tasks in public 
leadership during a crisis, complex transformational processes among the components of 
a school district’s social system, and expectations of high reliability in organizational 
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In October 2002, just outside Washington, D.C., in the suburban community of 
Montgomery County, Maryland, a series of random shootings with marksman accuracy 
sparked one the largest criminal manhunts in the nation’s history.  By the time the 
assailants were arrested more than three weeks later, there were 10 people dead and three 
wounded in two states and the District of Columbia.  In the midst of these events, school 
districts leaders across the region instituted a variety of safety and security measures, 
especially after one of the wounded victims was a middle school student.  The actions 
taken by the district leaders in Montgomery County, often chronicled in minute-to-minute 
detail, form the case on which this portrait of crisis management and decision making is 
based.  The portrait begins with the context of the study.   
Context of the Study 
The experiences in crisis management and decision making by school district 
leaders in the Montgomery County Public Schools during the sniper incident comprise a 
story with little precedent in the research about educational administration.  Within a few 
hours of the first shootings on the morning of October 3, 2002, the school district 
implemented one of the most stringent security measures possible, in response to a police 
warning about student safety.  The decision triggered a wave of similar actions, as other 
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school districts also reacted to an unseen threat.  Thus began the crisis management 
response of the Montgomery County Public Schools, the focus of this study, in which a 
group of school district leaders dealt with the cumulative effects of events that shocked 
and threatened the region for more than three weeks.  The event was characterized as the 
longest crisis of its kind to ever face a public school district in the nation (Bowler, 
2002)—after just the first 10 days.  A chronology of major events in the case provides an 
overview of the scope and sequence of the crisis (Table 1.1). 
 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in a decision denying a request to 
overturn a lower court conviction of one of the two assailants, compared the effects of the 
attacks to those of “Jack the Ripper” and described the public reaction in Montgomery 
County, in particular, as “gripped by a paroxysm of fear, a fear as paralyzing as that 
which froze the London district of Whitechapel in 1888” ("John Muhammad v. 
Maryland," 2007, p. 1).  The impact was felt well beyond the county, during what was 
described in the media as “a three-week siege in which a seemingly faceless gunman 
terrified the region by killing indiscriminately…forcing schoolchildren behind locked doors 
and turning mundane outdoor ventures into a test of nerves” (Morello, Davenport, & Harris, 
2002).1  The crisis reportedly affected 30 school districts, enrolling more than a million 
students and employing more than 65,000 teachers ("Sniper shootings," 2002, p. 17).  
Tightened security was reported in school districts encompassing an area from the 
Maryland border with Pennsylvania to south of Richmond, Virginia (Figure 1.1).  
                                                 
1 On October 12, 2002, little more than a week after the shootings began, Newsweek released a 
national poll saying 19% of American adults were “very worried” and 28% “somewhat worried” that they 
or a family member might be a victim of “this kind of violence” (2002 ).  The results suggested nearly one 
in two American adults thought such an attack was possible anywhere.    
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 Table 1.1  Chronology of Shootings and School District Actions  




Wednesday, October 4 ■ evening 
  
Thursday, October 3 ■■■■ morning  
■ evening 
■ morning ■ morning 
Friday, October 4 ■ afternoon  ■ morning only 
Saturday, October 5    
Sunday, October 6    
Monday, October 7 ■ morning ■ morning ■ morning 
Tuesday, October 8  ■  ■ 
Wednesday, October 9 ■ evening No school ■ 
Thursday, October 10   ■ 
Friday, October 11 ■ morning ■ morning ■ 
Saturday, October 12   ■ 
Sunday, October 13   ■ 
Monday, October 14 ■ evening ■ ■ 
Tuesday, October 15   ■ 
Wednesday, October 16   ■ 
Thursday, October 17   ■ 
Friday, October 18  No school ■ 
Saturday, October 19 ■ evening  ■ 
Sunday, October 20   ■ 
Monday, October 21   ■ 
Tuesday, October 22 ■ morning ■morning ■ 
Wednesday, October 23  ■ ■ 
Thursday, October 24  ■ ■ 
Friday, October 25    
Totals Dead:  10 
Wounded: 3  
Code Blue 
days: 8 
Days with outdoor  
restrictions: 20 
■ = shooting or decision to restrict outside activities all day (unless otherwise indicated) 
Shooting data from John Allen Muhammad v. State of Maryland (2007). Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland.  Retrieved November 11, 2007, from http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/cosa/2007.    
School data from Sniper crisis: Superintendent's crisis management communications (2002). 





 There is little in the way of research about crisis management and decision 
making among leaders of public school districts or schools.  As described in Chapter 2, 
the literature is largely based on anecdotal references to individual experiences without a 
foundation in research analysis.  On the other hand, there is extensive research outside the 
field of education regarding the management of crisis conditions and similar situations 
across a number of occupations and fields of expertise.  This includes, for example, 
research in the management of organizational crises (Allison & Zalikow, 1999; Weick, 
Figure 1.1  Area of Heightened School Security 
From “Sniper Shootings” (2002, October 30). Education Week, p. 17. Copyright 2002-2009, Editorial 





2001a), the making of crisis decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Klein, 1993a), and the effects of 
crises on human behavior (Gladwell, 2000; K. Sacco, Galletto, & Blanzieri, 2003), 
among others.   
The absence of such research in education suggests there is little need or interest 
within the field of educational leadership to know about research-based crisis 
management and decision making skills, the improvement of such skills through training, 
and the attainment of expertise based on standards of performance not simply experience.  
The absence creates a void in which this study is situated, requiring the development of a 
conceptual framework for the research based largely outside of education literature. 
The problem is related to the absence of training in general on in-depth 
management and decision-making skills for school district leaders, let alone crisis 
management and crisis decision making.  For example, Leithwood and Steinbach (1995) 
noted in a study of school principals that little training in critical problem solving skills 
was available.  The problem was thought to be particularly serious for novice principals 
who had subject area knowledge but lacked skills in resolving authentic, ill-structured 
problems.  
The literature on school leadership focuses primarily on decision making 
associated with policies and procedures, administration, instructional reforms, and 
organizational change.  All of these areas are important and worthy of considerably more 
attention.  But the absence of substantive inclusion of crisis management and decision 
making is noticeable even in the most comprehensive literature.  For example, the recent 
edition of one of the widely used texts in principal training, Educational Administration: 
Theory, Research, and Practice, 7th Edition (Hoy & Miskel, 2008), has an extensive 
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section on several models of decision making and problem solving, including conflict 
resolution, but does not provide a link to the applicability of these models to decision 
making in a crisis.  Similarly, a text published by the Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development, The New Principal’s Fieldbook: Strategies for Success 
(Robbins & Alvy, 2004), cites the need for “balancing teaming with decisiveness” (p. 
221) in responding to a crisis situation but does not mention let alone explain the unique 
characteristics of what decisiveness means in making a crisis decision.   
Various guide books on crises in schools, including Best Practices in School 
Crisis Prevention and Intervention (Brock, Lazarus, & Jimerson, 2002) and Coping with  
Crisis: A Resource for Schools, Parents, and Communities (Poland & McCormick, 
1999), have extensive descriptions of the tasks involved in responding to a crisis largely 
from the perspective of after-the-fact counseling, not the complex management of a 
broad-based emergency at a school or a crisis on the scale of a school district, nor the 
elements and demands of crisis decision making.  
Yet, as the review of the literature revealed, school district leaders are expected to 
know how to handle a crisis, be effective crisis managers, and attain expertise in threat 
assessment and crisis containment (R. A. Fein, et al., 2002).   
Framework 
The conceptual framework for the study was developed from a review of 
literature on crisis leadership, management of complex events, and decision making 
under extreme conditions, among related subjects.  The review, as described in Chapter 2, 
led to the development of a unique blend of three areas of research encompassing the 
context of critical tasks in public leadership during a crisis (Boin, 'T Hart, Stern, & 
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Sundelius, 2005), the complex transformational processes among various components of 
social systems of schools (Hoy & Miskel, 2005; 2008), and expectations of high 
reliability in the implementation of crisis management activities in environments that 
support mindfulness and expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007).   
The framework was influenced by research suggesting that effective decision 
makers in a crisis use their experience and training in the form of intuition to take action, 
make sense of their environment, and address the personal and situational impact of the 
crisis and the challenges that follow.  Such research comes from, among others, the study 
of fast-paced work environments (Eisenhardt, 1989), the military (Klein, 1997), 
firefighters (Weick, 2001b), emergency management personnel (Flin, 2001), and patient-
treatment decisions by critical care nurses (Currey & Botti, 2003). 
Important in the conceptualizing the analytical basis for the study was the concept 
of decision making as sensemaking, in which people act (make a decision) in order to 
understand a change in their environment (Weick, 2001a).  The context of a crisis causes 
a considerable disruption of the sensemaking capabilities of people, escalating problem 
conditions as the crisis unfolds and new challenges arise (Rosenthal et al., 2001).  At such 
moments, sensemaking occurs within the decision-making process itself, as decision 
makers rely on their own intellectual abilities to make sense of their surroundings and 
take actions that reflect what they instinctively feel and recognize, based on their training 
and expertise (Klein, 2003).  In the process, though, their action (or decision) changes the 
environment, and Weick called this “enacted sensemaking” (2001a, p. 224) and applied it 





Portraiture as a form of case study was chosen as the methodology for the study, 
based on the work of Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997) and Bloom (2003), among 
others.  The selection of portraiture was influenced, in part, by the work of  Heck and 
Hallinger (1999), who suggest that narrative forms of research are useful in describing the 
“decision-making or problem-solving practices of school leaders” (p. 155).  It also reflects 
the tradition of descriptive studies of decision making that explore situations from the 
point of view of the participants (Simon, 1978b, p. 8).  Pearson and Clair (1998, p. 62), 
for example, note that research of crisis events often lacks the perspective of people who 
experienced the crisis, and Rosenthal et al. (2001) suggest that such studies of 
management responses to a crisis should include exploration of the personal experiences 
and effects of shock, upheaval, and stress that occur from “very concrete and frightening 
events” for all participants, including managers (p. 22).  
 In particular, the study was conducted as an open-ended inquiry intended to 
explore and describe a lived experience shared by the participants in the case.  Thus, the 
narrative report provides, as described by Creswell (1998), a form of qualitative “rhetoric” 
about “a certain state of social being” (p. 79).  Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997) 
describe this as a form of emergent phenomenological inquiry, in which data gathered 
from a variety of sources are interpreted in the form of a narrative report reflecting a 
panoramic view of the participants and their actions.  In this study, the research involved 
a deep analysis of the events of the case based on archival records and the recollections of 
participants. This incorporated a process in the study, as described by Shank (2002, p. 160), 
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in which an analytical deconstruction of events was undertaken in order to reveal not only 
what occurred but also why.   
As a retrospective view of past actions, the portrait approached the crisis 
management and decision making events from the perspective of a case study, collecting 
data from multiple sources for the analysis and documentation of the case, as described 
by Yin (2003).  In some respects, portraiture is an extension of case study, with common 
data collection and analysis techniques.  I was influenced by the perspective of Shank 
(2002), who describes portraiture as going “beyond the simple notion of documenting a 
case toward the richer and more complex notion of…creating an illuminating case that is 
as much an artistic task as it is a piece of scientific reporting” (p. 54).   
Standard applications of qualitative research procedures were used, consistent 
with those outlined by Marshall and Rossman (1999), Creswell (1998, 2003), Miles and 
Huberman (1994), and Yin (2003), among others.  
The portrait is a strictly non-evaluative study, based on the a presumption of 
“goodness” in the actions of people, as described by Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis 
(1997), and throughout the study I resisted what they call “the more typical social science 
preoccupation with documenting pathology and suggesting remedies” (p. 141).  This 
meant the study approached the events of the case from the perspective of presumed 
strengths, rather than expected deficiencies (Hackmann, 2002, p. 54). This was consistent 
with the view of Pearson and Clair (1998, p. 73) who suggest that studies involving 
crises, which often focus on failure and loss, should be open to the possibility of success.   
My purpose in approaching portraiture as a form of case study reflects my 
personal interests as a researcher that are rooted in educational leadership and policy, 
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journalism, and political science. In addition, as a participant researcher in the events of 
the case, I also followed a methodology that facilitated the reality of this involvement as a 
benefit, rather than an impediment.  My involvement as a participant, as the director of 
communications for the school district, required certain research practices regarding 
personal responsibilities, verification, quality, and ethics, which are described in Chapter 
3.  In addition, the public identification of the participants was undertaken consistent with 
the requirements of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Maryland, 
College Park, and the Montgomery County Public Schools regulations on employee 
participation in research.   
Purpose  
The study was undertaken with the intention of understanding school district 
crisis management in the context of a single case, as an illustration of issues facing 
district leaders in crisis situations.  The study provided a unique opportunity to explore 
and describe rarely analyzed aspects of organizational management and decision making, 
let alone such actions in a public school district.  The subject reflects an area of research 
that is largely overlooked and ignored; and, in the process, the study sought to provide a 
basis for further research and an illumination of such practices in the administration of 
public schools.   
The responsibilities for school crisis management touch nearly every community.  
It is not an overstatement to suggest that schools are ubiquitous.  They are one of the most 
identifiable representations of government services available in local communities.  People, 
particularly parents of public school students, recognize and know their local principals and 
teachers, who are partners in the societal processes of raising and educating children.   
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The United States had an estimated 98,916 public elementary and secondary 
schools in operation in the fall of 2007, based on the most recent available federal data.  
It was largest number of public schools in operation since the mid-1960s.  They were 
governed by an estimated 13,924 school districts, representing a broad mixture of urban, 
suburban, and rural communities and regions.  In the fall of 2009, the public school 
enrollment nationally was an estimated 49.8 million students (Snyder & Dillow, 2010, 
Tables 34-93). 
Most school districts are moderately sized, much smaller than the large districts 
associated with the events of this study.  In the fall of 2007, the most recent year for 
which data are available, school districts with less than 46,900 students enrolled an 
estimated 78% of the nation’s students.  The rest were concentrated in less than 1% of 
school districts—the nation’s 100 largest, led by New York City with 1.3 million 
students.  Montgomery County’s district was identified as the 16th largest nationally, with 
Fairfax County, Virginia, ranked 13th and the largest in the region (Snyder & Dillow, 
2010, Table 92). 
Question 
The study addressed the question:  What can be learned from the decision making 
experiences of the leaders of the Montgomery County Public Schools in protecting 
students from the sniper in October 2002?    
The question brought the study into focus for the collection of information and 
data from the participants and the documentary record, consistent with portraiture 
(Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997) and case study (Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2003).  It was 
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a contextual question designed, as Maxwell (1996) explained, “to understand how events, 
actions, and meanings are shaped by the unique circumstances in which these occur” (p. 59).    
There were nine sub-questions that further deepened the study’s approach in 
exploring and describing a lived experience:   
1. What were the characteristics of the decisions? 
2. Who were the main participants? 
3. What are the background characteristics of this case? 
4. What commonly held views, themes, and metaphors emerge?    
5. What was unique about this case? 
6. What retrospective insights can be learned? 
7. What strategies and processes of decision making can be described? 
8. What does the analysis of the portrait reveal? 
9. How can this portrait be situated in the literature about crisis decision 
making and school district leadership? 
As open-ended questions, the inquiry was also consistent with “the logic of crisis 
analysis,” as described by Rosenthal, et al. (2001), in terms of avoiding a reliance on the 
linear focus in the chronology of events and, instead, being mindful of the “circular 
movements” in how a crisis unfolds (p. 21).   
Context of the School District 
Montgomery County was literally at the epicenter of the event, both because the 
killings began and ultimately ended there and because the law enforcement response was 
headquartered in Rockville, the county seat, not far from the central offices of the public 
school district.  
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At the time of the case, in the fall of 2002, the district enrolled nearly 139,000 
students in 191 schools.  The district was the largest in the state, with more than 16% of 
all students statewide (Maryland's report card, 2003).  One of the largest districts in the 
country, the district boasted at one point:  “More children attend school here than are 
enrolled in the schools in four individual states” (Annual report, 2002, p. 7).  More than 
half of the students were African American, Asian American, or Hispanic, creating one of 
the state’s most diverse districts, with a large percentage of students eligible for federal 
meal assistance, English language assistance, and other services.   
Montgomery County occupies 497 square miles of urban, suburban, and rural 
communities, with the Potomac River as the border with Virginia to the south and south-
west.  The nation’s capital city, Washington, D.C., is its famous neighbor.2  Four 
Maryland counties—Prince George’s, Howard, Carroll, and Frederick—form the 
remaining jurisdictional contour, from east to west.   
Overall, the county reported little crime at the time just prior to the events of the 
case.  Among Maryland’s five largest jurisdictions in 2001, it had the lowest rate of 
violent crime (the number of murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults per 
100,000 people).  The rate was half as much as the next lowest jurisdiction, Anne 
Arundel County, home to the state’s capital city, Annapolis. Murders also were relatively 
uncommon, with 19 occurring in the county compared to 463 across Maryland in 2001 
(Maryland state police, 2005, pp. 12-13).3 
                                                 
2 The county was created in 1776 and named for General Richard Montgomery, a fallen hero from 
the failed invasion of Canada during the American Revolutionary War (Montgomery County, 1999, pp. 3, 29).   




Nonetheless, the region at the time of the shootings was already on edge because  
of the terrorist attacks the year before.  In May 2002, for example, a poll found a higher 
level of fear and helplessness among residents in Washington, D.C., than among residents 
of other large cities in the nation (Hsu & Morin, 2002).  On August 2002, the federal 
director of homeland security urged local government leaders in the Washington region 
to coordinate their respective agencies for a possible terrorist attack on the nation’s 
capital (Hsu, 2002).  The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) 
engaged school district superintendents and their security staff in efforts to improve 
“planning, communication, information sharing, and coordination before, during and 
after a regional emergency” (Rogers, 2002).  The organization’s first meeting was on 
September 12, 2002, about three weeks before the sniper attacks began.     
Public Events 
The school district’s crisis decisions were public events, reported in the regional, 
national, and international news media and announced by the school system through 
almost daily letters to parents and regular announcements on its Web site in multiple 
languages.  The public aspect of the events is important in situating this study as a 
research project involving a publicly identified case and participants.  There were daily 
news stories, nightly broadcasts, and frequent news bulletins that included news about 
school operations and the decisions being made throughout the crisis (Sniper crisis,  
Week 1, 2002).  The spotlight intensified after the shooting of the middle school student,  
and a Washington Post editorial summed up the environmental context with a headline 
“A New Level of Fear” (2002, p. A34). 
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In the aftermath of the crisis, the school district was recognized publicly and 
nationally as a result of its efforts in crisis management.  In March 2003, the district’s 
emergency plan was identified as an example of “promising practices in school 
emergency response” by the U.S. Department of Education ("Emergency planning," 
2003).  On April 23, 2003, a segment on the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) program 
“Newshour” highlighted the school system’s “sophisticated response” to crises ("Safety 
lesson," 2003). In October 2004, the school system’s role in managing a public event was 
featured in a report on multi-agency law enforcement cooperation (G. R. Murphy & 
Wexler, 2004).  That same year, on September 3, 2004, NBC Dateline reported that a 
national study by a domestic security organization, America Prepared, praised the school 
district’s crisis readiness (Hansen & Thompson, 2004).  The study was described in The 
Washington Post as characterizing the school district as one of the “best prepared among 
the nation’s largest school districts to keep children safe during a parent’s nightmare: 
terrorism at school” (Dana, 2004, p. C6). 
Participants 
The participants in the study included 15 individuals who were engaged in the 
leadership decisions and actions of the Montgomery County Public Schools during the 
sniper crisis of October 2002.  All but three were identified from the preliminary 




Table 1.2  Identified Internal and External Participants 
Alvez, Aggie Director of Special Projects, Office of the Superintendent 
(director of communications and family outreach). 
Bowers, Larry A. Chief Operating Officer. 
Clarke, Edward A. Director of School Safety and Security (consultant, private 
practice, Olney, Maryland) 
Duncan, Douglas M. County Executive, Montgomery County (consultant, private 
practice, Rockville, Maryland) 
Hellmuth, Robert B. Assistant director, School Safety and Security (director of 
school safety and security) 
Ikheloa, Roland Staff Assistant to the Board of Education (chief of staff, 
Board of Education) 
Kamins, Matthew J.  Supervisor of Psychological Services (psychologist, 
Psychological Services) 
Kress, Donald H. Chief School Performance Officer (consultant, private 
practice, Germantown, Maryland) 
Lacey, Frieda K. Chief of Staff to the Superintendent of Schools (deputy 
superintendent of schools) 
Madden, Judy Supervisor of Guidance Services (director of educator 
learning, College Summit, Washington, D.C.) 
Shirley, Edward W. President, Montgomery County Association of 
Administrative and Supervisory Personnel (superintendent, 
Caroline County Public Schools, Denton, Maryland) 
Subin, Michael L. Chair, Education Committee, Montgomery County Council 
(attorney, private practice, Rockville, Maryland) 
Tronzano, Matthew A. Executive Assistant to the Chief Operating Officer (executive 
director, The Jones Center for Families, Springdale, Arkansas) 
Weast, Jerry D. Superintendent of Schools 
Williams, James A. 
 
Deputy Superintendent of Schools (superintendent, Buffalo 
City Public Schools, New York) 
Listed alphabetically by last name, with position or association with the Montgomery County 
Public Schools during the case and current professional status if different in parentheses. 
 
Significance 
The study has significance for practice, in that school district leaders and leaders 
of schools should have the knowledge and understanding necessary to manage a crisis, 
make decisions under crisis circumstances, and improve their performance through 
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practice sessions, similar to learning any other skill (such as teaching).  The study also 
has significance for policy, in that licensure in the preparation of school district leaders 
and leaders of schools should include requirements for attaining a standardized level of 
competency in crisis management and crisis decision making skills.  And, the study has 
significance for research, in that it provides an entry point for adding research in 
educational crisis management and decision making.   
Limitations 
As a qualitative study involving a single case there can be no generalization 
beyond the case.  It can be illustrative, but it is not predictive.  The study is also limited 
by the conceptual and methodological frameworks that established the analytical 
perspective and guided the conduct of the study.   
The study is further limited in its design as a retrospective study, relying on 
available records and the recollections of participants, whose selection and public 
identification create additional limitations.  These limitations apply, as well, to the 
researcher, who was also a participant, in addition to potential threats to such research 
because of bias and reflexivity. These limitations are addressed in Chapter 3. 
Definition of Terms 
Ambiguity—the lack of sensemaking as a result of “an ongoing stream” of information “that 
supports several different interpretations at the same time” (Weick, 1995, p. 91). 
Bounded Rationality—the “inescapable limitations of knowledge and computational 
ability” of a person in any given situation (Allison & Zalikow, 1999, p. 20). 
Case Study—the “exploration of a bounded system or a case over time through detailed, in-
depth data collection from multiple sources, rich in context” (Creswell, 1998, p. 61). 
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Code Blue—a security response strategy requiring all students to be accounted for and 
under supervision, with additional security measures implemented depending on 
the situation (Montgomery County Public Schools: retrieved June 26, 2005 from 
http://www.mcps.k12.md.us/info/emergency/procedures/codeblue.cfm). 
Crisis—“A period of upheaval and collective stress” that disrupts the known reality in 
“unexpected, often inconceivable ways” (Rosenthal et al., 2001, p. 6).   
Participant Researcher—a special mode of qualitative methodology in which the 
researcher participated in some way in the events being studied, including that of 
a staff member or decision maker in an organization (Yin, 2003, pp. 93-94).  
Portraiture—an emergent, open-ended form of phenomenological research that gathers 
and interprets multiple sources of data to explore and describe lived experiences 
in a narrative report, the portrait (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997).  
Phenomenology—the exploration of “the meaning of lived experiences for several 
individuals about a specific concept or the phenomenon” (Creswell, 1998, p. 51). 
Sensemaking—understanding reality through a process “that emerges from efforts to create 





Chapter 2:  Literature Review for the Portrait  
 
Overview 
The portrait of crisis management and decision making during the sniper incident 
of October 2002 by school district leaders in Montgomery County, Maryland, was 
undertaken against a backdrop of limited research on this topic in educational 
organizations.  The literature is largely defined by other fields or narrowly viewed within 
the context of school-based counseling. Little is available to illuminate the subject at the 
districtwide level.  At the same time, the evolution of crisis management for schools can 
be seen in the reports of steps taken (or not) by the federal government, states, and school 
districts.  Together, these sources contributed to the development of the conceptual 
framework for this study, the exploration and description of the case, and the subsequent 
discussion, conclusions, and implications.  The review begins by situating the study 
within the context of crisis management in school districts. 
Context of Crisis Management 
The literature on crisis management and decision making in school districts 
generally describes personal lessons learned by individuals involved in traumatic 
incidents.  Such reports provide a varied assortment of anecdotal insights, usually first-
person accounts, reflecting the actions of principals and superintendents under crisis 
conditions.  One such experience involved the shooting of an assistant principal at a high 
school in Wisconsin in December 1993.  George Goens was the district superintendent, 
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and he later described in a magazine article what he saw and experienced at the school.  
The scene, as he recalled, involved a crisis well under way, with different groups of 
people at varied stages of response, both professional and personal.  He concluded later 
that among the things he needed most that day was a simple “conceptual emergency 
plan” to guide staff “through the immediate tidal wave of the crisis” (Goens, 1996, p. 50).  
Fourteen years later, he wrote again about the experience, this time explaining vividly 
why he thought preparing for a crisis was necessary:   
Throughout that day, ambiguity and uncertainty stalked me like a dark, bleak 
shadow. The kids and staff were in lockdown. The perpetrator was unknown. The 
police were investigating. Getting everyone out of the building safely was a 
priority.  I was dazed and stunned, but paradoxically my behavior was controlled, 
linear and logical. Each decision that day carried immense magnitude because of 
the consequences for people’s lives. Time literally stood still or sped by in a 
vapor. It seemed surreal (Goens, 2007).  
 
Goens’ description captured one of the salient concepts from the research on crisis 
management and decision making.  Researchers describe typical crises in largely similar 
terms.  As one noted, a crisis creates a time and place where “we are not ourselves and the 
world around us is completely changed” (Gullatt & Long, 1996, p. 26).  The psychological 
experiences may reflect feelings of isolation, frustration, worry, and vulnerability, and the 
physiological factors may include adrenaline reactions, startled reflexes, and dysfunctions 
such as sleep deprivation (Klein, 1993b). The reactions worsen as a crisis escalates.  People 
under extreme changes in the social order are capable of mass behavior that can tip from 
panic to epidemic quickly and unexpectedly (Gladwell, 2000).  
Advance Preparation 
The goal of crisis management is to avoid falling victim to the distortion of senses 
that cause people to react haphazardly.  Such reactions can be primal.  Weick (1995), in 
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his work about organizational sensemaking, described the crisis response as rooted in 
basic human conditions that tacitly rely on everyday routines and the expected 
“dispositions of [other] individuals” (p. 86).  Abraham Maslow’s “theory of human need” 
in 1970 (as cited in Hoy & Miskel, 2008, p. 137) identified personal safety and security 
as the second most basic necessity in a hierarchy of human motivations.  Intense feelings 
associated with protecting basic conditions of life occur when a threat redefines “who we 
are, what we want, and what we think, reducing our ability to reflect and putting us back 
into an action mode in which meeting these [basic] needs entirely absorbs consciousness” 
(Greenspan, 1997, p. 117).   
Approaches to crisis management recognize that crises are not necessarily unique 
events, and researchers identify several common features and characteristics of crises that 
serve as linchpins in developing management strategies and decision schemes, in 
advance.  Unpredictability is a primary common attribute.  Crises are random and, as 
noted by Campbell (1999), they “can come at any time, usually out of nowhere” (p. 9).  
Other attributes are ambiguity and uncertainty.  These terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably, ironically creating vagueness about correct interpretations of the 
“distinct phenomena” (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997, p. 150).  Researchers suggest the words 
should be viewed as inherently different within the context of preparing for an emergency 
or responding to one.  Weick (1995), for example, described ambiguity as a byproduct of 
confusion, and uncertainty as a function of ignorance.   Confusion arises when people are 
caught by surprise and feel momentarily startled or, at worst, physically threatened 
(Sniezek, Wilkins, Wadlington, & Bauman, 2002).  Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) 
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suggested uncertainty is akin to a “sense of doubt,” manifesting itself as hesitancy, 
indecisiveness, and procrastination (p. 150).   
Ambiguity, of course, is not unique to crises.  There is a “lengthy tradition of 
research and theorizing” suggesting that the conditions associated with ambiguity are 
“endemic to organizational life” (Wallace, 2003, p. 10).  March (1988), in his work about 
decisions in an organizational environment, makes the point that dealing with ambiguity 
guides the development of personal and social structures within an organization and 
affects efforts in building experience, identifying relevance, coping with the past, 
communicating with others, and contributing to the creation of myths, rituals, and 
cultural symbols that offset inherent organizational ambiguities.  The level of ambiguity 
of a given situation determines the amount of effort required “to define the nature of the 
problem than if cues clearly specify what is wrong,” especially when there are vague 
cues, conflicting cues, and uninterpretable cues (Orasanu & Fischer, 2001, p. 353).  In a 
crisis, ambiguities are intensified by the speed of events.  Ambiguity becomes a “major 
obstacle to effective decision making” in high-stakes and tense situations where the risk 
are substantially escalated (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997, p. 149).   
 ‘Social Systems’ 
In normal, non-crisis environments, people conduct themselves according to 
various environmental and structural limits.  They adapt themselves to institutional 
structures and create symbols, sub-structures, and environmental processes for addressing 
goals, mediating conflicts, and working together (Cibulka, 1997).  For example, there are 
formal and informal communication processes that guide typical interactions in 
organizations (Senge, et al., 1999).  In terms of a school environment, Wayne K. Hoy and 
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Cecil G. Miskel introduced a theoretical model to illustrate the dynamics of human 
behavior based on the concept of an open social system (Figure 2.1).  Their eighth and 
most recent edition of a standard reference text on school administration continued to 
present the model as a blend of two very different views of organizational theory:  the 
“rational” and “scientific management” perspectives based on structure and rules, and the 
“human relations” and “natural system” perspectives based on human interaction (Hoy & 
Miskel, 2008, p. 17).   
The social systems model provided a useful reference point from which to 
examine the literature on crisis management and decision making and applying such 
research in the context of schools districts.  As discussed later in this chapter, the model 
influenced part of the conceptual framework developed for the analysis undertaken in 
this study.  This was in addition to other analytical components, also presented later, 
which helped to form the conceptual framework on which this portrait of crisis 
management and decision making is based.   
Hoy and Miskel suggest that the 10 major components of the model (Table 2.1) 
play a role in the behavior of people within a school organization and, thus, contribute to 
the behavior of the organization itself.  “As a social system,” they argue, “the school is 
characterized by an interdependence of parts, a clearly defined population, differentiation 
from its environment, a complex network of social relationships, and its own unique 
culture” (Hoy & Miskel, 2008, p. 22).  From that perspective, the model demonstrated a 
way of looking at the immensely varied interactions involved among participants in this 
case by examining what the authors called the “planned and unplanned aspects of 















Figure 2.1  “Social System Model for Schools”  
From Hoy, W. K., & Miskel, C. G. (2005). Educational administration: Theory, research, 
and practice (7th ed.). Figure 12.1, p. 411. Boston: McGraw Hill. Copyright 2005, The 
McGraw Hill Companies.  Reprinted with permission. 
 Among the areas that interest researchers of crisis management and decision 
making are the training, experiences, and mental conditioning necessary to pass through 
the turbulence of a crisis and regain mental clarity, if not normalcy.  Indeed, Weick  
(1996a) challenged school district leaders to act on the implications of sense making 
research in order to prepare for situations that threaten the life and safety of students and 
staff.   He made the argument three years before the shootings at Columbine High School 




Table 2.1  Component Definitions for “Social System Model” 
Environment External factors and influences, affecting the actions of 
people within the organization.  
Inputs Elements from outside the system that interact with the 
elements and processes within the organization. 
Structural System Formal rules and expectations that govern the function of 
the organization and the people within. 
Individual System Personal needs and beliefs of people within the 
organization and their understanding of their duties and 
responsibilities. 
Cultural System Shared values, norms, beliefs, and perspectives among 
people within an organization, both formal and informal. 
Political System Informal power relationships within an organization, 
often illegitimate, tending to personal or group interests. 
Technical Core: 
Teaching and Learning 
Primary purpose of a school organization; all other 
organizational functions are secondary. 
Transformational 
Process 
Conversion of inputs into outputs, on the basis of 
interaction with elements and processes of the 
organization.  
Outputs Products or services, influences or values, created by the 
transformational process. 
Discrepancy between 
Actual and Expected 
Performance 
Analysis of internal and external feedback about outputs 
and the processes and people who created them. 
Adapted from Hoy, W. K., & Miskel, C. G. (2008). Educational administration: Theory, 
research, and practice (8th ed.), pp. 23-33. Boston: McGraw Hill.   
 
 the defining point for school crisis management in terms of events before Columbine and 
those after.  Nearly a decade later, the national magazine for the American Association of  
School Administrators featured an article on “what works” in crisis management by an 
individual who based his eight recommendations on “my 20-plus years experience as a 
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superintendent” (Joel, 2007).  No references were made to formal training in crisis 
management or relevant research-based guidelines were made, or if training might be useful. 
Legacy of Fire Drills 
In the evolution of school crisis management, the fire drill is considered the 
embryonic starting point.  It was “one of the first precautions” to arise from a planned 
response to a potential emergency in the history of organized schooling (Heath, Ryan, 
Dean, & Bingham, 2007, p. 208).  The typical drill is designed to ensure that children and 
adults know how to exit a building without injury during a fire, and the procedure has 
been adapted for other emergencies.  The drill represents the minimum level of planning 
and activity in terms of school safety procedures.  Yet, to ensure that school leaders 
conduct such drills on a regular basis requires unusual procedural enforcements.  In 
Maryland, for example, each district is required “to hold a fire drill in each public school 
at least 10 times each school year” and, in order to prevent principals from bunching 
them together (during times of good weather, for example), a drill must be held “at least 
once every 60 days,” with each event documented and reported to the district 
superintendent ("Title 7-408," 2006, p. 291).   
The absence of competent skills in school evacuation was blamed, in part, for 
horrific deaths among school children as far back as 1850.  In that year, 40 students died 
and many more were injured as they panicked attempting to rush out of a New York City 
school as the result of a false alarm (Heath, et al., 2007, p. 208).  Other lessons from early 
school fires prompted changes in building design, including designated mass exits and 
outside stairways.  Nonetheless, such structural measures were not uniformly applied 
across the country less than a century ago.  In 1915, the federal government found that 
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only 14 of the nation’s 49 states required schools to have “fire escapes” of some kind 
("Digest of State laws," 1916, pp. 369-371).  Massive casualties from school fires 
continued well past the Korean War, as both private and public schools were slow to 
upgrade buildings and train staff on proper procedures.  The last major fire (defined as 
causing the deaths of 10 or more people) occurred in Chicago in 1958.  In that incident, 
known as the “Our Lady of the Angels School Fire,” 92 children and three adults died 
(Cote, 2003, p. 25).  A study of the incident by the National Fire Protection Association 
found that the building’s structural condition, cleanliness, and life safety equipment were 
insufficient to prevent and contain the fire, which injured more than 100 other people.  
However, the study also concluded that evidence from the fire “clearly indicate that 
adequate steps had not been taken at this school to assure proper emergency action by the 
teachers in case of fire…” (Babcock & Wilson, 1959, p. 174).   
In the years since the Chicago fire, changes in building design, materials, and 
equipment, along with adherence to typical fire drill procedures, are credited with 
preventing another such fire and major loss of life (Cote, 2003, p. 25).  But the lessons 
were slow to learn.  Three years after the incident, for example, fire drills were still 
considered somewhat of a novelty in New York City.  City schools received news media 
coverage in 1961 for “practicing fire drills and developing routines for exiting buildings” 
(Heath, et al., 2007, p. 210).   In the years since, architectural engineering advances were 
made to design buildings that facilitate a speedy exit.  Complex “evacuation computer 
models” were used to measure the effects of “points of constriction” (such as doorways) 
and calculate the time necessary for people “to flow past these points and to the outside” 
during an emergency (Kuligowski & Peacock, 2005, p. 1).  In school districts, choices 
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based on budgets and resources have affected the most basic public safety measures.  A 
recent study of districts across different geographic regions found a lack of safety 
equipment in schools, most notably fire extinguishers (Shelton, Owens, & Song, 2009).   
Responsibility for Care 
Fire safety measures are but the tip of the legal iceberg in terms of educators’ 
responsibilities for the welfare of students and staff.  Laws governing the operation of 
schools in Maryland, for example, touch nearly every aspect of the typical school day, 
from the nutritional content of the free and reduced-priced breakfast to the educational 
content of the instructional program to the particle content of the indoor air (Bounds, 
Woolums, Bresler, Eisenberg, & O'Meally, 2006, pp. 410-411).   School leaders cannot 
guarantee the absolute safety of students and staff at all times and under all circumstances.  
However, they have a “general duty of care,” particularly for students, and this is “the same 
degree of care and supervision that a reasonably prudent parent would employ under the 
circumstances” (Jimerson & Furlong, 2006, p. 43).  This duty is based, in large measure, on 
the responsibilities educators accept when they agree to teach the children of others.  Their 
relationship with students is characterized by the concept of in loco parentis, a Latin phrase 
for “in the place of a parent,” which arose from English common law and, under modern 
interpretations, is used to establish the basis (and often the limits) of teacher authority over 
their students (Alexander & Alexander, 2005, p. 433).   
The duty to care arises from an educator’s responsibility to protect students from 
foreseeable risks of harm.  The duty extends in Maryland, for example, to breaking up 
fights among students “or other individuals,” and school district staff may use “the degree 
of force…as reasonably necessary to prevent violence, restore order and to protect the 
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safety of the combatants and surrounding individuals” ("Education article," 2006, p. 287).  
Under general tort, liability, and insurance issues, for example, educators are thought to 
be negligent when that duty is “breached by the failure to exercise the appropriate 
standard of care” and that failure is causally related to a student’s injury “in which there 
are provable damages” (Bounds, et al., 2006, p. 223).   
In the late 19th century, schools were seen as potential havens amid community 
tragedies and teachers were urged to protect children from the grim details of local crimes 
and catastrophes.  An education journal at the time strongly criticized teachers who 
“frightened school children and caused sleep disorder” by sharing information about the 
massive flood that killed more than 2,200 people in the valley town of Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania ("Disasters," 1889).  Sixty-two years later, the modern notion of shelter in 
place emerged as schools in American cities initiated programs to protect “the emotional 
and physical safety” of students against foreign invasion, and as teachers in Washington, 
D.C., for example, planned “lessons on what to do in cases of atomic attacks” ("Many 
school systems," 1951).   
School safety and security measures have increased dramatically in the ensuing 
half-century.  School principals now make decisions over “which security measures to 
implement, including hiring law enforcement officers, using metal detectors or security 
cameras, locking entrances and exits during the school day, and using staff supervision in 
hallways” (Bauer, Guerino, K.L., & Tang, 2008, p. 10).  They have been told to be 
experts in threat assessment and the potential physical and emotional harm (R. A. Fein, et 
al., 2002). They must be cognizant of the threat of biological attacks, car bombings, 
suicide attacks, and military-equipped intruders (Brickman, Jones, & Groom, 2004).  
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Their schools are no longer theoretical targets of terrorism.  In 2004, a school in Russia 
was stormed and taken over by terrorists (Chivers, 2004).   
Closer to home, yearly reports detail the extent of violence in schools (Planty, et 
al., 2008), crimes in schools (Noonan & Vavra, 2007), and violent deaths in school-
associated settings (Dinkes, Kemp, Baum, & Snyder, 2009).  In 2005, for example, 
approximately 80% of schools nationally experienced one violent incident.    
Post-Columbine Era 
The pivotal change in the concept of protecting students occurred after the 
shootings at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999.  The incident resulted in the 
deaths of 12 students and a teacher, the wounding of many others, and the suicides of the 
two student attackers.  Jane Hammond, then the superintendent of the Jefferson County 
school district that included the high school, reflected on the event 10 years later: 
The Columbine tragedy galvanized the country around safety with a new focus on 
prevention and intervention in addition to response. We learned the importance of 
developing a systemic safety plan thoughtfully with parent, staff and community 
input. When effectively implemented, the safety plan shifts focus from perfunctory 
responsibilities to processes where students and staff members know their roles and 
how they contribute to the safety of the school (Hammond, 2009, p. 16). 
 
The findings of a Colorado state review panel two years after the incident 
concluded that “it is fair to observe that neither law enforcement command personnel nor 
school administrators were well prepared to counter the violence that erupted” (The 
Report, 2001, p. 112).  The report noted that the incident sparked changes in school crisis 
management preparations elsewhere in the nation and urged schools and school districts 
in Colorado to make improvements in inter-agency planning and training at the local and 
districtwide levels in school crisis management, including school security, 
31 
 
communications, incident prevention, student counseling and intervention, and police 
response tactics.   
In Montgomery County, Maryland, for example, school security changes 
prompted by Columbine occurred within a few months of the incident, with an external 
review in the summer of 1999 and the initiation of planning with police on new assault 
strategies to protect and rescue students threatened by an intruder in schools.  The 
changes included the introduction of new Code Red and Code Blue security procedures 
that sought to impose highly restrictive measures to protect and shelter students and staff 
within schools.  Elsewhere in Maryland, school districts were encouraged almost 
immediately after Columbine to develop districtwide crisis management plans.4   
On April 23, 1999, three days after the attacks, the state superintendent of 
schools, Nancy Grasmick, sent local superintendents a memorandum conveying a draft 
guide on developing a crisis management plan for schools (Grasmick, 1999).  The crisis 
management components recommended by the state included the identification of “key 
members of any crisis management team,” assignment of “designated backups” for team 
members, designation of “a chain of command,” development of a “flip-book versions of 
their crisis plans” as a quick reference source, development of “an emergency kit” for 
readily accessible equipment, information, and supplies, and practicing “a Code Red alert 
                                                 
4 Other Maryland state actions to address underlying causes of the Columbine incident, such as 
bullying and harassment, were also initiated.  This included the Interagency Steering Committee for Safe 
Schools, which made recommendations in August 2000 that were designed “to ensure that every school in 
Maryland had a crisis management plan in place,” recalled Chuck Buckler of the Maryland State 
Department of Education (Personal communications, January 20, 2009).   
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to react to a crisis” (Developing, 1999, pp. 5-13).5   Those same procedures were 
identified as components of crisis management plans implemented in Montgomery 
County over the following three years 
Incident Command 
One of the central changes in school security that emerged from the Columbine 
incident was the concept of incident command systems for the inter-agency management 
of school crises.  This was the type of system adopted by the Jefferson County school 
district in Colorado, which supervised Columbine High School.  A review panel reporting 
to the Colorado governor later urged the inclusion of all schools and school districts 
statewide in inter-agency training with law enforcement and rescue personnel on incident 
command procedures for emergencies.  It specifically urged that “each school’s 
emergency plan must be clear about which school personnel will carry out which 
functions in the course of a crisis” (The Report, 2001, p. 114).  The command system was 
based on models more commonly used among fire and law enforcement. 
A typical incident command system reflects a highly structured management 
organization, resembling a military-style hierarchy, in which personnel work under a 
unified leadership arrangement with specific roles and responsibilities in response to an 
emergency.  There is an incident commander, a command team, and others who serve in 
support functions.  The concept arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s after studies of a 
series of disastrous fires in California identified problems in coordination and 
                                                 
5 In the draft guide were two exhibits from Montgomery County as “sample formats” of security 
measures, including a “bomb threat checklist card” and the regulation on “weapons on MCPS property” 
(Developing, 1999, p. 14).  There were no references to districtwide plans from any other district. 
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collaboration “when a multitude of agencies responded to the same incident” (Molino, 
2006, p. 5).   
In 2000, a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recommended the 
inclusion of law enforcement specialists to assist school districts in crisis planning 
nationwide.  The report also urged the training of school staff “in the fundamentals of the 
threat assessment,” as well as improved training and staffing devoted to adolescent 
development, violence, and related mental health issues (M. E. O'Toole, 2000, p. 32).6  
The recommendations urged school leaders to be diligent and proactive in responding to 
the inherent exposure of schools to violence. 
In the fall of 2001, the Montgomery County Public Schools adopted the incident 
command concept as the central basis of a new emergency response plan for schools and 
the district.  The new system, which the district implemented about eight months before 
the sniper incident in October 2002, was patterned after the models developed by the 
Federal  Emergency Management Administration (FEMA).  
Also in the months prior to the sniper incident of October 2002, the Maryland 
State Department of Education actively encouraged the development of plans by school 
districts and involved local school district staff in the preparation of model plans, 
including staff from Montgomery County.   By the following year, in October 2003, the 
department published a 173-page guide on emergency planning that included a suggested 
configuration of an incident command system (Emergency planning guidelines, 2003, p. 
11).  In the state’s guide, the configuration reflected the operations of an educational 
                                                 
6 Similar recommendations were made in May 2002 in a report by the U.S. Secret Service and 
Department of Education, which urged specific training for both police and school officials (Vossekuil, 
Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Moszeleski, 2002, p. 41).   
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organization and incorporated school-level representation on the districtwide command 
team (Figure 2.2).  The guide noted, for example: 
Lessons learned from September 11 in New York revealed that principals must be 
empowered to make decisions without consulting with central office. The arrival 
of first responders may result in the incident command being transitioned to a 
unified command. Unified command means that designated individuals from one 
or more response agencies will work jointly with the LSS or school commander to 
carry out the response (Emergency planning guidelines, 2003, p. 11). 
 
In December 2004, the Maryland State Board of Education adopted a regulation, 
titled Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 13A.02.02, Emergency Plans, which 
required school districts to maintain written emergency plans developed in collaboration 
with police and other safety organizations, engage in an annual series of drills, and 
provide annual assurances to the state superintendent of schools that certifies compliance 
with the regulation.  According to a department representative, the original 2003 
emergency planning document remained the agency’s main source of written guidance 
for schools and the COMAR reference remains the state’s existing legal requirement 
(Personal communications,” 2009).  In 2006, a legislative-appointed Task Force on 
School Safety recommended that school districts receive professional assistance from 
local emergency management agencies and law enforcement personnel in “crisis response 
team development,” “crisis management planning,” and “emergency operations 
planning,” among other areas ("Report from the task force," 2007, p. 2).  
Federal Guidance 
In May 2003, the U.S. Department of Education introduced an incident command 
system as a central component of crisis planning for schools and communities, noting the 
importance of emergency preparations because “school districts in this country may be 
touched either directly or indirectly by a crisis of some kind at any time” (Practical 
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information, 2003, p. 1.2).  The 146-page guide, which was marginally revised in 2007, 
provided the first national crisis planning resource for schools, with detailed information 
on the management of crises, their mitigation and prevention, preparedness of staff, 
procedures for responding, and steps for recovery.  The guide also provided sources of 
additional information at the federal, state, and local levels.7   
The incident command system recommended in the federal guide was based on 
the FEMA model.  It described emergency situations in which police and rescue 
personnel, such as first responders, take command of all response activities.  The incident 
commander was the individual who “manages the entire incident and will very often be 
                                                 
7 Montgomery County Public Schools was identified in the planning guide as a source of further 
information on emergency preparedness (Practical information, 2003, p. A.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Maryland Recommended Crisis Management Model 
Illustration from Emergency planning guidelines for local school systems and schools (2003). Maryland 
State Department of Education.  Retrieved March 9, 2009, at http://www.marylandpublicschools.org.    
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an emergency responder rather than a school administrator” (Practical information, 2003, 
p. 6.19).  For other incident command functions, the guide underscored less the 
leadership of school personnel and more the deference to, and outright replacement by, 
others:   
Although emergency responders may be managing the incident, there is still much 
for school staff to do, including managing the care of students and the supplies 
and staffing needs of the situation. While the [incident command system] calls for 
school staff to serve in all of the critical functions, be prepared for the incident 
commander to designate outside personnel to manage these responsibilities 
(Practical information, 2003, p. 6.19).  
 
The same emphasis on external agencies was reflected in the descriptions of the 
other functions of the incident command team (public information, safety, liaison, 
operations, planning and intelligence, and logistics).  None of the descriptions referenced 
broader responsibilities associated with school crisis management and decision making.   
A change in emphasis, however, was evident in the on-line training offered to 
schools.  For example, the “primary audience” of the introductory course included 
“kindergarten through high school personnel” and the course provided role playing 
exercises specific to school-based situations (Introduction to the incident command 
system, 2008). 
Funding Requirement 
In 2006, the department began requiring applicants for federal emergency 
preparedness grants to implement the components of the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) as a condition of funding.  This represented a fundamental shift in the 
federal role in school crisis management.  Earlier requirements under the Safe and Drug 
Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 and the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
obligated school districts receiving such funds to provide assurances that a crisis 
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management plan was in place.  Under NIMS, the components for school crisis 
management plans are much more prescriptive and the requirements extensive.  
The NIMS components were established in 2004 under the Department of 
Homeland Security as part of the federal government’s “uniform system for managing 
domestic incidents” (NIMS, 2006, p. 1).  The components include the requirement that 
each participating school and school district establish an incident command system and 
engage in training on the development and implementation of the system as a form of 
crisis management (Figure 2.3).  The required training is provided through online courses 
presented by FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute.     
Under the federal funding requirement, the incident command system was 
identified for use by all participating schools and higher education institutions receiving 
funding “for managing all emergency incidents and pre-planned school and campus 
events” (NIMS implementation, 2008). All federal departments and agencies are required 
to implement the NIMS components, as are any state and local government units and 
community and non-profit organizations that receive federal funding for emergency 
assistance planning and programs.  The Department of Homeland Security has 
encouraged the components as a standard for all schools, regardless of funding source.  
The goal is to create a nationwide network of similarly prepared agencies and 
organizations as part of an emergency response matrix that “unites all response teams 
across all of the participating jurisdictions” at any time and place an emergency may 
occur (NIMS implementation, 2008).   
There has been no study published on the effectiveness of the incident command 
system for schools. The Department of Education described the NIMS components as 
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“reflecting proven practices” of the participating federal agencies, including the 
Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and the U.S. Fire Administration, among 
others (NIMS, 2006).  However, the standardized use of an incident command system has 
drawn criticism.  Researchers who conducted a meta-study of literature about the federal 
use of the incident command system raised questions about whether the imposition of the 
model was appropriate on a national basis, given the diversity of community characteristics 
and emergency situations.  The analysis cited the federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 
New Orleans as well as the recovery operations after the terrorist attacks in New York City 
as examples in which one size does not fit all.  “The command and control mode does not 
currently, and given the social complexity, likely never will work for all phases of disaster 
operations,” the researchers concluded (Buck, Trainor, & Aquirre, 2006, p. 2001). 
  
 
Figure 2.3  Federal Incident Command Organization for Schools 
From Unit 4: Incident Commander and Command Staff Functions (2009).  In Introduction to the 
Incident Command System, I-100, for Schools.  Federal Emergency Management Administration.  




Mental Health Concerns    
Mental health professionals were not typically involved in the leadership 
decisions associated with crisis management.  The lack of involvement goes back to at 
least the early 1990s as school districts began planning more formalized crisis response 
and intervention activities in schools (Poland, 1994).  School staff involved in the mental 
health services, including school psychologists, school counselors, pupil personnel 
workers, and other professionals, participated in the responses to a crisis but not in 
positions that expressly included them in other aspects of school crisis management.   
The lack of such a defined leadership role for mental health professionals was 
evident in the recommended incident command team configurations offered by the U.S. 
Department of Education through March 2009.  A review of the department’s website 
conducted for this study revealed no provisions in the department’s documents for a 
formal leadership role for mental health professionals.  The review also included the 
NIMS components and training, plus earlier department documents on school crisis 
management.   
In the education department’s descriptions of crisis management functions, mental 
health services and professionals were identified as important components of a school 
crisis response, but not as part of the command functions.  This was made particularly 
clear in the distinction among training components under the required NIMS protocols, in 
which “critical personnel” with command responsibilities were to receive twice as much 
training (in terms of required courses) as “general personnel,” which covered various 
school-based and support staff, including such positions as “counselors, psychologists, 
and psychiatrists” (NIMS implementation, 2008, p. 21).  The instructor’s guide for the 
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introductory course on the incident command system contained one reference to “mental 
health,” which appeared in the description of the “potential responsibilities” for the crisis 
intervention team (Instructors guide, 2007, p. 5.19). 
There were no other references to well-being, traumatic stress, counseling and 
other terms and phrases typically associated with mental health problems and issues in 
response to emergency situations, based on an electronic word search.   
Providers of mental health services have a pervasive role in school crisis 
interventions and responses.  The 2006 School Health Policies and Programs Study, a 
questionnaire administered every six years to a nationally representative sample of school 
districts by the Centers for Disease Control, found that 94% of school districts had 
provided “counseling after a natural disaster or other emergency or crisis situation” in the 
previous year (Brener, Weist, Adelman, Taylor, & Vernon-Smiley, 2007, p. 495).  Post-
crisis counseling was identified as the second most prevalent provision of mental health 
services in schools, behind crisis intervention for personal problems.   
There is extensive literature on the provision of crisis intervention support in 
schools, including proposed structures that contribute to the management of crises.  For 
example, Knox and Roberts (2005) described a model of crisis intervention that builds 
from school-level crisis teams to district-level teams and other supports to regional level 
assistance involving community-based mental health providers, with all three levels of 
response involved in primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of crisis intervention.  
Jimerson, Brock, and Pletcher (2005) recommended an integrated model of school crisis 
preparation and crisis intervention as a way of improving the response and collaboration 
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of mental health providers during an emergency, especially events  involving many staff 
with different levels and types of expertise, training, and experiences.   
Nickerson, Brock, and Reeves (2006) proposed placing a mental health 
professional, such as a school psychologist, on an incident command team as a “mental 
health officer” (p. 66).  They recommended the position as a direct advisor to the incident 
commander, along with the typical alignment of other command staff, such as the 
positions for public information, safety, and liaison with external agencies. Other 
researchers have noted that, despite the lack of formal leadership positions, mental health 
providers occupy unique positions with influential, if not positional, authority during the 
onset of a crisis and response.  One article noted, for example, that “school counselors 
can expect to take on leadership roles in times of crises due to their expertise” and 
“effective school counselors have found subtle ways to support and counsel formal 
leaders” (A. H. Fein, Carlisle, & Isaacson, 2008).  In 2008, the National Association of 
School Principals released a training program on school crisis prevention and 
intervention that placed a mental health professional among the key members of a crisis 
management team (Reeves, Brock, & Cowan, 2008). 
Welfare of Children 
Schools by their very nature remain especially vulnerable to the parental and 
community anxiety that terrorism and community violence create about the safety of 
children (Greene, Barrios, Blair, & Kolbe, 2004; Lindle, 2008; Vossekuil, et al., 2002), as 
well as levels of traumatic fear (Wendell, 2002) and posttraumatic stress disorders (Brock 
& Cowan, 2004).  Schools, already well recognized as incubators for the common cold, 
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are also identified as seedbeds for pandemics of catastrophic proportions (McGiboney & 
Fretwell, 2007).   
In 2004, the National Advisory Committee on Children and Terrorism 
recommended more deliberate steps in the preparation of schools for large-scale 
traumatic emergencies.  The committee reported that “no region of the country is safe 
from the impact of terror,” citing the sniper shootings in October 2002 in Maryland, 
Virginia, and Washington, D.C., as an example of domestic terrorism (Greene, et al., 
2004, p. 39).  The report noted the central role of schools in the well being of entire 
communities, not only as a gathering place for children and a source of teaching and 
learning but also due the responsibilities assumed by school staff on behalf of parents, 
keeping their children safe and providing shelter, health care, and nutrition.  Schools were 
described as serving as a community resource for adults and families, including recovery 
services after a traumatic event.  The report urged special attention to schools in the 
national, regional, and local planning for emergencies, identifying schools as key delivery 
points for physical as well as mental health intervention and support. “No place else in 
the community has access to such a high percentage of children and adolescents, and, 
through them, adult family members,” the report said (Greene, et al., 2004, p. 41).   
The report referenced not just the physical impact of emergencies but also the 
threat to the mental well being of children who experienced a traumatic event.  Research 
on the effects of traumatic events on children and adults is extensive, but there is little in 
the way of literature on the traumatic effects of emergencies in school districts.  Studies 
regarding the effects of the terrorist attacks on September 2001 on students and school 
staff in New York City suggested that the crisis impacted the ability of some teachers and 
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parents to care for children and may have inhibited the delivery of services (Brown & 
Bobrow, 2004).  Serious mental health trauma may have impacted as many as one of 
every four students in the school district, especially girls (Hoven, et al., 2005).  
There were no published studies regarding the traumatic effects of the sniper 
incident in October 2002 on public school students and staff in the immediately affected 
areas of Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. However, there were studies that 
reported high levels of traumatic stress among students at four private schools 
(Westerman, Augustyn, & Westerman, 2003), among staff at a military hospital (Grieger, 
Fullerton, Ursano, & Reeves, 2003), and among women living within five miles of 
shooting sites (Scheldren, et al., 2006), as well as other behavioral changes among 
women living near the shooting sites (Zivotofsky & Koslowsky, 2005).  Another study 
reported higher stress among patients of area mental health providers (Cabello, 2003; 
Grados & Alvord, 2003; Peele, 2004).   
Lack of Preparation 
Studies point to a lack of preparation and readiness to address violence when it 
occurs among schools and colleges in the United States.  A non-government study seven 
years after Columbine and five years after the terrorist attacks in 2001 reported the lack 
of school readiness for a mass-casualty incident (Graham, Shirm, Liggin, Aitken, & Dick, 
2006).  Other studies subsequently described problems and inconsistent preparation for 
school safety and management among school districts in specific states and jurisdictions, 
including Los Angeles County, California (Kano, Ramirez, Ybarra, Frias, & Bourque, 




In April 2007, a Virginia state review panel faulted the campus administration and 
police force at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) for 
alleged crisis management mistakes in connection with an incident in which a student 
shot and killed 32 students and faculty and wounded 13 others before killing himself 
(Report of the review panel, 2007). The report criticized the university administration on 
several aspects of its crisis management efforts, including communications and mental 
health services.   
After the Virginia Tech incident, a federal report by three members of the 
President’s cabinet—the secretaries of Health and Human Services, Education, and 
Justice—said that “many” of the nation’s schools were prepared for security threats 
(Leavitt, Spellings, & Gonzales, 2007).  At the same time, a study by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported widespread lack of training, 
equipment, and readiness in crisis management among schools nationally (Ashby, 2007).  
Congressional reaction to the GAO report included criticism of federal emergency 
management efforts by the chairperson of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
on Homeland Security (Thompson, 2007).   
Context of Crisis Decision Making 
The literature on crisis management and decision making describes the process of 
making a decision under emergency conditions as best done with prior training—not only 
in the topic of the crisis decision but in the processes of making the decision.  
Researchers place a crisis decision at the extreme end-point of a decision-making 
continuum.  At the other end are simple, discretionary decisions.  From there, the 
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continuum escalates to high-stakes, rapid decisions because a “severe situation demands 
immediate action” (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976, p. 251).   
In between those two points are the processes of the human mind, which Herbert 
A. Simon argued are both “capable of dealing with only one or a few things at a time” 
and being able to address complex issues quickly by “recognizing familiar features of the 
problem situation” (1978a, pp. 503-504).   
Simon’s theories of problem solving and decision making are well documented in 
the literature on organizational administration, dating to his “seminal” publication in 
1945 of Administrative Behavior (as cited in Leithwood & Steinbach, 1995, p. 38).   In 
that work, Simon introduced the concept of “bounded rationality” to describe the 
practical limitations within which administrative decisions and policy are made (as cited 
in Dunn, 2004, p. 51).  Simon later expanded on the concept and suggested that people 
act within the bounds of their own personal knowledge and the limits of their surroundings.  
“In complex situations,” wrote Simon (1978b, p. 8) “there is likely to be a considerable gap 
between the real environment of a decision (the world as God or some other omniscient 
observer see it) and the environment as the actors perceive it” (p. 8).  The concept that 
human behavior reflects personal perception is fundamental in  the research of decisions 
arising amid complex and challenging circumstances, such as crisis situations involving 
international politics and the threat of war (Allison & Zalikow, 1999).   
The introduction of bounded rationality by Simon also accompanied his concept 
of the phases in rational decision making, including the use of intelligence, design, and 
choice to identify problems and issues that would guide the selection of actions (Nutt, 
1992, p. 520).  The rational decision maker concept underscores the classical views of 
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executive decision making, in which decisions are viewed as an “essentially orderly and 
rational” process with defined and isolated problems, gathered information, and presented 
alternatives, with an established implementation and ending point (Burns, 1978, p. 379).  
This characterization is linked to the “prevailing mythology” of organizational managers 
as rational people “who plan, organize, coordinate, and control activities of subordinates” 
(Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 265).   
Within the concept of rationality, however, Simon suggested that there are 
acceptable limits to information gathering and that, eventually, a person has to make a 
decision based on the best information in hand.  Simon called this “satisficing,” in 
reference to the acceptance of a satisfactory decision and the recognition that that such a 
decision will suffice for the given set of limits (as cited in Dunn, 2004, p. 51).   Another 
idea about incremental decision making, called “muddling through,” recognized that 
sometimes complex problems are resolved incrementally based on lessons learned from 
past decisions and “intimate knowledge” that only the decision maker may know, if not 
anyone else (Lindblom, 1959, p. 88).   
Not the Ideal 
What accounts for decision making, however, is far from perfect.  Weick (1995) 
cites research showing that decision making is “often inconsistent, unstable, and 
externally driven,” with the “past notoriously unreliable as a guide to the present or 
future” in which “political and symbolic considerations play a central, perhaps 
overriding, role in decision making” (p. 106).  This is sometimes also described in the 
literature with the metaphor of a garbage can.  Individuals trying to make sense of the 
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ambiguities between actual and expected events gather everything into a jumble and mix 
it together—the preverbal garbage in a can (March, 1988, p. 13).    
The garbage can model recognizes that rarely in real life are decisions reached in 
a truly rational and straightforward fashion.  Indeed, Hoy & Miskel (2008) suggest that 
the basic feature of the model, which they do not recommend as a process to emulate,  is 
just the opposite of orderly decision making and, instead, benefits institutions and 
individuals who need “ways of doing things for which there are no good reasons” even 
occasionally needing to “act before they think” (p. 343).  Or, as suggested elsewhere, the 
idea of unruly decision making “fits well with other theories that emphasize the 
disorderly nature of school administration” (Slater & Boyd, 1999, p. 327).   
In his analysis of decision making, Weick (2001a) described the garbage can 
model as the reaction of decision makers to the unwieldy “streams of people, choices, 
solutions, and problems that intermittently converge, more for reasons of timing, than 
logic” (p. 14). The concept also is called the “primordial soup” of decision making, in 
which problems and solutions are mixed together “in continuous flux” (Dunn, 2004, p. 
44).  The metaphor of “mud wrestling” is used by Mawhinney (1994) to describe a 
similar approach to untangling the mix of ambiguity and complexity in the dynamics of 
policy decision making (p. 2-3).  
Rational Decisions 
There are a variety of models of rational decision making.  For example, Hoy and 
Miskel (2005) describe four basic models: “classical,” which has a heavy reliance on 
theory to drive decision making; “administrative,” which relies on both theory and 
experience, with realistic assessments offsetting the “naïve” aspects of theory; 
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“incremental,” which uses successive comparisons of options and past actions to reduce 
or eliminate the need for theory altogether; and “mixed scanning,” which combines 
theory, experience, and successive comparisons (pp. 300-315).   
Ultimately, however, Hoy and Miskel (2005) suggest that a “contingency 
approach” in decision making—in which decision makers pick the right strategy for the 
situation and make decisions based on expectations of making the best of a situation 
(“adaptive satisficing” in reference to Simon’s earlier work)—is the most appropriate for 
complex tasks, including conflicts (p. 315-317).  In this approach, Hoy and Miskel (2008) 
suggest three basic questions for selecting the best decision making model (p. 342): 
 Is there sufficient information to define a satisfactory outcome? 
 Is there time to engage in a comprehensive search? 
 How important is the decision? 
Both “satisficing” and “muddling through” are important concepts in contrast to 
the ideal that perfect decisions can be made if people maximize their abilities, wait for the 
right moment, and act with indisputable precision.  This notion of “maximization” is 
based on concepts of comprehensive rationality, in which the decision maker is “assumed 
to have a utility function that consistently ranks all the alternatives the actor faces and to 
choose the alternative that achieves the highest utility” (Allison & Zalikow, 1999, p. 20).   
The reality is quite different.  Most crisis decisions aim for satisfactory rather than 
optimal results under challenging conditions that create ambiguity and uncertainty.  All 
decision makers are affected by the “inescapable limitations of knowledge and 
computational ability” regarding human conceptions of a given situation, problem, or 
issue (Allison & Zalikow, 1999, p. 20).  As Burns (1978) noted, even the day-to-day 
decision making of organizational executives does “not take place in a vacuum…but in 
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the context of political and psychological forces, rational and irrational, operating 
through it” (p. 379).  In fact, the concept of bounded rationality includes the possibility of 
seemingly irrational behavior.  Allison and Zelikow (1999) suggest that irrational 
decision making based on misperceptions may, in actuality, be entirely rational because 
the decisions are based on the “values, beliefs, and stereotypes of the decision maker, 
irrespective of the accuracy of his views” (p. 20). 
Sensemaking 
Studies of organizational decision making suggest the relationship between action 
and decision often defines the very culture of the organization.  For example, the book 
Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (1976) by James March and Johan Olsen (as cited 
in Allison and Zelikow, 1999) described the culture of the Pentagon as interwoven with an 
emphasis on heroic action and decision, with each action representing a decision and the 
decisions providing “powerful tokens of identity and rules for future action” (p. 154).  
Action and decisions, therefore, are part of the sensemaking in organizations and 
the reaction to inherent ambiguity.  Weick (1995) notes that “the basic idea of 
sensemaking is that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to 
create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs” (p. 106).  The sensemaking 
involving decision making occurs on two levels.  First, there is sensemaking as a result of 
making decisions and restoring order (Weick, 2001a).  Second, there is sensemaking 
within decision making, in which a decision maker relies on the recognition of familiar 
patterns to make a choice. This concept refers back to the work of Simon (1978), whose 
insights have been cited by Klein (2003) to explain “how people can make effective 
decisions without conducting a deliberate analysis” because they can recognize patterns 
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and cues, anticipate goals and expectations, and implement routines and actions based on 
their “sense of a situation” (pp. 22-23). 
Crisis decision making is highly subjective and deeply personal.  For example, the 
central decisions by American political leaders during the Cuban Missile Crisis emerged 
not necessarily from a planned, objective strategy but from a very subjective process of 
argument and reflection among a variety participants whose opinions were continually 
“influenced by and validated against the course of events” (Grattan, 2004, p. 65).   
Nonetheless, the subjectivity in decision making is not necessarily irrational.  On 
the contrary, subjectivity can be rational and built into the planned process of addressing 
strategic expectations.  This is essentially the concept of “subjectively expected utility,” a 
mathematics and economics model of rational decision making that assumes that 
“decisions should be reached by summing over the set of alternatives, the utility of each 
alternative weighted by the subjective probability of its occurrence” (Crozier & Ranyard, 
1997, p. 5).  The primary variation of this model, “Prospect Theory,” suggests that 
personal decisions are more than just subjective—they are “reference dependent” to the 
probable outcome of decisions in a given situation (Kahneman, 2003, p. 704).  This is 
what Weick (1995) argued in suggesting that “perceptions matter” among people as they 
react to their specific environment, events, and dispositions (p. 86). An individual’s own 
strategies for making choices are “highly contingent” upon situational factors, especially 
perceptions of time and problem complexity, according to the conclusions of Kerstholt 
and Raaijmakers (1997, p. 205) in their review of two decades of studies on decision 
processes.   
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Subjectivity in decision making is all about personal insights.  People bring their 
own beliefs, interpretations, and reactions to events and make decisions accordingly.  
High profile and tragic events can trigger fearful reactions, for example.  In one study, for 
example, researchers found that personal fear of terrorism and conservative views about 
safety increased among a sample of college students in Italy immediately after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, despite no such apparent 
threat in Italy itself (K. Sacco, et al., 2003, p. 1125). 
The highly negative news affects subjectivity more so than similar news that has 
occurred long ago.  This is called the “recency effect” that Hertwig, Barron, Weber and 
Erev (2004) identified in studies of risky choices.  They found that the recency of 
negative events, not the “objective probability” of the event ever occurring again, is an 
important factor in making personal decisions involving elements of risk (p. 535).    
Sometimes, it may be just a matter of how a crisis problem is presented before the 
decisions are even made.  For example, Kuhberger (1995) concluded in a study using a 
mock disease scenario that people will reverse their decisions based on different 
interpretations or framing of options and presentations of the same problem (p. 230).  In 
his later work, Kuhberger (1998) reviewed 15 years of research on problem and decision 
framing and found that people are influenced primarily by “semantic manipulations” in 
the way a problem situation is described, as well as contextual and individual factors that 
may influence their perspective (p. 453).  Beyond Ambiguity 
Crises create a range of contextual factors that reflect complexity of the incident, 
a mass of new information, loss of control, pressure on routine decision making, new 
responsibilities, and psychological challenges from stress and irrationality (Rosenthal, et 
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al., 2001, pp. 18-19).  The success of a decision maker in this situation is dependent on how 
they make sense of what is happening, often relying on their own “mental models” of 
previously successful challenges and training “not some bag of tools or techniques, that 
determine their ability to deal with the unknowable” (Stacey, 1992, p. 19).  
A crisis, therefore, requires that decisions are made about what people can handle, 
absorb, and understand within the circumstances of the events.  These are both sense 
making and communication actions.  Addressing these needs requires an understanding 
how people think, what they assume, and the generalizations they make about what they 
are seeing, hearing, and feeling (Senge, 1990, p. 18).   It also includes what Senge (1990) 
referred to as “learningful conversations” that balance listening and talking, acquiring 
feedback and providing responses, in situations where “people expose their own thinking 
effectively and make that thinking open to the influence of others” (p. 18).  Effective crisis 
decision making recognizes that this profoundly human side of crisis events involves 
“improvising and interacting with key stakeholders so that individual and collective sense 
making, shared meaning, and roles are reconstructed” (Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 66).  
Limited Time 
Crisis decision making is often characterized as extremely time sensitive.  Morris 
(1977) found the “chief effect of time pressures is to force one into making decisions 
with something less the amount of information which would otherwise be desired” (p. 
213).  When time pressure is extreme, the decision makers are thrust out of normal 
conditions and “must accede to situational dominance and instinctive or routinized 
responses” (Rosenthal, et al., 2001, p. 7).  Klein (1997) argues that time pressure forces 
people to make decisions based on whatever experience they have (p. 340) and that such 
53 
 
experiences can contribute to a level of expertise in specific problem-solving skills that 
people can learn and practice (p. 341).   
Based on a review of effort and accuracy studies, Maule and Edland (1997) 
suggest that the pressure of time can be mitigated by a constant “appraisal process,” 
especially in decisions affected by deadlines (pp. 201-202). Similarly, in her studies of 
fast-paced decision making in microcomputer companies, Eisenhardt (1990) found that 
people can be trained to adapt to speedy decision making by learning skills for 
“accelerating information processing, building up the confidence to decide, and yet 
maintaining the cohesiveness of the group” (p. 53).  This process was later refined as 
strategic decision making that emerges when participants “develop collective intuition, 
accelerate constructive conflict, maintain decision pacing, and avoid politics” 
(Eisenhardt, 1999, p. 65).   
Time-sensitive decision skills are valued in private industries where 
“extraordinary management” situations require decision makers to use innovative 
strategies that result from “an exploratory, experimental process based on intuition and 
reasoning by analogy” within the given context of a specific and challenging problem 
(Stacey, 1992, p. 14).  For example, in hospital clinics, doctors are attempting to use 
strategies of “evidenced-based medicine” to assist clinicians, educators, and 
administrators in analyzing what they actually see, not what they expect to see (Falzer, 
2004, p. 87).  
In complex situations involving high variability and ambiguity, it may be 
necessary to make a decision quickly, ready or not, and take action in order to stabilize 
the situation.  Weick (2001a, p. 50) argues that in these circumstances the inherent delay 
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in rational decision making can dissipate the energy necessary to carry out the eventual 
decision and can make a challenging situation worse.   
Taking action of some kind is the inherent goal of decision making, and 
understanding the pressure to act is important in the analysis of decision making.  Nutt 
(1992, p. 519) suggests that, during the formulation of a decision, the decision maker 
receives a flow of information, both from the formal means of a decision support system 
and from informal means such as colleagues, all directed at taking action. In making policy 
decisions, for example, the role of action is ever present, with the decisions seen as a choice 
of alternatives weighed through a hierarchal process of possible causes for action, plausible 
causes, and ultimately, actionable causes (Dunn, 2004, pp. 103-104). 
Inherent in this and other forms of rational decision making models is the ideal 
that deliberate choices are being made based on some type of weighing of options in a 
predictable manner.  Rational action is not only based on the “assumption that action 
constitutes more than a simple, purposive choice of a unitary agent” but also that decision 
makers will be influenced by the need for “consistency” in terms of goals, objectives, 
action, and principles (Allison & Zalikow, 1999, p. 17).   
However, it is the prevalence of such models and other forms of “conventional 
definitions of decision making” that unnecessarily narrow the options of school 
administrators (Leithwood & Steinbach, 1995, p. 39).  Instead, decision making should 
be seen multi-dimensionally.  Bolman and Deal (1997), for example, categorize decision 
making through contextual frames that recognize multiple realities in an organization—
structural, human resource, political, and symbolic—and influence a decision maker’s 
orientation towards rationality, inclusiveness, power, and rituals (pp. 266-267).   
55 
 
Research has analyzed the intellectual and physical processes at play and the 
actions taken in response, particularly among organizational leaders.  Rosenthal, Boin, 
and Comfort (2001), in their early work about crisis management, noted that crises offer 
both challenges and opportunities for leaders precisely because they must use all of their 
skills in “a period of upheaval and collective stress” that disrupts the known reality in 
“unexpected, often inconceivable ways” (p. 6). 8   
Problem Solving 
Literature about decisions that occur in solving large-scale policy problems can 
inform the study of the decision making, including crisis decision making.  For example, 
a policy decision reflects not one act but “a series of interdependent activities arrayed 
through time” to address an issue or a problem, and these activities begin with a process 
for agenda setting, policy formation, and policy adoption (Dunn, 2004, p. 44).  The 
political aspect of policy decisions is helpful in understanding how decision makers are 
subjected to political and theoretical perspectives that influence what happens and to 
whom at each stage of the policy process, particularly at the problem definition stage 
(Kingdon, 1995, p. 110). For some researchers, the problem definition stage, along with 
how the decision agenda is set and the policy itself is formulated, are seen as the most 
important elements of the policy process (Cooper, Fusarelli, & Randall, 2004, p. 64).  
Policy decisions rely heavily on procedural processes that are consistent with 
rational decision making and reflect a positivistic view that policy making should follow 
                                                 
8 Note: The work of school superintendents is described as already stressful.  In a 2006 survey on 
the status of school superintendents, 44% of respondents reported experiencing “considerable stress” and 
15% reported  “very great stress” in their jobs (Glass & Franceschini, 2007, p. 48).  Inexperience also was a 
factor, with nearly a third reported as being a superintendent for four years or less. 
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a deliberate and predictable operational pathway, notwithstanding any political bumps 
along the way.  The rationality of the process is defined, in part, by the expectation that 
certain procedural elements will occur.  In fact, Dye (2002) uses the “process model” as a 
helpful tool in describing the various activities involved in policy making (pp. 15-16).   
Context also matters.  The research in policy making helps illustrate this point, 
especially since crisis decision making in an organization, such as a school district, is 
tantamount to fast-speed policy making.  For example, in the work by McDonnell & 
Elmore (1991, p. 173), highly complex and contentious decisions in policy making were 
found to be framed not just by “how a policy problem is defined” (the political context) 
but also the “resources and constraints policy makers face” (the institutional context, plus 
governmental capacity, fiscal resources, political support or opposition, information, and 
past policy choices).  
But policy making, like decision making, may ultimately be judged as successful 
not in how decisions are made but in how they are put into practice.  For example, 
McLaughlin (1991) suggests that the success of a policy rests in the implementation stage 
where “the consequences of even the best planned, best supported, and most promising 
policy initiatives depend finally on what happens as individuals throughout the policy 
system interpret and act on their own” (p. 186).  Here, decision making results from the 
interplay of people making their own choices, multiplied by number of people and 
interpretations involved.  In describing the complexity of “street level” implementation, 
for example, Lipsky (1980) noted that what appeared to be “simple and straightforward is 
really complex and convoluted” in terms of the “number of separate decisions that are 
part of what we think of as a single one” (p. 93).   
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Opportunities   
Researchers see crises as often giving leaders a rare and potentially valuable 
“opportunity to innovate” (Mintzberg, et al., 1976, p. 251).  There are two concepts that 
are important here—leadership to make sense and restore order and leadership to move 
an agenda.  In the latter instance, crises can trigger changes in employee attitudes, 
managerial strategies, and business structures and foster conditions that “stimulate the 
entrepreneur to think and plan strategically” (McCarthy, 2003, p. 329). A case study of a 
business crisis related to a damaged product found that company managers created a 
“novel” alternative that would otherwise not have been identified under normal conditions 
(Papadakis, Kaloghirou, & Iatrelli, 1999, p. 34).   
Leaders may use a crisis as a “focusing event” to bring attention to a policy 
problem or act as a “powerful symbol” for a problem’s resolution (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 
94-95).  For example, a crisis in the form of “frontal assaults” on an organizational 
bureaucracy are sometimes purposefully instigated as a tactical strategy designed by 
reformers and change agents to encourage an “awakening” among recalcitrant employees 
to the need for important but difficult systemic changes (Brock, et al., 2002).  A study of 
how nine companies handled particular crises suggested that the critical events 
themselves became a “defining moment” in which leaders ushered in successful 
strategies (McCarthy, 2003, p. 334). Just the specter of a crisis can be the impetus for 
change.  The images of children as potential victims dying horribly from a nuclear war, 
for example, were significant in constraining political leaders and resolving the Cuban 
missile crisis (Burns, 1978, p. 413).  
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A leader’s ability to handle the opportunities of a conflict reflects a fundamental 
skill in fostering the “social trust” necessary to lead others in less critical times (Smylie & 
Hart, 1999, p. 432).   Such trust is one form of the “currency of leadership” that leaders 
expend in their efforts to command individuals (Ogawa & Bossert, 1995, p. 39).   For 
example, being able to depend on employees to provide information and intelligence is a 
critical element of successful leadership, because leaders are subjected to daily situations 
that are “marked by great uncertainty, confusion, and distortion” (J. T. Murphy, 2000, p. 
118)—not unlike the conditions of a crisis. 
‘Critical Tasks’ 
Crises that affect the public realm have the added dimension of government 
decision making—for example, responding to a bridge collapse, an apartment building 
fire, a hostage situation, or a terrorist incident.  Government, by definition, is a group, not 
an individual.  The literature on group dynamics suggests a special kind of leadership is 
necessary for effective decision making, one that focuses on helping individuals “develop 
a shared sense of direction and commitment” through communication and team work and 
not by trying “to dominate and get their own ideas accepted”(Bolman & Deal, 1997, pp. 
157-158).  It is this aspect of group leadership that is emphasized in the political aspect of 
crisis leadership: being available, communicative, and trustworthy, and developing 
support through connections and associations (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007, pp. 50-53).    
Other research suggests this does not go far enough in the modern era of 
emergencies that threaten neighborhoods, communities, towns, cities, states, and nations.  
In these situations, “public leaders have a special responsibility to help safeguard society 
from the adverse consequences of crises…and [they] have to concern themselves with all 
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crisis phases:  the incubation stage, the onset, and the aftermath” (Boin, et al., 2005, p. 
10).  In other words, they have to manage the crisis, not talk about it.   
Boin, et al. (2005), in their work about government decision making during a 
crisis, embrace the political aspects of public leadership, but they see it as secondary and 
more of a tool rather than a means to end.  Instead, they identified five “critical tasks” of 
political leaders during a crisis that underscore a personally involved approach (Table 
2.2).  They caution, however, that this does not necessarily mean deep involvement in the 
technical and operational arenas, although that might occur to some degree.  Instead, their 
suggested leadership tasks focus on “the overall direction of crisis responses and the 
political process surrounding these responses” (Boin, et al., 2005, p. 10).  
In terms of school organizations, the five “critical tasks” by Boin, et al., offer an 
additional way of examining the literature on crisis management and decision making 
and, as with Hoy and Miskel’s “Social System Model of Schools (2008), applying such 
research in the context of schools.  The leadership component is important, regardless of 
the context of the crisis response.  Research suggests that, in the rush of critical events, 
leaders have to learn not to be “paralyzed by confused complexity” caused by the 
changes unfolding quickly around them and rely, instead, on their training and experience 
to guide them (Weick, 2001a, p. 30).  Crises accelerate the dynamics of decision making, 
applying great pressures on leaders in situations that can have significant implications.  
Leaders must be able to take command and make decisions quickly in an authoritative 
manner when confronted with genuine emergencies and crises, mustering the emotional 
strength necessary to control their environment and the actions of others (Goleman, 
Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002, p. 78).  
60 
 
The leadership skills necessary in a crisis are described succinctly in an 
instructional manual produced by FEMA: 
The ability to make sound, timely decisions during a crisis is critical, and poor 
crisis decision making—or the absence of decisions—potentially can result in 
injury or death to responders and/or victims.  There is a need, therefore, to 
provide training to those in decision-making capacities that will assist them in 
solving problems and making decisions during a crisis ("Crisis decision making," 
1999, pp. I-4). 
 
In terms of school crisis management and decision making, the five “critical 
tasks” by Boin, et al. (2005) also presented another lens through which to analyze the 
events of the case in this study.  The case involved the decision making experiences of 
school district leaders in their management of a crisis involving their school district—the 
social system, as described by Hoy and Miskel (2008).  The “critical tasks” by Boin, et al. 
Table 2.2  Component Definitions for “Critical Tasks”  
 Making sense of the 
crisis 
Recognize the reality behind the immediate crisis 
turbulence and determine what is happening and why.  
 Making crisis 
decisions and taking 
action  
Provide leadership not only through executive functions 
but also by using authority to facilitate coordinated 
implementation. 
 Meaning making for 
others 
Resolve ambiguity and reduce uncertainty by helping 
others understand the crisis issues and the plan for 
addressing them.   
 Terminating the 
crisis 
Work toward not just the end point and a return to 
normalcy, but also the accountability for whatever 
started the crisis. 
 Learning from the 
crisis 
Draw lessons from the crisis and the organizational 
response, as an opportunity to make necessary 
improvements. 
Adapted from “critical tasks” by Boin, A., 'T Hart, P., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2005). The 





(2005) provided a way to identify and categorize the district leaders decision making 
experiences (adapted as “critical leadership tasks”) and apply them as the “input” 
component of an emerging conceptual framework (Figure 2.4).  As discussed later in this 
chapter, there are other parts of the emerging framework. 
Context of Expertise and Reliability 
Substantial literature exists on the development and implementation of crisis 
management plans, including the steps involved in prevention, intervention, recovery, 
communications, safety and security, and reputation protection.  In an oft-sited model by 
Pearson and Clair (1998, p. 66), the process of crisis management is divided into two 
segments—what happens before a triggering event adn what happens after.   
The post-event phases include the work of a “reaction apparatus” that mobilizes in 
a crisis and takes charge, consisting of individuals who are flexible in their 
responsibilities, knowledgeable about the areas affected by the crisis, empowered to 
make decisions, and available on short notice (Andersen, 2003, p. 130).  This apparatus is 
known as incident command.  The incident command system, as referenced earlier in this 
chapter, is a management model designed to achieve uniform modes of authority and 
responsibilities across government agencies, based on the work of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Fire Academy (Cole, 2000, p. 203). 
Training in crisis management includes seminars, table-top exercises, and mock 
events to increase familiarity and experience in management tasks, including tactical 
decision games used by the military (Crichton, Flin, & Rattray, 2000, pp. 209-210).  
FEMA, for example, emphasizes the use of a basic problem solving model (size up the 
situation, identify contingencies, determine objectives, identify needed resources, build a  
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Figure 2.4  Addition of “Input” Elements in Conceptual Framework 
Adapted from “social system model” by Hoy & Miskel (2005), p. 411; and “critical tasks” by Boin, et 
al. (2005), pp. 10-15.  
plan, and take action and evaluate results) in teaching students the essence of managing a 
crisis ("Crisis decision making," 1999).   
Technology simulations of a crisis provide safe environments in which 
individuals and teams can experiment with procedures, protocols, and strategies, while 
testing themselves and their experiences (Boin, Kofman-Bos, & Overdijk, 2004, p. 390).  
The simulation methodology now “widely used in various crisis management contexts” 




Reliance on Intuition 
The influence of experience-based intuition also is seen as critical in crisis 
decision making.  Organizational research suggests that decision makers employ different 
methods for processing strategic issues based on their own personal perceptions of 
immediacy, importance, and available contingencies (Dutton, 1986, p. 511).  A crisis 
accelerates the decision making processes.  Leaders then rely on their training and 
experiences to help guide them quickly, especially when doubt and emotions are in play.  
This is a reflection of intuition—the “essential leadership ability to apply not just 
technical expertise but also life wisdom” (Goleman, et al., 2002, p. 42).   
In the psychology of decision making, people are affected by their present and 
past experiences, along with inductive inferences.  They figure out “what regularly goes 
wrong, what tends to go wrong, and what hypothetically can go wrong” in a given 
situation and then they intellectually decipher the steps necessary to “prevent a negative 
sequence from unfolding” (Teigen & Brun, 1997, p. 119).  The intellectual process is fast 
and unseen, as individuals respond to contextual clues and act on their “gut feelings” that 
evolve into an emotional acceptance of a solution to a problem because it “felt right” 
(Goleman, et al., 2002, p. 43).   
Klein (2003) likens this mental processing, in part, to the “hunch” that develops 
as people seek to comprehend unfolding events (p. 21).  Other descriptions include 
“improvisation” by Weick (1998, p. 544), “smart guess” by Goleman et al. (2002, p. 42), 
and “snap decisions” by Gladwell (2004, p. 48) who also noted that the abilities of 
individuals to make fast judgments often rely on their perceptions and the “thinnest slice 
of experience” (p. 52).  Specific training and exercises provide instruction on how to rely 
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on “intuitive decision making, based on pattern matching and recognition of familiar and 
typical cases” (Crichton, et al., 2000, p. 209).   
In contrast, normative models of decision making are described as inherently 
different.  The distinction is based on different mental processes, with reasoning 
described as a “slower, serial, effortful, more likely to be closely monitored and 
deliberately controlled,” and intuition described as “fast, automatic, effortless, 
associative, implicit, often emotionally charged” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 698).   
The latter is not without its critics.  A review of the book, “How Doctors Think” 
by Jerome E. Groopman (2007, Houghton Mifflin), noted the author’s argument against 
relying too heavily on intuitive judgment instead of “the old fashioned virtues of 
deliberation, caution and systematic thinking” (Adler, 2007). 
Not trusting one’s intuitive understanding and instincts about a crisis situation can 
be dangerous.  For example, in a study about fighting fires, Weick (1996b) examined the 
repercussions of a wildfire in Montana in 1949 where 13 firefighters died because they 
balked at the initial interpretation of the conditions they were experiencing and the 
options available to them to escape.  Weick (1996) concluded that, in the face of such 
swift and surprising circumstances, leaders need to restructure their “intuitive 
understandings of phenomenon on the spot” and remain creative enough under pressure 
“to bring order out of chaos” (p. 5).  In a subsequent review that used the Montana event 
to underscore how unforeseen problems are ignored in educational administration, Weick 
(1996a) urged school leaders to prepare themselves in the way that firefighters need to 
learn to be alert to the changing contexts of situations in avoiding failure, injury, and 




Crisis management research describes very intense and ambiguous situations for a 
decision maker.  A crisis heightens nearly everything exponentially, compounding the 
decision elements and escalating problematic conditions as the crisis unfolds and new 
challenges arise (Rosenthal et al., 2001).  At the moment of truth, when they act, decision 
makers in such an event ultimately rely on their past experiences, training, expertise, and 
intuition to guide them (Klein, 2003).  Research suggests that decision making under 
such conditions resemble the experiences of leaders in fast-paced computer industries 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), military commanders in war situations (Klein, 1997), and firefighters 
confronting complex blazes (Weick, 2001b). 
Crises are seen as a “process” in which “the very identity of a crisis changes over 
time” (Rosenthal, 2003, p. 132). This includes the “crisis after the crisis” that creates a 
stream of subsequent challenges that are “no less formidable than the challenges of the 
acute crisis stage” ('T Hart & Boin, 2001, p. 28).  In other words, “crises are dynamic and 
multi-faceted, requiring cycles of decision making” (Flin, 2001, p. 110).  Often, crises are 
not confined to single events, but can be flashpoints to long, simmering problems 
(Netzley, 2001).  In studies of corporate crises, researchers have found that the first 48 
hours of the crisis are most important, followed by the next one to eight days (Lewis, 
2004, p. 65).  
‘Normal Accidents’ 
Having contingencies to deal with the effects of any number of potential, even 
remotely possible, crisis events gave rise to a theory of “normal accidents,” in which 
accidents are expected so that “people get their bearings” quickly when the real thing 
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happens unexpectedly (Weick, 2004, p. 27).  Researchers recognize different levels of 
crises in a workplace, beginning with those that might cause bereavement and grief, then 
trauma, then a disaster, and finally a catastrophe (Lewis, 2004, p. 64).  Crises are seen as 
different from the concept of a catastrophe, in terms of measuring the scope of the event 
and its “origin, consequences, underlying course, and level of risk” (Lalonde, 2004, p. 
76).  For example, a fire in a basement of a house is a crisis requiring immediate action to 
save the structure.  A house that is burned completely to the ground may also create a 
crisis of homelessness, but the destroyed house itself is beyond crisis; it is a catastrophe.    
In the corporate world, normal accidents are also seen as “risk management,” 
knowing that crises are inevitable in product development and distribution and efforts 
should reduce the potential of future losses as a result of such crises (Day, McKay, 
Ishman, & Chung, 2004, p. 832). Being able to create advance solutions and responses to 
unforeseen events requires significant expertise and “knowledge of events that have 
already taken place, a lot of imagination, and the ability to describe and present the 
conceivable scenarios” (Andersen, 2003, p. 129).   
‘High Reliability’ 
In 1999, in the article “Organizing for High Reliability: Processes of Collective 
Mindfulness” (republished in 2008), an argument was made that a highly reliable 
organization is one in which routinized and complex activities are closely attended by 
“continuous mindful awareness” of the potential for mistakes, not necessarily to prevent 
them but to recognize and resolve them when they invariably happen (Weick, Sutcliffe, 
& Obstfeld, 2008, p. 36).  The authors defined the concept of “mindfulness” as dependant 
more on “the quality of attention” than constantly being at attention, suggesting value of 
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being attentive was linked more with “what people do with what they notice as it is about 
the activity of noticing itself” (Weick, et al., 2008, p. 37). 
Reliability, they noted, was not based on an engineering model of repeatability.  
Instead, it was based on the concept that reliability increases when highly skilled 
personnel pay attention to the likelihood of variance-induced problems and errors 
inherent in human performance, and they strive to prevent an organizational culture in 
which “unexpected events are normalized” through mindless and inattentive routines 
(Weick, et al., 2008, p. 36).  The core concept was that highly reliable organizations share 
common features, which can be emulated.  In a subsequent book, the common features 
were grouped as the five “principals of high reliability” (Table 2.3).  Initially, they were 
identified as five “processes of mindful organizing,” as outlined in the original article 
published in 1999 (Weick, et al., 2008, pp. 38-39).  Two years later, in 2001, the 
processes were reintroduced in a book, “Managing the Unexpected,” and described as the 
five “hallmarks of reliability” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Six years later, in the book’s 
second edition, the processes were rephrased again, this time not as objectives to obtain but 
as normative values to embrace.  In that version, they became the principals “underlying the 
performance of highly reliable organizations” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 9). 
The five principles provide another lens through which to examine the literature 
on crisis management and decision making and, as with Hoy and Miskel’s “Social 
System of Schools” (2008) and the “critical tasks” identified by Boin, et al. (2005), apply 
the analysis in the context of schools.  In fact, Hoy and Miskel opened the door to such 
analysis in the latest edition of their text on educational administration, in which they 
note that “just as individuals can be mindful or mindless, so too can schools—for 
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example, the mindless adherence to rules is just one example of a collective mindlessness 
that imbues school life” (2008, p. 111).   
For this study, the five principles were viewed as a way of conceptualizing 
another facet of the social system of school organization.  Hoy and Miskel (2008) viewed 
the “mindfulness” aspect of reliability as an “enabling” structural component, in which 
the entire school organization fosters a reciprocal “learning” environment as a core goal 
(p. 112).  With this concept in mind, the five “principals of high reliability” were added 
as the third component of the conceptual framework for this study and arranged as a 
structural envelope surrounding the central component of the social system model (Figure 
2.5).  Inherent in this framework is an understanding that the five reliability principles are 
not isolated from the other components.  Instead, they reflect an integrated component, 
another system of interactions, with implications for each of the others. 
  
Table 2.3  Component Definitions for “High Reliability” Principles  
 Preoccupation 
with Failure 
Acknowledge errors, anticipate mistakes, and be wary of 
success-driven complacency. 
 Reluctance to 
Simplify  
Generate comprehensive, holistic fact-gathering, including 
divergent views, and nuanced interpretations.   
 Sensitivity with 
Operations 
Focus resources on front-line personal and situational 
awareness, at the expense of broad strategic actions 
 Commitment to 
Resilience 
Maintain a deep pool of highly-trained and knowledgeable 
personnel with authority to improvise.   
 Deference to 
Expertise 
Delegate problem solving and decision making to the experts 
closest to the problem. 
Adapted from principles “underlying performance of highly reliable organizations” in Weick, K. E., 




Figure 2.5  Addition of “High Reliability” Elements in Conceptual Framework 
Adapted from “social system model” in Hoy & Miskel (2005), p. 411; “critical tasks” in Boin, et al. 
(2005), pp. 10-15; and “high reliability” principles in Weick & Sutcliffe (2007), pp. 9-17.    
Conceptual Framework for Analysis 
            The final major element of the conceptual framework for the analysis was the 
identification of “crisis management targets” for the decisions and actions taken during 
the crisis (Table 2.4).  The identification of the targets relied substantially on a 
preliminary review of the case, pending a deeper understanding of events as the analysis 
continued.  This final element comprised the “outputs” portion of the “social system 
model of schools” (Hoy & Miskel, 2008, p. 459).  In this instance, however, the concept 
of outputs, as measurable units, was beyond the scope of the study, as was the related 
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component of measuring the differences expected and actual performance.  Instead, and 
in keeping with the relationship of inputs-to-outputs, the component was reconceived as 
“crisis management targets” (Figure 2.6). 
This, then, became the conceptual framework to guide the analysis of the study, 
not as a model of crisis management but as a framework for understanding its 
components.  A model of crisis management was beyond the scope of this study.  The 
Table 2.4  Component Definitions for “Crisis Management Targets”  
 Students and 
staff are safe 
Uphold duty to care and ensure against unreasonable risks of 
physical and mental harm for everyone in schools and offices. 
 Schools open for 
teaching and learning  
Protect key mission of school district, along with community 
support functions of schools for children and families. 
 Students attend school 
and staff report to work 
Use low attendance data as an indication of potential problems 
and strive for normal attendance by both students and staff.  
 Mental health 
support provided 
Enlist expert guidance from mental health professionals, with 
the aim of addressing the immediate and long-term effects. 
 Staff implements 
district decisions 
Ensure that measures taken to address the crisis are not 
impeded by blockers and other bureaucratic barriers. 
Parents and public 
support district decisions 
Enlist active or passive agreement steps taken to alleviate or 
remedy effects of the crisis on schools and communities. 
 Agencies support 
district decisions 
Secure endorsements and collaboration with elected and 
appointed leaders of government emergency efforts. 
 District operations 
continue 
Maintain normal functions of core business and instructional 
services, unaffected by the crisis (such as payroll).  




 conceptual framework suggests that to “critical leadership tasks” are affected by the 
transformational process within the social systems of the school district and, in turn, the 
ideal of success in achieving crisis management targets are affected by the elements 




Figure 2.6  Addition of “Targets” to form Conceptual Framework for Analysis 
Adapted from “social system model” in Hoy & Miskel (2005), p. 411; “critical tasks” in Boin, et al. 








Chapter 3:  Methodology of the Portrait  
 
Overview 
The portrait addressed the issue:  What can be learned from the crisis decision 
making experiences of school district leaders?  The question provided entry into an 
important area of inquiry.  The literature on crisis decision making, within the larger 
scope of crisis management, hinted at possible insights, but a review of the research 
revealed the topic as largely removed from field of educational leadership. The focus was 
elsewhere, primarily on corporate, industrial, governmental, and related organizations, for 
which crises were often associated with large-scale events.  Little was known about crisis 
decision making by school and school district leaders.  This chapter provides an overview 
of the methodology and research design, including the collection and analysis of data, 
verification tasks for quality, and the creation of a compelling narrative, based on the 
emergent themes of the research. 
Conceptual Framework 
 A conceptual framework for the analysis of the case was developed based on a 
review of literature encompassing the context of critical leadership tasks, social systems 
of schools, and expectations of high reliability in the implementation of crisis 
management activities (Figure 2.6).  Within the framework were theoretical components 
arrayed in a model of possible relationships in the achievement of identified conceptual 
targets (such as students and staff are safe). Outside of the model, these components 
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provide the basis for identifying the actions of the school district’s leadership in terms of 
a category for each component (Table 3.1).   
The elements of the framework also provided a way to analyze their relationship 
to one another and to explore each of the areas on their own, in terms of clues and themes 
that might emerge through careful analysis.  At the outset, the model of the framework 
and the individual component categories merely set the stage for the inquiry.  They were 
the “tools used to generate questions and to search for patterns,” as noted by Marshall and 
Rossman (1999, p. 53), and served as the basis for an open-ended inquiry.    
Research Method 
The methodology of portraiture was used to describe and explore the complex 
circumstances and emergent themes of the case, based on a conceptual framework that 
integrated research about schools as social systems, leaders engaged in critical tasks of 
managing crisis events, and values of organizations that emphasize mindfulness in 
pursuing high reliability among their workforce.  Research methods consistent with case 
study and the analysis of critical decisions were used to collect data from multiple 
sources and construct the narrative portrait. 
The author, as researcher, was also a participant in the case, a special form of 
inquiry that provided certain benefits from an insider’s perspective and certain limitations 
associated with that same insider’s limited view.  The study reflected my interest in 
developing a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of executive leadership of 
school districts and the application of expertise and training at decisive moments. 
The study explored a specific case, with identified participants:  the crisis decision 
making experiences of a set of public school district leaders in Montgomery County, 
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Maryland, during the 23 days of the sniper incident in October 2002.  The participants 
included leadership staff and other associated personnel who were publicly identified.  
Their identification was consistent with the research requirements of the Institutional 
Review Board of the University of Maryland, College Park, and the Montgomery County 
Public Schools, as described later in this chapter.   
Table 3.1  Analytical Categories from Conceptual Framework 
Critical leadership tasks Making sense of the crisis 
 Making crisis decisions and taking action 
 Meaning making for others 
 Terminating the crisis 
 Learning from the crisis 
Principals of high reliability Deference to expertise 
 Sensitivity to operations 
 Preoccupation with failure 
 Reluctance to Simplify 
 Commitment to Resilience 
Transformation process Structural system 
 Political system 
 Individual system 
 Cultural system 
 Crisis environment 
 Feedback 
Crisis management targets Students and staff are safe 
 Schools open for teaching and learning 
 Students attend school and staff report to work 
 Mental health support provided 
 Staff implements district decisions 
 Agencies support district decisions 
 District operations continue 
Adapted from “critical tasks” by Boin, et al. (2005); “social system of schools” by Hoy and 




The case provided an opportunity to build on existing knowledge about decision 
making in a crisis and inform the practice of crisis decision making by school leaders.  
More specifically, the portrait addressed research questions, which guided the 
development of the conceptual framework, the analytical methodology, and processes 
used to identify, understand, and describe the findings of this specific case:   
 What can be learned from the decision making experiences of the leaders 
of the Montgomery County Public Schools in protecting students from the 
sniper in October 2002?     
 
 What were the characteristics of the decisions? 
 Who were the main participants? 
 What are the background characteristics of this case? 
 What commonly held views, themes, and metaphors emerge?    
 What was unique about this case? 
 What retrospective insights can be learned? 
 What strategies and processes of decision making can be described? 
 What does the analysis of the portrait reveal? 
 How can this portrait be situated in the literature about crisis decision 
making and school district leadership? 
 
Portraiture  
The methodology employed for this research was based on portraiture as a form 
of case study.   Portraiture provided a means of engaging in a form of emergent, open-
ended inquiry, consistent with the phenomenological processes described by Lawrence-
Lightfoot and Davis (1997), in which the data was gathered and interpreted from a variety of 
sources in order to explore lived experiences.  The roots of the methodology, they said, are 
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grounded in “the traditions and values of the phenomenological paradigm, sharing many 
of the techniques, standards, and goals of ethnography” (p. 13).   
I embraced this concept in both research and analysis, creating a portrait of the 
case as a narrative outcome of portraiture, but not merely to tell a story.  I endeavored to 
create “a reality,” as suggested by Bloom (2003, p. 875), in which the reader was invited into 
the subject through reflections on the past, the interpretations of the present, and insights 
about the future.  This was accomplished consistent with the type of exploratory and 
descriptive research studies described by Marshall and Rossman (1999) that “build rich 
descriptions of complex circumstances” (p. 33).  The approach also was consistent with 
the design of studies of crisis events, which Rosenthal (2001, p. 21) describes as 
emphasizing an open-ended and flexible analysis of complex, unpredictable events that 
unfold and change.  The focus on the experiences of participants also responds to 
important suggestions in crisis research. Pearson and Clair (1998, p. 62) note that 
research of crisis events often lacks the perspective of people who experienced the crisis.  
Rosenthal et al. (2001) suggest that such studies should explore the personal experiences 
of shock, upheaval, and stress of “very concrete and frightening events” in a crisis (p. 
22).  Heck and Hallinger (1999) suggest that narrative forms of research can be useful in 
describing the “decision-making or problem-solving practices of school leaders” (p. 155).   
Qualitative Research 
Careful attention was taken to maintain the alignment of the methodology with 
the qualitative research procedures that explore events, situations, and actions of people, 
as described by Maxwell (1996, pp. 17-21).  This included detailing the context in which 
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participants in the case acted and understood their actions, the processes by which those 
actions occurred, and the identification of any unanticipated phenomena and relationships.   
I approached the study knowing that, as a form of qualitative research that deeply 
involves the researcher in the telling of events, portraiture required a personal “level of 
understanding and empathy,” as described by Hackmann (2002), which would be 
exceedingly difficult to achieve if one were writing as “a dispassionate, detached 
observer” (p. 53).  As such, I also understood what Hackmann (2002) argued were 
portraiture’s similarities to social anthropology and, not entirely favorably, his 
characterization of portraiture as “descriptive case study” or “impressionistic tales” 
because it often reflected the influence of the researcher’s experiences in the field (p. 52).   
The perspective of case study was appropriate for use in this study, given that the 
events being portrayed took place well in the past, required retrospective interviews and 
archival documentation to reconstruct, and involved bounded sets of events, participants, 
place and time.  There were ample suggestions in the literature to support this approach.  
Creswell (1998, p. 37), for example, described portraiture as closely related to case study in 
the alignment of qualitative research methods.  Marshall and Rossman (1999) found that 
portraiture embodies the narrative design of case study by taking “the reader into the setting 
with a vividness and detail not typically present in more analytic formats” (p. 159).   
Complex Descriptions 
The study explored the complex challenges faced by the school leaders in the 
case.  The techniques undertaken to accomplish this involved a methodology that 
Lawrence-Lightfoot (1997) described as “an iterative process of data collection, 
interpretation, and analysis” (pp. 213-214) and was based on the establishment of personal 
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perspective, guiding questions, an informed literature review, and an overall conceptual 
framework.   
The data collection involved multiple sources of information, including direct 
observations, review of documents, and interviews with participants.  This was consistent 
with case study criteria, as proffered by Creswell (1998, pp. 62-63), for describing the actions 
of people and then developing a theory about what happened within the events of the case.  
The data collection also involved explorations of the relationship of contextual conditions 
and processes, which Yin (2003) recommended for situating “a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context” (p. 13).  That approach was particularly important in the research 
of this case.  As noted by Yin (2003), the research techniques of case study are appropriate 
for “distinctive situations,” in which there are multiple variables, multiple evidence sources, 
and theoretical propositions developed in advance (pp. 13-14).    
An interview technique from the field of task analysis, known as the critical 
decision method, was also consulted in the development of the interview strategies with 
participants.  The method was helpful, as suggested by Graesser, Baggett, & Williams 
(1996, p. 19), in understanding how people remember and make sense of what happened 
during critical decisions.  Researchers use the technique in the study of decision making 
under naturalistic conditions, not unlike the events of this case.  The methodology 
influenced my approach to not only explore an entire complex task or event, but also to 
focus on decision details, as suggested by Lipshitz (2001, p. 343), among others, and 
keep the decision making experiences as the central focus of the study.  My use of the 
technique relied on probe questions consistent with the observations by Klein, et al., 
(1989) in their retrospective research of complex decisions “characterized by high time 
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pressure, high information content, and changing conditions” (p. 462).  The use of probe 
questions in this study helped participants who were far removed from the events in 2002 
and needed assistance, as suggested by Gordon (1997, p. 137), to remember a past 
incident, identify key decisions within that incident, and describe the trigger conditions 
that prompted each incident.  Gordon identified Klein, et al., as having reinvented the 
process.  It was originally developed by Flanagan (1954) in the study of “case-based 
reasoning in problem solving” (as described by Hoffman,1998, p. 256), in which experts 
recall how they encountered and resolved problems.   
Personal Involvement 
At the time of the events involved in this case, I was employed by the 
Montgomery County Public Schools as the director of communications and served as the 
district’s spokesperson.  I participated in the events of the case, as a member of the 
superintendent’s senior staff and held one of the four primary positions on the incident 
command team, as the information officer.   Since that time, I continued to work with 
many of the participants in the case.  I served as the superintendent’s chief of staff, 
beginning in August 2004, and retired from the school district in October 2007.  
Subsequent to that retirement, I performed contract work on behalf of the school district.  
That work ended in December 2008, and I have not had more than incidental contact with 
any of the case participants since then, outside of the research activities of this study.   
My involvement in the events of the case meant I participated in or observed the 
majority of the crisis management activities and decisions described in this study. I am a 
primary or secondary author of many of the documents in the archival record of the case, 
and my actions and commentary were included in news media and literary accounts of 
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the incident.9  As such, I conducted the study as a participant researcher. These dual 
positions provided me with a unique opportunity to explore and describe lived 
experiences of the participants within the case, including myself, and examine 
information that I was unaware of at the time.  I also contributed information of my own, 
including personal observations and insights that were revealed during the research 
process.  I, therefore, contributed to the study not only as a researcher but also as an 
insider, providing my perspective to the reconstruction and analysis of the case and 
adding my own identified recollections, knowledge, and expertise.  
My inclusion as participant and researcher in the action and analysis of the 
portrait reflected one of the distinctive characteristics of portraiture.  Active involvement 
of the researcher is one of the primary features of the methodology that distinguishes it 
from other forms of qualitative inquiry (Hackmann, 2002, p. 52).  I approached this 
perspective from the point of view of a portraitist, in much the same way a painter or 
photographer interprets scenes through a personal brush or lens.  My point of view was 
ever present.  While I sought balance and truth about past events, as best as can be 
reconstructed years afterward (and as described later in this chapter, under verification 
and quality), my efforts were never entirely objective and devoid of my own thoughts and 
recollections.  Indeed, this was never a goal.  In portraiture, as described by Hackmann 
(2002), the “investigator’s voice is purposefully woven into the written document” as a 
                                                 
9 The most recent was Censer, J. R. (2010). On the trail of the D.C. sniper: Fear and the media. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.  A section of the book, “Schools and the Sniper,” described 
several aspects of events of the case and participants, including me from an interview in 2004. The book 
also was cited as a source document for this study. 
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result of “the researcher’s interaction with the actors in the research setting” (p. 52).  This 
was true regardless of my participant status. 
Special Mode of Inquiry 
My role as a participant researcher reflected a special mode of inquiry, based on 
established practices in qualitative research.  Yin (2003), for example, described 
participant research as a form of “illustrative studies,” in which the investigator is “not 
merely a passive observer” but also assumes roles within the case situation and “may 
actually participate in the events being studied” (pp. 93-94).  In examples that reflected 
the specific nature of this study, Yin (2003) cited “a staff member in an organizational 
setting” or “a key decision maker in an organizational setting” as a type of participant 
researcher (p. 94).  In my situation, experience in the case provided access and 
opportunities that might not otherwise be available.  Maxwell (1996, pp. 17-22) 
underscored the value of such access, consistent with the qualitative research 
expectations for faithfully reconstructing the events of the case.  He referenced the 
prospect of a participant researcher enriching the development of an evidentiary record 
and the context of the case, as providing potentially unique perspectives in exploring and 
describing in detail the circumstances of how events occurred in a way that can advance 
the public understanding and the significance of the case.  I endeavored to do just that.   
At the same time, efforts were taken to ensure that my subjectivity and voice did 
not dominate the study (as noted later in this chapter, including reference to critical 
friends who read drafts of the study with this thought in mind).  Researchers in portraiture 
are expected to assume a secondary role, not primary, in the conduct and report of the 
study.   Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997) note that portraiture is not a form of 
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editorial and caution that a researcher’s voice “should never overwhelm the voices or 
actions” of the others and turn the study into a “self-portrait” (p. 105).  On this point, 
there has been some criticism of the involvement of researchers as the primary 
interpreters in portraiture (Mello, 2002, p. 232).  Critics have suggested that it has been 
difficult to verify whether the portraitist has told the “truth” (English, 2000, p. 21) or 
whether the researcher engaged in merely a “personal essay” that reflected the 
researcher’s own “idiosyncratic interpretation of a situation” (Donmoyer, 1999, p. 630).  
Ellis and Bochner (1999), while generally endorsing the style of personal narrative, 
caution about the overindulgence of writers who become not witnesses but characters in 
the narrative (p. 235).  Weick (2002) warns against “self-as-theorist” and the problems 
associated with reflexivity when the author overpowers the voices of others in the case 
(pp. 893-984).  These cautions were taken to heart by me in the ongoing conduct of the 
study, in all of its phases. 
Personal Experience  
My personal and professional experience with the topic of crisis decision making 
among school district leaders spans more than three decades.  Prior to my 17-year career 
with the Montgomery County Public Schools, I was a reporter for the Journal newspaper 
in Prince George’s County, Maryland, covering the Board of Education, superintendent, 
and schools.  I later served as the special assistant to the president for communications at 
the then Bowie State College in Maryland, prior to appointment as the public affairs and 
communications director for the Prince George’s County Public Schools.  I hold a Bachelor 
of Arts degree (journalism) and a Master of Education degree (policy, planning, and 
administration), both from the University of Maryland, College Park.   
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During my career, I have participated in crisis management and decisions 
involving many types of emergencies affecting the health and safety of students and staff.  
These include deaths and acts of violence, traffic accidents, weather emergencies, bomb 
threats, arrests, and the impact of regional, national, and international events on the operation 
of schools.  I have lectured and written on the topic, including the events of this case. 
I approached this study with the intent of telling the truth and presenting the case 
with credibility.  I knew that my work was influenced by personal values, including the 
strong belief in the goodness of people.  This belief, in the conduct of this study, relied on 
a personal understanding of the actions and motivations of people as intrinsically good, 
unless shown otherwise.  No effort was made to minimize or hide unflattering 
information that was important to addressing the research questions or understanding the 
events and context of the case, including information about my actions, nor was any 
effort made to highlight information that was otherwise unnecessary or gratuitous.   
The case involved people I know personally and professionally.  Their actions and 
experiences during the sniper crisis were (and remain) highly valued by me as a shared 
experience and as a source of insightful understanding about crisis decision making by 
school district leaders.  My relationship with them required attention to the kind of 
strategic, ethical, and personal issues of a participant researcher, as described by Marshall 
(1999, p. 79), and as presented later in this chapter.   
Research Design 
 The research design was based on the context and setting of the portrait, in which 
a specific case was bounded by time and place, with a bounded set of decision events, 
participants, and available data.  Certain limitations in the data sampling were overcome 
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through a multi-stage process that included an emergent basis for data collection.  The 
design also was based on participants being publicly identified as a result of the public 
nature of the case and the media exposure it received. 
 Data collection for the portrait included all types of documentation, artifacts, and 
other materials about the case and the roles of participants.  This included documents and 
artifacts created by me (whole or in part) as a participant during the case itself.  It also 
included documentation of data from interviews, retrospective observations, and an 
ongoing form of memoing.  Various forms and processes were created to assist in the 
data collection, including consent forms, timeline charts, contact forms, and other ways 
of managing the data, as described later in the chapter under data collection.  
The research design followed a logical sequence of steps consistent with the 
concept of “illumination” in portraiture, which refers to the phenomenological process of 
exploring (not examining or evaluating) the essential elements of a lived experience 
(Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997).  The design encompasses the essential focus of the 
portrait itself—the crisis decision making experiences of an identified set of school 
district leaders during the sniper crisis in October 2002.    
The research design adhered to the four main components of the process of 
illumination in portraiture, as outlined by Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997):  the 
context and setting of the portrait was established, the voice and perspective of the 
participants were identified, the relationship of the portraitist to participants was 
confirmed, and emergent themes were developed.  These four components were 
analogous to the research methods described by Maxwell (1996, p. 108) for sampling, 
data collection, research relationship, and data analysis in case study and other qualitative 
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research.  I used the research processes of portraiture and case study interchangeably in 
the creation of this portrait.  The combination was seamless, providing the basis for the 
final process of illumination—determination of the story, the composition of the 
narrative, and the completion of the portrait. 
Context and Setting 
The first step in the study established the context of the portrait itself.  The 
process of framing was used to explore and describe the physical setting of the case, the 
contextual setting of the portrait, the personal setting of the portraitist, the background of 
the events in the case, and details of the portrait itself.  The framing process followed the 
guidance of Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997, p. 41) and involved data collection 
procedures of direct observation, analysis of documents and other archival or historical 
records, and interviews with participants, other contacts, or informants.  This was 
essentially the qualitative processes of sampling, as described by Maxwell (1996), which 
included identifying the sources of data related to the sites, persons, places, and times of 
the case.   
Time and Place 
The physical setting of the portrait was bounded by both time and place, 
consistent with case study methodology outlined by Creswell (2003, p. 37).  The 
establishment of a finite boundary was necessary to focus the portrait specifically on the 
experiences of school district leaders in making crisis decisions during the 23 days of the 
sniper incident.  The boundary of time, therefore, coincides with the school district’s 
involvement with the sniper crisis, beginning Thursday morning, October 3, through 
Friday, afternoon, October 25, 2002.  (Although the boundary of time for the case was 
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limited to the time period in October 2002, there were contextual factors that occurred 
prior to then, as explored and described in Chapter 4.) 
The boundary of place is the physical locations of the school district and the 
participants in the study.  For the most part, the events of the case were made within the 
confines of school district’s central administrative headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.  
On occasion, however, the research revealed other circumstances and conditions that 
enlarged the physical boundary of the case and included the homes of case participants.   
Initial Sampling 
The sources of data for this portrait were influenced by the research question and 
the conceptual framework of the portrait.  This was consistent with the sampling process 
suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 27).  The research question focused on the 
crisis decision making experiences of school district leaders during the identified case.  
The conceptual framework suggested a perspective through which to view those decision 
making experiences and apply an analytical process for exploring and describing in a 
narrative report of this study.      
The framework suggested that critical leadership tasks in school crisis 
management are part of an open social system, in which decisions are transformed 
through various human interactions affected by structural, political, individual, and 
cultural systems, an external crisis environment, and feedback on efforts to achieve crisis 
management targets.  The framework also included recognition of factors related to 
expectations of high reliability in the implementation of crisis leadership tasks and 
activities.   
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Therefore, the study focused on describing and exploring specific crisis decisions, 
the experiences of participants in making those decisions, and the available documentary 
records about those events, and interviews with participants about their experiences.  This 
required sampling that was bounded by a set of decision events, a set of school district 
leaders, and a set of data sources.   
Decision Set 
There were decision events that provided an initial bounded sample, and these 
were related to the high-profile events of the sniper incident.  They served as an 
immediate focus area and entry point for data collection.  Consistent with the emergent 
nature of the investigative processes of the study, however, the sampling grew over time 
as the research information revealed additional decision events and other activities.   
Participant Set 
The school leaders to be included as participants in this study constituted a 
bounded set.  They were identified primarily through the review of data in preparation for 
the study and from my own recollections of the case.  Others were included in the data 
collection processes as informants and critical friends.  The participant set included 15 
people, in addition to me, as identified in Chapter 1 and reintroduced here (Table 3.2).  
They included 12 employees of the school district, four of whom have since left or 
retired; and three others who not employed by the district but who were personally 
involved in the decisions in the case.  These individuals were part of an “elite” 
interviewing group, as described by Marshall (1999, p. 113), and were narrowly selected 




Table 3.2  Identified Internal and External Participants 
Alvez, Aggie Director of Special Projects, Office of the Superintendent 
(director of communications and family outreach). 
Bowers, Larry A. Chief Operating Officer. 
Clarke, Edward A. Director of School Safety and Security (consultant, private 
practice, Olney, Maryland) 
Duncan, Douglas M. County Executive, Montgomery County (consultant, private 
practice, Rockville, Maryland) 
Hellmuth, Robert B. Assistant director, School Safety and Security (director of 
school safety and security) 
Ikheloa, Roland  Staff Assistant to the Board of Education (chief of staff, 
Board of Education) 
Kamins, Matthew J.  Supervisor of Psychological Services (psychologist, 
Psychological Services) 
Kress, Donald H. Chief School Performance Officer (consultant, private 
practice, Germantown, Maryland) 
Lacey, Frieda K. Chief of Staff to the Superintendent of Schools (deputy 
superintendent of schools) 
Madden, Judy Supervisor of Guidance Services (director of educator 
learning, College Summit, Washington, D.C.) 
Shirley, Edward W. President, Montgomery County Association of 
Administrative and Supervisory Personnel (superintendent, 
Caroline County Public Schools, Denton, Maryland) 
Subin, Michael L. Chair, Education Committee, Montgomery County Council 
(attorney, private practice, Rockville, Maryland) 
Tronzano, Matthew A. Executive Assistant to the Chief Operating Officer (executive 
director, The Jones Center for Families, Springdale, Arkansas) 
Weast, Jerry D. Superintendent of Schools 
Williams, James A. 
 
Deputy Superintendent of Schools (superintendent, Buffalo 
City Public Schools, New York) 
Listed alphabetically by last name, with position or association with the Montgomery County 
Public Schools during the case and current professional status if different in parentheses. 
 
 It was necessary to publicly identify the participants due to the unique 
characteristics of the case, and the substantial public exposure already received by many 
of the participants.  As a non-evaluative study, it was not seen as appropriate or necessary 
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to shield participants through anonymity, nor was the prospect of public identification 
seen as impediment to their participation.  Each of the participants reviewed and signed a 
detailed consent form describing the extent of the public identification and its limitations, 
and they had the opportunity to decline to engage in any aspect of the study or withdraw 
at any time.  Public disclosure was authorized under procedures approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of the University of Maryland, College Park, as well as a 
corresponding reviewing authority for the school district.    
As part of the procedural safeguards, each participant was given an opportunity to 
review, reject, change through deletion or expansion, and/or approve all or any portions 
of the verbatim typed transcript of their digitally-recorded interviews.  In addition, 
participants were given a similar opportunity regarding segments of their approved 
interview transcripts preliminarily identified for potential use in the narrative report of the 
study.   
There were no known risks associated with participating in the study.  Personal 
information, not otherwise specified in the consent form as related to the study, was kept 
confidential and stored in a secured cabinet or computer files available only to the 
researcher through coded access.  Participants were promised that all copies of their 
recorded interviews were to be given to them or destroyed at the conclusion of the study, 
per the typical protocol for recorded interviews.    
Information Set 
Data used in the course of the study included information obtained in five 
categories:  (a) paper documents and online copies of materials and other files, 
contemporary newspaper articles and transcripts of television and radio programs, and 
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retrospective articles, books, and conference presentations related to the events of the 
case; (b) digitally-recorded and transcribed interviews with the identified participants in 
the case, in addition to follow-up notes from telephone or e-mail inquiries; (c) notes from 
inquiries with informants regarding technical and background questions regarding events 
of the case; (d) written commentary by critical friends who reviewed preliminary drafts 
of the narrative report of the study, and notes from oral commentary by students and 
faculty within the College of Education who received early presentations of preliminary 
findings;  and (e) retrospective  memos by me regarding the events of the case, analysis 
of data, and observations about the ongoing illumination of personal insights and 
findings.  From these sources, and as described later in this chapter, data was collected 
from more than 700 separate records and nearly as many analytical memos. 
A major source of data was a four-volume set of large document binders, titled 
Superintendent’s Crisis Management Communications, made available by the Office of 
the Superintendent of Schools for Montgomery County.  The binders included one for 
each of the approximate three weeks of the incident and each contained copies of 
contemporaneous documents, notes, and other materials produced during that week.  The 
materials were retained for inclusion in an after-event report of decisions and actions of 
the district’s leadership.  A fourth binder contained other documents and materials largely 
related to associated events during and after the incident.  The binders were prepared by 
secretarial staff for the Chief Operating Officer in December 2002, about six weeks after 
the conclusion of the incident.  Other offices and departments in the school district also 
provided access to contemporaneous documents and data about the district, the context of 
emergency management events prior to the case, and the events of the case.   
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I found no reason to doubt that the school district’s archival file contained a 
comprehensive and inclusive inventory of the materials produced during the identified 
time and place asserted by the collection.  Indeed, the materials include raw notes of 
contemporaneous discussions and debate, letters and messages of complaint and 
criticism, and previously confidential materials.  However, I was aware that such 
documentation, produced in this manner, can include inaccurate and misleading 
information through inadvertent mistakes and omission.  In an effort to verify the 
completeness and accuracy of the records, I also searched for and obtained data from 
other sources. 
Sample Limitations  
Two important limitations regarding the initial sampling were identified prior to the 
onset of the study, and each was addressed as the study progressed.  The limitations involved 
(a) retrospective identification of the participant set and (b) retrospective identification of the 
crisis decision set. To overcome these limitations, a process of constant comparative analysis 
was used to identify emerging possibilities for additional participants and decision events.  
Although Creswell (1998, p. 106) and others primarily have associated this strategy with 
grounded theory, I found it useful as an additional process of checking facts, ideas, and 
preliminary conclusions arising from a retrospective investigation of a complicated case.   
This resulted in the identification of numerous previously unknown or unrecognized 
aspects of events in the case, including three participants who were overlooked initially 
and identified only during the course of the study.  (There was also one individual who 
ultimately declined to participate in the interview process but provided access to a 




Data were collected in an organized fashion involving rigorous attention to 
maintaining chronological order, subject identification, and categorizing by associated 
groups, topics, participants, and other defining features of the form of documentation, 
such as letters, e-mails, transcripts, reports, etc.  The various forms of data came from 
multiple sources, including interviews with elite participants, personal observations, 
informal contacts with other informants, and records and artifacts from within the school 
district and from external sources.  The external records included articles and 
photographs from newspapers, transcripts of radio and television programs, subsequent 
books and conference presentations, and publicly available material obtained from the 
Internet and other sources, including court records.  Such data sources, as noted by 
Marshall and Rossman (1999, pp. 134-135), had their own strengths and weaknesses.  
My purpose was to collect as much information as possible to search for clues, reduce 
ambiguity and clarify points of contention or disagreement, and provide informed 
prompting in questions for interviews and subsequent follow-ups inquiries.  
 Of the more than 700 records collected in this study, 696 were imported to a 
software program for subsequent qualitative data analysis, as explained later in this 
chapter.  These files included 246 school district records; 241 items from news media 
sources, transcripts, and books; and 15 approved interview transcript, 24 court 
documents; and 185 records from various other sources.  In addition, there were 629 
analytical memos (of various lengths) written by me over the course of study, and these 





Efforts were made to identify and describe the events of the case, in the broadest 
and the most specific terms.  This included obtaining relevant documents, artifacts, and 
other materials related in any way to the overall scope of the study.  Such documents and 
the process for collecting them were important procedural elements in establishing the 
internal context for the environment of the portrait, setting the stage for obtaining 
additional information from people being interviewed, and generally facilitating the 
illumination of the case, and all of which reflected the research steps recommended by 
Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997, p. 63).  This also was consistent with qualitative 
methodologies for establishing the “history and context” of a specific activity or event, as 
noted by Marshall (1999, p. 116).   Efforts were also made to follow the guidance 
outlined by Yin (2003, pp. 85-89) concerning the types of documents to be searched for, 
collected, and analyzed.   
Marshall and Rossman (1999), in recommendations for data collection, noted that 
documents of any kind can be useful in obtaining information for “portraying the values 
and beliefs of the participants in the setting” (p. 116).  In portraiture, this includes 
“alternative information,” as described by Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997, p. 64), and 
the purpose is to broaden the context for the portrait and enliven the description with novel 
or unique insights and observations.  One court record found in the course of the case 
investigation, for example, was a digital recording of the testimony of Lee Boyd Malvo on 
May 23, 2006.  He was the younger of the two assailants convicted in the shootings, and he 
was testifying that day in Montgomery County at a trial of his accomplice ("State of 
Maryland v. Muhammad," 2006).  Part of his testimony concerned events four years 
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earlier, on October 3, 2002.  On the recording, a woman can be heard in the background 
beginning to cry, first in muffed sobs and then in piercing and repeated wails, as a voice 
can be heard comforting her, and Malvo continued to describe in detail the shooting of 
someone the woman obviously knew and cared for and probably loved.  The sounds 
brought me back to the morning the crisis began. 
Record Organization 
Processes were created to manage the record collection and ensure that a primary 
focus remained on the research question, as data were gathered about events in the case, 
the indentified participants, and their experiences in crisis decision making during the 
case.  The events of the case were associated largely with a date chronology and, 
therefore, all records were categorized by the date and source of their origination and the 
topic they referenced.  From this categorization, the events were identified over a 23-day 
period in October 2002.  Three types of events: (a) the sniper shootings, (b) the school 
district’s decisions to implement the Code Blue procedure and (c) the often separate 
decisions to restrict outdoor activities—served to broadly define the chronology of the 
case (Table 3.2).   
The internal and external participants in the case were identifiable by name or 
position from the archival records of the case and confirmed by later participant 
interviews.  Initially, the participant set included 12 individuals, other than me, and they 
were identified as having been part of one or more meetings of the Incident Command 
Team, as convened by the superintendent of schools on the first day of the crisis.  Later in 
the analysis, it became apparent that three other individuals also participated, in some 
fashion, and they were added to the list, as described earlier in Table 3.1.  All relevant 
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Table 3.3  Chronology of Sniper Shootings and School District Security Decisions 
 




Wednesday, October 4 ■ evening   
Thursday, October 3 ■■■■ morning  
■ evening 
■ morning ■ morning 
Friday, October 4 ■ afternoon  ■ morning only 
Saturday, October 5    
Sunday, October 6    
Monday, October 7 ■ morning ■ morning ■ morning 
Tuesday, October 8  ■  ■ 
Wednesday, October 9 ■ evening No school ■ 
Thursday, October 10   ■ 
Friday, October 11 ■ morning ■ morning ■ 
Saturday, October 12   ■ 
Sunday, October 13   ■ 
Monday, October 14 ■ evening ■ ■ 
Tuesday, October 15   ■ 
Wednesday, October 16   ■ 
Thursday, October 17   ■ 
Friday, October 18  No school ■ 
Saturday, October 19 ■ evening  ■ 
Sunday, October 20   ■ 
Monday, October 21   ■ 
Tuesday, October 22 ■ morning ■ morning ■ 
Wednesday, October 23  ■ ■ 
Thursday, October 24  ■ ■ 
Friday, October 25    
Totals Dead:  10 
Wounded: 3  
Code Blue 
days: 8 
Days with outdoor 
restrictions: 20 
■ = shooting or school district security decision (implemented all day unless otherwise indicated). 
Shooting data compiled from John Allen Muhammad v. State of Maryland (2007). Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland.  Retrieved November 11, 2007, from http://mdcourts.gov.    
School data compiled from Sniper crisis: Superintendent's crisis management communications (2002). 




records also were categorized by association with specific participants, either as the 
individual who created the record or as someone referenced in the record.   
Content Organization 
In addition to the chronology of the major events and the identification of 
participants, records also were organized in reference to the theoretical elements of the 
conceptual framework for the case, as described in Chapter 2. This was consistent with 
research guidelines identified by Marshall and Huberman (1999, p. 117).  The 
organization process occurred in substantial depth and included content coding 
referenced later in this chapter, but it was also an important organizational process at the 
outset of the study, especially for identifying and categorizing records as the study 
progressed.  There were 23 components of the conceptual framework (Table 3.1) and 
records were broadly categorized among them, as part of the initial organization.  For 
instance, letters of complaint were labeled as feedback.     
The chronology of school district security decisions, as illustrated in Table 3.3, 
did not include all of the crisis decisions experienced by participants in the case.  A 
means of identifying those decisions in a systematic fashion was developed.  That process 
itself led to the realization that there were many more activities related to the leadership 
of the school district during the crisis than just the decisions (for example, providing a 
report to the incident command team about student absenteeism).  Therefore, an effort 
was made to identify these activities for analysis as part of the entire crisis decision 
making dynamic.  A separate category of “crisis management activities” was created, 
within which were “leadership decisions” and “leadership actions.”  This resulted in the 
ability to identify records associated with a “crisis management activity” and identify 
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such activities chronologically over the course of the case and in relation to other 
characteristics of the case.  Eventually, the chronology of activities was combined with 
other identifiers, including elements from the conceptual framework, and a tracking list 
was prepared over the course of the study (Figure 3.1).     
This process was undertaken as the records were collected and organized, initially 
as a method of framing the material for later analysis.  Eventually, it formed the basis of 
thinking about the events of the case, not as disparate pieces that occurred along the way, 
but as parts of an organic whole that changed in identifiable ways as the events 
continued.  My thinking and analysis about such things was recorded and retained in a 
process of note taking and memoing.  To assist in this process, I created an “artifact 
analysis memo” that served as an organizing tool for the various documents, materials, 
and other artifacts and records (Figure 3.2).  It was particularly helpful for noting a 
record’s description, associated event, potential significance, content summary, and 
relationship to other information.  The form was influenced by a sample referenced by 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 55).  It was also influenced by a record-keeping strategy 
identified from the research file of the late Jacqueline Haas, whose dissertation (2005), as 
noted elsewhere, influenced the preparation of this study.   
The collected documents were stored and managed in properly labeled boxes 
within areas under my supervision.  Special or unique documents were treated with great 
care, with attention maintaining their status as research artifacts of an ongoing study.  
Nonetheless, I was mindful of the advice from Yin (2003, pp. 87-88) regarding an over-




protection against being misled, either purposefully or by mistake.   As noted earlier, the 
documentary information was just one part of the story. 
Personal Setting 
The data collection procedures for this study included a personal 
acknowledgement to the other participants in the case about my dual perspective as a 
participant researcher. Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997) cautioned that the 
participant researcher, notwithstanding personal attachments to the case, must maintain 
the position as “an outsider to the scene and needs to accept and exploit that 
perspective…[with] a researcher’s view that is sufficiently distanced to encompass the  
 
Figure 3.1  Excerpt from Chronology of Crisis Management Activities 
Format adapted from Haas, J. C. (2005). A case study of the actions taken by a school district in 
planning and implementing a strategy to establish school-based professional learning communities. 





Figure 3.2  Format for Personal Insights about Data and Records 
 
 
various sources of data, the broader physical and ideological landscape and the 
developing vision of the whole” (p. 69).  This was a stance I pursued with vigor. 
It was a difficult position to be in.  In ethnographic studies, for example, 
researchers often have to carefully balance the two sides of being the insider and the 
outsider, and they confront special considerations of identity and relationship when 
circumstances prompt role changes (Creswell, 2003, p. 123).  In this case, I conveyed my 
position as an outsider looking in, but undoubtedly others saw me entirely as an insider.  
And, their viewpoint probably continued even after I retired from the school district’s 
employment and began to interview the participants.   
At every step of the process, both before and after my departure from the district, 
I followed the “full explanation” procedure, as described by Schram (p. 90), to ensure 
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that people who I came in contact with were informed about my role.  This was ethically 
important, as well as necessary for ensuring the quality of the study.   
‘Critical Friends’ 
One of the measures I took to address issues associated researcher with effects, 
including potential researcher bias and the limits of a single case, was the enlistment of 
two individuals who served as critical friends.  Their role, as outlined by Handal (1999), 
was to provide expert knowledge of the topic of study and serve as a confidant and 
advisor in providing guidance in the course of the research.  One was Kitty Porterfield,
former director of communications for the Fairfax County Public Schools, Virginia, a
 position she held during the sniper incident.  She now is a partner with Porterfield &
Carnes Communications in Alexandria, Virginia, and co-author of the book, “Why
Communication Matters: Strategies for PR Professionals” (2008, Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers).   The other was Judith S. Bresler, a partner in the law firm of Carney,
Kelehan, Bresler, Bennett & Scherr in Columbia, Maryland; and an adjunct professor of
school law at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, and Goucher
College in Towson, Maryland.  A co-author of the book “Maryland School Law 
Deskbook” (2009, Second Edition, LexisNexis Publishing), she is general counsel to 
several school districts in Maryland, including the Montgomery County Public Schools.   
Both Bresler and Porterfield provided the additional benefit of insider and 
outsider perspectives, each from their own point of view.  They were invited to share 
their professional insights and comments “without reservation,” and they were provided 
with written guidance regarding verification and quality in qualitative research, including 
standards of credibility, transferability, dependability, application, and completeness 
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(Personal communications, 2009).  Both read drafts of the narrative report of the study 
and provided extensive commentary and insights, suggestions for improvement, and 
questions about areas of concern.  Their commentary was used in the further refinement 
of the narrative report of the study. 
Memoing Impressions 
One method of helping me straddle the conflicting divide between observer and 
participant was to keep careful notes about personal observations, interpretations, 
emerging theories, shifts in perspective, and any other observations about the ongoing 
conduct of the proposed study.  Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997, p. 188) described 
this process in portraiture as creating an “impressionistic record” of the events, ideas, and 
problems of the day.  The procedure is similar to daily “memoing,” as described by Miles 
and Huberman (1994, pp. 72-75), in which the researcher creates personal narratives as a 
sense-making tool during the conduct of the proposed study.   These impressionistic 
records or memos were dated, labeled for record keeping, and included in the data 
analysis procedures, as with any other record.   
As noted earlier, more than 600 memos of varying depth were produced in the 
course of the study.  The vast majority were associated with the analysis of individual 
records (Figure 3.2), which started at the outset of the study and continued throughout.  
Additional types of memos, which reflected more of a running record or journal, began as 
the study progressed into deeper analytical phases.  Memos about the participant 
interviews were also produced, along with my own commentary identified in the 
transcripts of the interviews.   
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At the outset of the data collection, I also revisited the sites where most of the 
case took place, among the offices and conference rooms of the school administration 
building.  My visits to these familiar areas (conducted after work hours prior to my 
departure) were helpful in providing contextual references and prompts for my own 
recollections.  Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997) describe this as part of conducting a 
“visual scan” of the entire setting of the case, including the landscape, buildings, and 
interior and exterior spaces, with the widest viewpoint possible and then narrowing the 
focus from “the macro to the micro environment, the outside in” (p. 45).  This I did and
recorded my thoughts and impressions in a memo for the record.   
Voice and Perspective 
The voice and perspective of participants in this study were used in the 
identification of emergent themes from the data and the overall construction of the 
portrait.  The participants formed an elite sample, and they were interviewed using 
retrospective interview techniques consistent with the analysis of critical decisions.  The 
interview protocol was developed based on the initial data collection and analysis and the 
specific purpose of each interview. 
Not all of the interviews were the same.  They reflected the relative degree to 
which the participant was involved in the events of the case.  Nonetheless, all of the 
interviews were noteworthy and produced valuable insights about points of view; added 
unknown information, substantiated information, offered clues about potential other 
information to be collected, and helped to create a more complete picture of one or more 
events.  This is a fundamental aspect of portraiture, in which the voice of participants is 
paramount in illuminating the details of the portrait, shaping its perspective, and 
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informing the narrative (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997).  Consistent with 
observation by Maxwell  (1996, p. 16) about participants adding “meaning” to the 
interpretation of data and shaping the “reality” of what is being explored and described 
(p. 16), the participants in this study offered a rich trove of perspectives, insights, and 
commentary.  Their voices not only contributed to the development of the overall 
emergent themes and findings, they also permeate the narrative report of the study. 
The participants’ willingness to share their experiences with me was, in a large 
measure, a reflection of our professional associations and friendships.  Indeed, the 
interviews were lengthy conversations.  The familiarity reflected an important interview 
technique in qualitative research for helping the perspectives of the interviewees emerge 
in the research (Schram, 2003, p. 103).  While such familiarity gave me pause, as I 
wrestled with maintaining some level of professional distance, it did provide what 
McCracken (1988) described as “the advantage of…an extraordinary intimate 
acquaintance with the object of study” (p. 32).  The problematic issues that were 
associated with this aspect of the study are addressed later in this chapter. 
Elite Interviews 
The 15 people indentified as participants in the case were, in the parlance of 
Marshall and Rossman (1999), the “elites” in the qualitative research sample, because of 
their unusual or special expertise and knowledge (p. 113).  In other words, they were 
highly valued, and great care was taken in conducting the interviews in this study.  The 
interviews were held after extensive research was conducted in assembling data about the 
events of the case, distilling the information from the record collection and content 
analysis, and organizing the data into coherent reflections of potential themes and 
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chronologies.  This was done consistent with the preparation strategies advocated for 
long interviews by McCracken (1988, pp. 32-33), in which an immersion process takes 
place, providing background and insights for the interview questions and preparing the 
interviewer with the independent expertise in the subject in order to maintain professional 
distance.   
The interview procedures were patterned, in part, on the critical decision method 
identified in Chapter 2.  In summary, the method includes specific questions or probes 
that unlock long-term memories and establish a productive two-way discussion.  The 
strategy is designed to allow the development of details about events that emerge in the 
process of telling and retelling (Graesser, et al., 1996, p. 19).   
Various studies and lists of sample questions from Miller (2001), Klein et al. 
(1989), Militello and Hutton (1998), and O'Hare, Wiggins, Williams, & Wong (1998) 
were reviewed in the development of the interview questions and protocols used in this 
study.  I was also influenced by the work of Pryor (2004) and Paden-McAlpine (1999) 
who described incremental processes tailored to the specific individual and event.   I 
found the latter insights to be generally consistent with my experiences.  Several of the 
participants had limited time and opportunity for interviews; others had lots of time and 
wanted to chat; and still others were simply hard to schedule and their sessions were 
tantamount to an interruption of a busy day.  Consequently, each of the interviews were 
conducted differently, based on the circumstances, but all of them followed the basic 
outlines of a scripted set of questions prepared in advance.  Each of the interviews 
included opportunity for verbal as well as visual prompts in an effort to assist in the 




The interviews, notwithstanding the advance preparation and use of prepared 
questions, were highly subjective, flexible, and dependent on differing variables with 
each situation.  This was consistent with the process in the critical decision method, as 
described by Hoffman, et al. (1998), in which both the interviewee and the interviewer 
engage in a back-and-forth discussion about key points, clarifications, and repetition 
where necessary.  The interviews were conducted in an open-ended manner, consistent 
with the strategies common in qualitative research.  While Yin (2003, pp. 89-90) suggests 
the use of a standardized protocol to ensure consistency, I found that the interviews were 
often more reflective of what Marshall and Rossman (1999) described as unfolding “as 
the participant views it, not as the researcher views it” (p. 108).   Nonetheless, I found the 
interviews productive and, for the most part, enjoyable. 
 The interviews were conducted during the months of November 2007 through 
January 2008.  All but two of the interviews took place in the offices of the participants, 
while one occurred in a participant’s home and another in a conference room at a 
university library.  The interviews lasted from one to three hours.   
Each of the participants signed a consent form authorizing the audio recording of 
the interview sessions.  The audio recordings were transcribed by a professional 
transcriber, reviewed by me for completeness and consistency with the audio-record, and 
submitted to each participant for their review and approval.  They were asked to review 
the transcripts for any changes or additional comments, and then sign a written release 
form authorizing the use of the transcript in the study.  A subsequent review and approval 
process occurred for any excerpts of the interviews identified for use in the narrative 
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report of the study.  Generally, the transcripts and excerpts were approved without 
change.   
Data Analysis 
The analysis of the data collected from this case focused on the development of 
emergent themes that formed the basis of the portrait.  The analysis involved qualitative 
methods of coding, pattern recognition, and thematic construction of the data in ways that 
helped me build, understand, and explain the portrait in a coherent narrative format, 
supported with representations of data in tables and figures, including illustrations of 
artifacts from the case. 
The use of portraiture as the methodology for this study involved analytic 
processes common in qualitative research. Coding was used to identify recurring themes 
in the words, phrases, and other statements collected, as suggested by Lawrence-
Lightfoot and Davis (1997, p. 188).  A systematic process of coding was used for all 
documents, records, artifacts, verbatim transcripts, and the memos or impressionistic 
records.  The organization of records by date and time, participant, and subject, as well as 
source, was done as the first steps in the process of coding and the preparation of the data 
for detailed analysis.  Each day of the crisis was identified as a separate case, and a 
process of cross-case analysis was used to analyze the events of the overall case in 
chronological order.  The subsequent organization of the data through coding that 
reflected the components of the conceptual framework further deepened the analysis. 
The coding scheme used in this study—in which the data were organized into 
meaningful bits and pieces that were relevant to the elements of the case and the 
conceptual framework—was consistent with qualitative data analysis techniques 
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identified by Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 55-65).  This included coding that 
identified descriptive data, interpretive data, and patterns in the data.    
The analytic process was assisted with the NVivo 8 software program that enables 
coded data to be organized in a relational database that can be manipulated to search for 
patterns, missing data, responses to queries, development of matrices, identification of 
outliers, and other aspects of data analysis.  Given the vast number of records (more than 
700), plus a nearly equal number of memos, the coding aspect of the study was nearly 
overwhelming.  However, because of the coding allowed for very specific entries—
including dates, participants, and the components of the conceptual framework—the data 
analysis was able to discern patterns and themes regarding information that was not 
otherwise available.  These results are reported in subsequent chapters.   
Patterns and Themes  
A deliberate process of data analysis was used to identify the patterns and themes 
in the data from this study, consistent with the procedures outlined by Lawrence-
Lightfoot and Davis (1997, pp. 197-214) and (Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 69-72).  
This included searching for words and phrases repeated by participants and personal 
metaphors used in the description of events of the case.  It also included using the process 
of triangulation to identify the convergence of information from different sources and 
uncover patterns—or the absence of patterns—in the data. 
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the findings associated with the conceptual 
framework regarding the distribution of decisions and activities across the components of 
the critical leadership tasks, social system structures, reliability principals, and crisis 
management targets helped to illuminate other ways of interpreting the events of the case 
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Figure 3.3  Analytical Coding Illustration with Conceptual Framework  
Underlying conceptual framework adapted from “social systems” by Hoy and Miskel (2008); “critical 
tasks” by Boin, et al. (2005) and “high reliability” principles by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007).    
 
 
and to consider potential associations that might not otherwise be evident.  The process of 
identifying the distributions and associations was conducted by performing matrix 
queries in the NVivo8 program among the coded words and phrases that represented the 
crisis management activities of the case and the coded components of the conceptual 
framework and other organizational codes for dates, etc.   
The process of developing the emergent themes is important in portraiture, 
because the narrative story is built on the framework of the themes, noting evidentiary 
material for each theme and making cross-theme comparisons, in order to create a 
comprehensive and coherent picture (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997).  Such themes 
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or patterns can include identification of relationships among characteristics of the case 
and participants, common experiences, and other elements, including those that serve to 
summarize information in meaningful ways (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 70). 
Production 
 The completion of this study involved the production of a narrative portrait, a 
process that began with the emergent themes identified from the data analysis.  The intent 
was to contribute substantive research to the knowledge of crisis decision making among 
school district leaders by creating an authentic story that describes and explores the 
events of the case and the lived experiences of the participants.  
The narrative production of the portrait was based on the emergent themes, data 
evidence, situational context, voices of participants, and other information that was 
developed from the data collection and analysis, including the comparative queries that 
revealed potential associations and other relationships among the events of the case and 
the conceptual framework.  Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997, pp. 247-259) describe  
the compositional art of portraiture as a metaphoric process of “weaving” the thematic 
elements of structure, form, and coherence into an authentic, readable, and accessible 
story.  This was the goal of the narrative report. 
Narrative Report 
The narrative report of this study provides a detailed description of the 
exploration conducted about a specific case involving the lived experiences of a set of 
school district leaders and their decisions during the sniper incident of October 2002.  
The report reflects the participants in the recounting of their experiences, as they revealed  
personal memories during interviews and subsequent conversations and described, in 
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their own words, what happened to them and why.  Their understanding of the crisis 
events and their role as decision makers served as the basis for anchoring the portrait in 
what Bloom and Erlandson (2003) describe as an integration of details that situate the 
events of the portrait in “the past, present, and future” (p. 875).  By focusing on them, the 
participants serve as the witnesses and interpreters of the events (Bloom & Erlandson, 
2003, p. 877).  The intent was to produce what Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis  called “a 
narrative that is at once complex, provocative, and inviting, that attempts to be holistic, 
revealing the dynamic interaction of values, personality, structure, and history” (p. 11).     
Verification and Quality 
In portraiture, authenticity is the key standard.  Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis 
(1997) describe an authentic portrait as one that captures “the essence and resonance” of 
the participants in a study and reveals their “perspective through the details of action and 
thought” (pp. 12-14}.  They further suggest that a portrait is authentic if it is believable, 
makes sense, and causes “that click of recognition” as credible (p. 249).  Miles and 
Huberman (1994) equate authenticity with internal validity in describing the “truth value” 
of the study, in terms of such qualifiers as content-rich descriptions, internal coherence, 
and comprehensiveness (p. 278).  Every effort was made to double-check and authentic 
information collected during the study and to cross-check ideas and interpretations in 
light of reasonableness and plausibility.  
Personal Responsibilities 
This study required adherence to personal responsibilities for the maintenance of 
professional integrity, personal honesty, and truthfulness.  I understood from the outset 
that portraiture, as with all qualitative research, is not immune to errors that can 
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undermine the quality of the final narrative if reasonable safeguards are not placed into 
practice at the beginning.  In particular, on a personal note, I was very much aware of the 
specific threats of bias and reflexivity that are inherent in qualitative research generally 
(Maxwell, 1996, pp. 90-91) and participant researcher studies specifically (Yin, 2003, pp. 
94-95).  I was very sensitive to the problems identified by Schram (2003) “involvement” 
in the case and “familiarity” with the participants (pp. 88-91).   
I also understood from the outset the prescription Maxwell (1996) offered for 
overcoming researcher bias and reflexivity by identifying “how a particular researcher’s 
values influence the conduct and conclusions of the study” (p. 91).  Therefore, I 
endeavored to uphold my personal perspectives about truth and goodness and the value I 
give to the lived experience shared among the participants in this case, as acknowledged 
earlier.  At the same time, I was aware that this personal stance can lead to the possibility 
of other potential threats associated with researcher bias that Miles and Huberman (1994) 
describe as “holistic fallacy,” in which events of the case are seen as more congruent than 
they really are and inconsistencies are overlooked; “elite bias,” in which overweighting 
of data occurs for high status informants; and “going native,” in which the research 
perspective is abandoned in favor of local perceptions and explanations (p. 263).  I  
endeavored to avoid such threats by adhering to the verification and quality tests 
described below. 
I also addressed the second major threat of reflexivity, in terms of how people 
responded to me, particularly in interviews.  Maxwell (1996) suggests that responses in 
an interview are “always a function of the interviewer and the interview situation” (p. 
91).  In my situation, I interviewed people who were previously coworkers and 
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colleagues and, in some cases, organizational superiors.  Maxwell (1996) suggests that 
there are no surefire methods to avoid the potential negative influences of reflexivity, but 
they can be diminished through an upfront acknowledgement of the challenge when 
contacting informants and conducting interviews (p. 91).  This I accomplished in my 
interaction with the other participants, particularly since the interviews occurred not long 
after my retirement from the school district.  I was also aware of other techniques, such as 
of what Schram (2003, p. 101) describes as “impression management” and “posturing” in 
order to balance the multiple relationship roles and maintain integrity in the relationships 
(p. 101).  I was mindful of the reflexivity threats and implemented the verification and 
quality tests accordingly, as described below. 
Verification  
The tactics for testing or confirming findings in a study included eight essential 
steps, as adapted from the recommendations by Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 262-277) 
and Creswell (1998, pp. 201-203).  As noted by Maxwell (1996, p. 92), such strategies 
offer plausible tests for the existence of potential threats (p. 92).  The eight strategies 
conducted in this study were: 
1. Checking for Researcher Effects.  The study was open and straightforward 
about my relationship with the topic, my involvement in the case, the purpose 
of the research, and the process of data collection and analysis. The procedure 
of involving two critical friends was used to review aspects of the study 
implementation, including the narrative report, and to gain advice, 
consultation, and reaction to any issues of potential criticism.  
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2. Triangulation. The research methodologies of the study reinforced my ability 
to substantiate findings and conclusions by incorporating multiple sources of 
data (official, informal, and from different places internal and external to the 
school system); multiple methods of collecting data (observations, 
documents, contacts, informants, and interviews); and multiple kinds of data 
(text, audio recordings, memos, and notes).  This was done, as described by 
Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997), to identify “points of convergence in 
the data” (p. 204). 
3. Weighting the Evidence.  The organization and analysis of data in the study 
emphasized that not all data are equal, and I placed greater reliance on data 
that reflected primary sources, repeated contacts, and observed behavior, as 
well as data checked against hard facts, alternative accounts, and personal 
knowledge.  In portraiture, this reflects the process of “referential adequacy,” 
in which the researcher tests personal knowledge and expertise against the 
phenomenon being studied (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997, p. 246). 
4. Following Up Surprises.  The study’s procedures included repeated inquiries, 
reflection, and comparisons to allow ample opportunity for considering new 
information that may reveal inconsistency, incongruence, and necessary 
revisions. 
5. Looking for Negative Evidence.  The study’s procedures allowed me to test and 
document assumptions about data, events, explanations, and theories by looking 
for accounts and interpretations that refuted, contradicted, or discounted findings 
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and conclusions.  This was a regular part of the ongoing analysis prior to and 
during the preparation of the narrative report. 
6. Checking Out Rival Perspectives.  I incorporated procedures in the study that 
prompted me to look for alternative, rival perspectives that might emerge from 
the data collection and analysis, including outlier perspectives, and present 
plausible “next best” meanings for the data.  I was aware that Yin (2003, p. 
163) considered this step one of the key elements of an exemplary case study. 
I was also aware of Yin’s other verification measures, including case topic 
significance, data collection completeness, sufficient evidence display, and 
reader engagement in the case report or narrative (2003, pp. 160-165). 
7. Getting Feedback from Informants.  The procedures in this study for 
following-up the participant interviews with what Maxwell (1996) calls 
“member checks” (p. 94) were conducted in two phases—first every 
participant received a copy of the typed transcript of their audio-recorded 
interview for their review and approval; and, second, they received a copy of 
any excerpts from the approved transcript that were identified for possible 
inclusion in the narrative report of the study; and this, too, they were asked to 
review and approve.   
8. Intentional Redundancy. I endeavored to follow what was described by 
Creswell (1998 p. 202) a key feature of verification—the intentional redundancy 
in the collected data as a way to confirm assertions, interpretations, and 
inferences notes that, in addition to verification through triangulation.  Yin (2003, 
p. 162) also describes this as a key element of a case study’s completeness.   
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Maxwell (1996) calls this the “rich data” phase of validity testing, and it includes 
verbatim interview transcripts and detailed, descriptive note taking (p. 95). 
Quality 
 In addition to procedures for verification, procedural measures were included to 
ensure that the study maintained a high level of quality.  This is defined as authenticity in 
portraiture (Lawrence-Lightfoot, 1997).  Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 277-280) offered 
five tests for quality that I was aware of and incorporated as procedural safeguards:  
1. Confirmability.  The study’s methods and procedures were described and 
implemented in detail; updates and changes to the procedures were 
documented and preserved, with attention given to noting the organizational 
relationship and sequential implementation of the research methods; and care 
was taken to guard against researcher bias.   
2. Dependability.  The processes of the study were implemented consistently, 
with an emphasis on clarity, uniformity, and completeness in data collection, 
data analysis, and triangulation; and critical friends were utilized to review 
and comment on the narrative report of the study. 
3. Credibility.  The development of conclusions and the narrative rendering of 
the portrait emphasized authenticity, comprehensiveness, and coherence, with 
attention to the convergence of data through triangulation and the continual 
link to the research questions and theoretical framework. 
4. Transferability.  The characteristics of the study’s elements and conclusions 
were fully described, with an emphasis on preserving a procedural record that 
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can be understood, compared, and replicated; along with a goal of producing 
conclusions and a narrative that were well-documented and complete. 
5. Application.  The creation of the overall portrait strived for intellectual 
accessibility and value, providing the reader with a narrative report that is 
useful to researchers and practioners. 
Ethical Responsibilities 
 The development and implementation of this study included a determination to 
maintain ethical standards that strive to protect the integrity of both the study and its 
participants.  I was aware of the range of ethical issues, as described by Miles and 
Huberman (1994, pp. 291-297), which were addressed throughout the conduct of the 
project.  These ethical responsibilities included protecting study participants from 
avoidable harm and risks, maintaining relationships based on honesty and trustworthiness, 
and shielding participants with appropriate levels of privacy and confidentiality.  I upheld 
these responsibilities. 
Special care also was taken to ensure the openness of the study, its attention to 
goodness, and the free choice of individuals on whether they wished to participate 










The study of crisis management by leaders of the Montgomery County Public 
Schools during the sniper shootings of October 2002 encompasses a period of 23 days in 
which the shootings took place and prior events that formed the foundation of the school 
district’s crisis response.  The resulting portrait provides a comprehensive description of 
a single case, bounded within an identified place and time, involving specific actions, 
decisions, events, and participants.  The portrait is informed by a conceptual framework 
for understanding crisis management in the context of school district leadership, as 
presented in Chapter 2, and an analytical methodology for understanding the events of the 
case, as presented in Chapter 3.  Chapter 4 presents the initial events of the case through 
the fourth day of the crisis.  The chapter begins nine months before the sniper attacks.  
Context of Last Crisis Guided New Plan 
 On January 11, 2002, senior leaders of the Montgomery County Public Schools 
introduced a new crisis management plan for the central office.  The plan was unveiled at 
an afternoon meeting in the small auditorium where the Board of Education usually met.  
Invitees received copies of the plan as they entered the room.  This was the first time 
most of them had seen the document, felt the pages in their hands, and learned about their 
new responsibilities.  The plan affected more than 70 people.  From a variety of offices 
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representing the dual sides of the school district’s central office—operations and 
instruction—they sat side-by-side in theatre-style seats as a slide show conveyed an 
overview of the district’s current thinking about worst-case scenarios.  They heard the 
term “emergency response” in the name of the new plan, and they heard the terms 
“incident command” and “incident commander” and “command and control” to describe 
its administration (Overview, 2002).   
The meeting occurred four months to the day after the terrorist attacks the 
previous September, and attacks of anthrax-laden envelopes were even more recent.  The 
meeting represented the school district’s largest assembly of central office staff as 
potential crisis management participants.  On paper, each had a role to play in the new 
plan’s implementation.   
The first speaker was the superintendent of schools, Jerry D. Weast.10  A set of 
suggested remarks for him had been prepared by staff and referred to Columbine, the 
terrorist attacks, and the need for “a formal process for dealing with and responding to all 
types of emergency situations” ("Talking points, emergency plan," 2002).  Weast knew 
well about the need for such a process.  After the September attacks, he directed his 
principal deputies, James A. Williams11 and Larry A. Bowers,12 with responsibility for 
                                                 
10 Jerry D. Weast, Ed.D., was appointed superintendent in August 1999.  He was previously
superintendent of seven school districts in four states:  Kansas, Montana, North Carolina, and South 
Dakota, beginning in 1976; and a teacher and elementary and secondary principal, beginning in 1969
("Biography," 2009; "Board of Education approves," 1999).  He remains superintendent, reappointed twice.
11 James A. Williams, Ed.D., was appointed deputy superintendent in 2000.  He previously worked 
in Washington, D.C., as a teacher, guidance counselor, assistant principal, and principal of a learning center 
and a high school.  He also was assistant superintendent, deputy superintendent, and superintendent of the 
Dayton Public Schools in Dayton, Ohio.  He is currently superintendent of Buffalo Public Schools, Buffalo, 
New York ("Board report," 2000a; "Buffalo," 2010) 
12 Larry A. Bowers was appointed chief operating officer in 1999 and currently retains that 
position. He began work for the school district in 1978 as staff assistant to the Board of Education.  He then 
(Continued next page) 
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developing the plan presented that afternoon and subsequently to the Board of Education 
(Weast, 2002r).  He told a national conference audience more than a year later that the 
events of 9/11 caught the district ill-equipped to respond to the immediate effects and 
implications of terrorist attacks at the nation’s capital just miles away.  “We really were 
not prepared,” he told conference participants (22 days of crisis, 2003).13    
In fact, problems arose from a very basic level. In notes prepared for Williams’ 
portion of the presentation of the new plan, schools were described as “well-prepared” for 
an emergency at individual buildings, but it was a different story at the district level and 
for events involving multiple schools:  “There has been no written protocol in place for a 
countywide emergency” ("Talking points, emergency plan," 2002).  In other words, there 
was no plan to follow, and district leaders responded to emergencies based largely on 
personal experience and expertise.  As Weast informed the Board of Education a few 
weeks after the plan’s unveiling to staff, the district’s new Incident Command System 
addressed that problem by establishing a formal organization of responsibility and 
authority and  improving the district’s “collective ability to respond” (Weast, 2002r, p. 1).   
Positional Authority 
The need for such a plan had been building for years, and reached a pivotal point
in the spring of 1999, about four months before Weast was appointed superintendent.  On
April 20 of that year, in Jefferson County, Colorado, two students shot and killed
___________________ 
(Continued from previous page) 
served as administrative assistant to the deputy superintendent; director of management, budget, and 
planning; chief financial officer, and twice as an acting deputy superintendent.  Previously, he worked in 
the private sector in financial accounting ("Board Report," 1999a) 
13 For an extended description of the impact of the terrorist attacks on the school district and the 
emergency response, see “Appendix B: Lessons from September 11.”   
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themselves and 12 other students and a teacher and injured 21 other students, in addition
to those hurt trying to escape, at Columbine High School (The Report, 2001).  In the 
months after the shootings, Montgomery County implemented several new security 
procedures directed at improving individual school safety, such as the Code Red and 
Code Blue measures.14  An institutional shift to formal procedures for districtwide crisis 
management did not begin until nearly three years later, with distribution of the new plan 
to the assembly of central office staff. 15  In between those events, there were three 
turning points that suggested the shift had already occurred.   
A new management philosophy accompanied the beginning of Weast’s tenure as 
superintendent in August 1999.16  Years later, in response to an inquiry about events 
following a horrific bus accident in May 2000, he described a very concrete view about 
the exercise of positional authority in relation to official responsibility:   
I learned a long time ago…that you actually have more than positional 
power…it’s a power of example, and that power opens doors that help people in 
times of crisis…I would go to the accident scene, especially where there was a 
death or a tragic circumstance, not because I wanted to chase the ambulance, but 
because I wanted to force people to pay attention to the participants. And in our 
case, it was always children (Weast interview, personal communications, 2007).  
 
The bus accident involved the death of the driver, while the bus was full of 
students going home from an elementary school.  Weast went to the scene, using a   
contact with the police department to get past the barricades, and became the district’s 
first superintendent in recent times (if ever) to engage in that manner.  It did not end  
                                                 
14 For an extended description of the effects of the shootings and changes made in Montgomery 
County, see “Appendix C: Impact of Columbine.” 
15 A detailed description of the plan is provided in “Appendix D: Incident Command System.” 
16 An extended description of changes in management philosophy and operations of the school 
district that followed Weast’s appointment is provided in “Appendix E:  Positional Authority.” 
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there. He accompanied the students to a nearby hospital, another unprecedented action,  
and continued to demonstrate the exercise of positional authority by marshalling  
resources and assistance in front of the school district staff assigned to do the same thing.   
 Judy Madden,17 then supervisor of counseling services, was at the hospital with 
crisis support teams.  The teams were trained to take commands only from the team captains, 
which included Madden.  She recalled years later the confusion that erupted when their 
training was challenged by new circumstances and new commands that emerged as a result 
of the unexpected presence of the superintendent.  The experience sparked the most basic of 
questions, she said, about “who do you respond to, who do you take directions from—to 
make sure that there is a coherent response?” (Madden, personal interview, 2007).18 
Central Command 
Edward A. Clarke,19 a retired county police captain, was then the newly appointed 
director of school safety and security for the district.  His first crisis response for the district 
was the bus accident when he gained access for Weast and Williams to the accident scene 
and gained some insight about the superintendent’s exercise of authority (“Appendix F: 
Bus Accident”).  One of his immediate responsibilities was the development of a new 
                                                 
17 Judy Madden, Ed.D., was appointed supervisor of counseling services in 1999.  She began work 
in the school district in 1985 as a school counselor, pupil personnel worker, and counseling specialist.  She 
is currently director of educator learning for College Summit in Washington, D.C. (Madden, personal 
communications, 2010). 
18 For an extended description of the accident response and associated changes in expectations for 
emergency management in the school district, see “Appendix F:  Bus Accident.” 
19 Edward A. Clarke was appointed director of school safety and security in 2000.  He was 
previously a captain and director of the training academy for the Montgomery County Police Department.   
He also served as a patrol officer, sergeant, commander of two offices (field training and evaluation, and 
planning and policy management) and two districts (Wheaton-Glenmont and Bethesda), and director of 
special operations.  He is currently a consultant in private practice in Olney, Maryland ("Board report," 
2000b; Clarke, personal communications, 2010). 
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emergency response plan, which was delivered the following year, after the terrorist 
attacks.20 
Years later, Clarke recalled framing the new plan around a structure that was 
familiar to police yet retained the school district’s own identity and authority.  He 
recalled thinking that the purpose of the incident command model was to provide a 
common structure across all governmental agencies in response to an emergency.  “They 
can co-exist, and they should co-exist, in an efficient way in the resolution of a variety of 
emergencies or crisis,” he said (Clarke, personal interview, 2007).   
The new response plan covered any incident “defined as an emergency or crisis 
that threatens the health and safety of students, staff, and parents at an individual school 
or office, multiple schools or offices, or across the school system” (Emergency plan, 
2002, p. A-1).  The envisioned emergencies included injuries and deaths, threats of 
violence, firearms, building fires, bombs, and hazardous materials, as well as national or 
state emergencies.  The plan was 20 pages in length.  Most of the document was 
descriptions of “duties and responsibilities” of the participants, including an incident 
commander, the members of the incident command team, and the four sub-groups for 
operations, planning, logistics, and finance (Emergency plan, 2002, pp. B-1 to  B-20).   
A single-page summary described the plan’s purpose and scope, and a short 
phrase captured the essence of the plan: “central office coordination and deployment of 
multiple layers of personnel and resources” (Emergency plan, 2002, p. A-1).  In other 
words, the plan was less about specific responses to identified emergencies and more 
                                                 
20 Note:  I was a member of a small planning committee that worked with Clarke in helping to 
prepare the new emergency response plan. 
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about a common response based on structure and authority, a change in the institutional 
perspective on emergency management that evolved with important events (Figure 4.1).  
Narrow Focus 
Analyzing the responsibilities of the plan's top position—the incident 
commander—a narrow focus emerged in five main areas (as developed for this study and 
introduced in Chapter 2):  making sense of the crisis, meaning making for others, 
addressing matters related of district structure, being sensitive to district operations, and 
ensuring staff implementation of district decisions.   This concentration was evident when 
a content analysis of the job responsibilities was undertaken in relation to the components 
of the conceptual framework (Figure 3.1).  The limited areas of focus meant that the  
other areas were largely unmentioned.  These were primarily the people-oriented   
components, including explicit actions to ensure that students and staff are safe.   
Schools Trained 
Three months before the central office staff were informed of the new plan,  
Clarke distributed an initial draft of the plan to principals in late October 2001, along 
with a new draft “guidelines and procedures” for updating school crisis plans and a 
memorandum explaining the packet (Clarke, 2001a, p. 3).  The guidance provided 
principals with a list of the required components a “comprehensive school  
emergency/crisis plan” and identified new measures such as “chain of command,” 
“command post,” an “emergency kit” for managing a crisis, and updated instructions for 
conducting a Code Red or Code Blue (Draft guidelines, 2001, pp. 1-3).  At the time, the 
districtwide plan for the central office was under development.  The focus on schools first 
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was a continuation of past-practices in the school district, which quietly emphasized that 
safety and security among the nearly 200 schools across the 500-square-mile school 
district was largely a local affair.21   
Robert B. Hellmuth22 was then the assistant director for school safety and 
security.  He later recalled that at the time the schools received the new guidelines the 
district was moving rapidly to provide updated instruction on security measures 
following the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax attacks.  The training began on December 4, 
                                                 
21 See extended description of the school district’s safety and security efforts in “Appendix G: 
Montgomery School Security.” 
22 Robert B. Hellmuth served with the Montgomery County Police Department from 1970 to 1992, 
the last five years in the Special Investigations Division.  He began work for the school district in 1995 as a 
middle school security assistant and then as a high school security team leader, field security coordinator, 
and assistant director of school safety and security. He is currently director ("Board report," 2007; 
Hellmuth, personal communications, 2008, 2010). 
 




2001, and ended in March 2002, with 11 classes offered at various times, each lasting 
from two to three hours.  Participants needed to attend only one session, and the sessions 
were filled with school administrators, teachers, school-based security and building 
service personnel.  Also participating were community superintendents and other staff 
from the Office of School Performance, which oversaw the supervision of schools—the 
only central office personnel invited to attend.  Ninety percent of schools participated, 
and the training was voluntary.  “We provided training for anyone who responded to our 
offer,” he recalled (Hellmuth, personal interview, 2007).   
In a report to the Board of Education, Weast said the training was “an ongoing 
and dynamic process” with sessions tailored to specific groups, with the departments of 
transportation and maintenance added (Weast, 2002t, p. 2).  The initial training for 
school-based staff was designed as the first phase of a two-part lesson plan, with the more 
advanced training set to continue in October 2002.  Ultimately, the reported tally of 
participants included more than 3,100 school district employees.  Absent from among 
targeted employees were the superintendent’s leadership team and the personnel who 
attended the meeting in January 2002 to implement the new districtwide emergency plan.  
Among these people were those who ultimately participated in the Incident Command 
Team convened in October 2002, in response to the sniper shootings.  Instead, their 
training consisted of a table-top exercise during the summer, just prior to the opening of 
schools, without any pre-training.    
Hand-Picked Team 
The people who were chosen to attend the meeting in January 2002 were well 
regarded.  In his orientation comments, Clarke told them they were essentially hand-
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picked for their new roles and assignments. The slides on the projection screen described 
them as “highly skilled and trained” and selected for the teams on the basis of their 
“collective knowledge, skills, and abilities” (Overview, 2002).  This message was 
repeated to Board of Education the following month at a public meeting in which the 
same overview was provided.   
The large number of people involved in the plan reflected one of its defining 
characteristics—there were three team members identified by name for nearly every 
position, one person as the primary team member and two others as back-ups.  Several 
people served on multiple teams (for example, I was a primary for one position and a 
back-up for another). This “three-deep” strategy, as it came to be known, was designed to 
ensure that every position was covered if an emergency occurred and people were 
unavailable for any reason.  The only position without three designated assignments was 
the incident commander, which had two (Larry A. Bowers, the chief operating officer, 
and Richard Hawes, director of facilities management).  Weast was not named to any of 
the team positions, and on the organizational chart, he was identified as the 
superintendent, overseeing the entire organizational structure (Clarke, 2002c).   
By omission, the assignments also identified people who were not chosen, 
including senior staff.  Each appointment was approved by Weast.  He later told 
participants at a conference that he learned a lesson after watching some senior staff 
reactions during the terrorist attacks in 2001.  “Not everybody works well in a panic,” he 
said then (22 days of crisis, 2003).  In response to an inquiry years later, Weast recalled 
that he wanted people in the command team positions who could act on the basis of skills 
and abilities, not necessarily bureaucratic authority: 
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Some of the people we found in positional power…couldn’t hold up under a 
crisis, and yet they were darn good at what they were doing educationally, but in a 
crisis [they] either took too long to make a decision or were more paralyzed in 
making the decision (Weast, personal interview, 2007).  
 
As a result, some individuals who held lower-level positions in the district’s main 
office were chosen over more senior administrators.   
Table Top Drill  
By late spring of 2002, no training was scheduled for central office staff in their 
new roles in the incident command system.  Bowers, as the chief operating officer, oversaw 
the day-to-day operations of the school district, including such diverse elements as student 
transportation and school performance.  Although school safety and security reported to 
James A. Williams, the deputy superintendent, Bowers wrote directly to Clarke, the 
director of school safety and security, on May 8 about the delay in training.  In his 
memorandum, which was shared simultaneously with the senior staff, Bowers specifically 
inquired about scheduling a “tabletop exercise…within the next month” and noted previous 
discussion about “the importance of practicing our response to a crisis situation” (Bowers, 
2002c).  The exercise had been expected much earlier.  Weast told the board the previous 
February that “a tabletop emergency/crisis exercise… will be conducted in the near future” 
(Weast, 2002r, p. 3).   
The exercise was announced on June 28 as scheduled for the last week of July.  In 
announcing the event, Bowers wrote to all of the participants, encouraging their 
attendance and acknowledging the potential conflicts with summer schedules.  He 
emphasized the importance of being as “prepared as possible” in the event of an 
emergency (Bowers, 2002a). The day before the planned exercise, the event was 
postponed when the air conditioning system in the main meeting room broke down.  The 
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new date was set for the next month, in late August, on a Friday morning, four days 
before opening of schools. Clarke told participants in an e-mail that there were no other 
options.  It was “imperative,” he wrote, “that we conduct this exercise prior to the first 
day of school” (Clarke, 2002b).  Nonetheless, several participants responded by e-mail to 
the school safety and security department with their regrets, saying they were unable to 
attend ("Table top exercise," 2002).  Their reasons included a niece’s wedding, a 
daughter’s college visit, an office staff retreat, medical appointments, and personal leave.  
No Prior Training 
The table top practice was held on August 23, 2002.  The participants were 
assigned to one of five teams.  In addition to the central command group, there were teams 
for operations, logistics, planning, and finance, in accordance with the incident command 
structure (Figure D.1 in “Appendix D”).  The teams gathered in separate rooms within the 
headquarters building.  This was their first meeting as a team since the orientation seven 
months earlier.  There had been no other training since then.  When Bowers announced 
plans for the exercise in late June, he asked participants to prepare themselves by reviewing 
the materials they received the previous January.  They were “expected,” he wrote, “to be 
familiar with the responsibilities of their designated roles within the Incident Command 
System” (Bowers, 2002a).   
They were to know what to do, he informed them, because the event was expected 
“to test the readiness of all components” of the newly designed plan (Bowers, 2002a).  
The exercise involved a tabletop drill designed to practice crisis management skills under 
controlled conditions.  Participants were seated around tables in conference rooms, 
essentially role-playing to a scripted event.  The drill required responses to escalating 
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scenarios of mayhem associated with a tornado “destroying everything in its path” 
(Tabletop presentation, 2002).  The planned destruction included the collapse of school 
gymnasium roof, an overturned tanker truck in front of a school, and other subsequent 
emergencies affecting several identifiable schools and locations in nearby Olney, 
Maryland. Bowers led the exercise.   
The drill felt strikingly realistic. Tensions were raised.  The pace was fast.  
Participants were warned to say “this is an exercise” if they talked with anyone not also 
role-playing within the drill (Tabletop presentation, 2002).  Over the course of four 
hours, participants responded in real time to the unfolding developments as they learned 
about them from the exercise planners.  Clarke and his staff used a tightly scripted 
schedule to maintain a heightened awareness of time and the pressure of deadlines.   
In the plan for the exercise, the first three objectives were to self-assess the 
readiness of team members, identify new ideas, and build team collaboration.  The fourth 
objective was to “evaluate the school system’s response” overall in the preparation for a 
real crisis (Tabletop exercise, 2002). Participants also were to record their activities for 
later review and assessment.  At the start of the exercise, they were instructed to 
“maintain a written activity log” and participate with the response team officers in a 
debriefing “to assess, evaluate, and discuss lessons-learned” (Tabletop presentation, 
2002).  Observational notes were taken by school safety and security staff and kept on 
file in a binder.  Two weeks after the exercise, Weast informed the Board of Education 
about the exercise in a report on school security preparations for the new school year.  
“This exercise,” he wrote, “tested all components of the plan and evaluated its strengths 
and weaknesses. We will continue to evaluate the process…” (Weast, 2002t).  A draft 
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evaluation was prepared by school safety and security staff, but it was never submitted, nor 
acted upon.  The mock emergency was overshadowed a few weeks later by the real thing.  
Observant Leader  
Weast did not participate in the training exercise.  He observed.  Officially, there 
was little for him to do in the role assigned to him in the new plan.  His main 
responsibility was to decide when to activate the system and whether to delegate 
authority to the incident commander (Emergency plan, 2002, p. B-2).  He deferred to 
Bowers for the training exercise. Bowers’ name appeared as incident commander on all 
the documents associated with the plan.  Weast agreed with the command structure from 
the outset, communicating his approval in a memorandum to the Board of Education six 
months earlier.  “Mr. Bowers,” he wrote in February, “has been designated as the primary 
incident commander and has been given the authority and responsibility for developing 
the school system response to the emergency/crisis” (Weast, 2002r, p. 2).   
In all other respects, the command framework retained the existing governance 
structure for the school district, with the Board of Education and superintendent of 
schools at the top of the organizational chart (Figure D.1 in “Appendix D: Incident 
Command System”).  Once the command system was activated, the plan described the 
superintendent’s major functions as ensuring “the continuity of the school system,” in 
terms of activities other than those directed toward the emergency, and to serve “as a 
liaison” to governmental and political authorities (Emergency plan, 2002, p. B-2).  There 
was no mention of being involved in the minutia of operational command decisions, 
except possibly in an advisory role in communications with the incident commander, who 
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was ensure that “the superintendent…[is] fully briefed on all aspects of the 
emergency/crisis” (Emergency plan, 2002, pp. B-3) .   
For Bowers, this alignment made sense based “on the premise,” he told command 
team members several months later, that the superintendent would be elsewhere in a 
major emergency, working primarily with county emergency management authorities 
(Lessons learned, 2002, p. 1).  In such a scenario, Weast and Bowers were to work in 
tandem, relying on close communications and coordination.  Even though this was not 
what the new structure described, it was what Bowers recalled as the best possible 
scenario. 
Decision making itself has got to be directed by either the superintendent or the 
commander on site [at the central office], which many times is me, because the 
superintendent likes to go out to the scene. It’s his communication with me that 
really should drive everything else, and the challenge is then to have a 
communication system where that actually works… (Bowers, personal interview, 
2007) 
 
At the outset, however, the formal structure had its doubters.  Judith Madden, the 
supervisor of counseling, recalled years later being unable to reconcile the new structure 
with her own experiences, including the bus accident two years earlier and then the 
terrorist attacks.  “I remember thinking that was a crazy incident command structure to 
begin with,” she later said, “because I knew in reality that [it] would never happen. 
There’s no way he would—that Jerry [Weast] was going to yield decision making” 
(Madden, personal interview, 2007). 
In early September, a few weeks after the table-top drill, Weast expressed 
confidence in the district’s emergency readiness in an update to the Board of Education.  
“While we hope that we are never faced with any situation that requires the activation of 
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the emergency/crisis plan, it is important that we are prepared in case the need arises,” he 
wrote (Weast, 2002t).  The first test came less than a month later. 
Superintendent Took Over after First Shots 
On Thursday, October 3, 2002, school security was not an urgent issue on an 
otherwise typical school morning.  The district’s website displayed images of smiling 
students and reports of school improvements (Figure 4.2).  The day before was National 
Walk to School Day, an event described by the school district as a way to improve 
physical fitness as well as child safety (Schools participate, 2002).  The morning 
newspaper described the latest academic initiative ("Schools," 2002).   There was no 
indication of a pending crisis.   
The initial shooting happened at about 7:45 a.m., but it was of little notice, until a 
second shooting within 40 minutes, followed by a third shooting within another 30  
minutes.23  It was not yet 9 a.m.   The regular process of opening schools was in effect, 
with the last of the elementary schools set to open at 9:15 a.m. (Management plan, 2001, 
pp. 17-21).   
The focus shifted abruptly to security, as word of the shootings spread.  The 
county was later described as “an ideal place to unleash the terror,” in part, because it 
lacked much experience with public violence (Londoño & Rich, 2006).  
                                                 
23 The first shooting killed a man mowing the grass near Rockville Pike at White Flint Mall at 
about 7:45 a.m. The second shooting occurred about 35 minutes later at about 8:25 a.m., and killed a man 
pumping gas at a Mobile service station on Connecticut Avenue at Aspen Hill Road.  Less than a half hour 
later, the third shooting killed a woman sitting on a bench in front of a restaurant along Georgia Avenue, on 
the outskirts of Olney (Horwitz & Ruane, 2003; "John Muhammad v. Maryland," 2007, pp. 5-6). 
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In the span of less than an hour, most of the preparations of the previous year in 
the development and implementation of the new emergency response plan—including the 
designation of Larry A. Bowers as the incident commander—were set aside and the 
superintendent retained authority for the emergency management of the school district 
(Figure 4.3).  Weast proceeded to direct a series of quick decisions with a small group of 
staff, including Bowers and me, before convening the rest of the senior staff.   
  
 
Figure 4.2  Public Face Prior to the Shootings 
Image of district’s website on September 23, 2002, retrieved August 15, 2007, from Internet 
Archive (online database) at http:www.archive.org. Copyright 2002, Montgomery County 




 Initial Police Warning  
School operations, at the district level on the morning of October 3, 2002, were 
not part of the initial police response.24 Almost one hour elapsed after the third shooting, 
and nearly two hours after the first shooting, before police notified the school district.25 
Robert B. Hellmuth, the assistant director of school safety and security, was in his office 
that morning.  His supervisor, Edward A. Clarke, was attending a funeral in Silver Spring 
of a former police colleague.  Years later, Hellmuth, who also had been a police officer 
                                                 
24 The police response evolved into a large-scale manhunt, with assistance from state, federal, and 
local agencies, with officers searching vehicles “with guns drawn” (Cannon, 2003, p. 25).  The county’s 
transportation staff monitored remote traffic cameras, looking for clues ("9/11 lessons," 2002). 
25 A police spokeswoman that morning, as quoted in a later book, said the shootings were a “crime 
that we have not experienced before” (Cannon, 2003, p. 24).  It was so unusual that the county’s murder 
rate increased by 25% in one day, according to another account of the incident (Horwitz & Ruane, 2003, p. 
87). Five years later, a police commander said in a television news report: “In the beginning, it was chaos. 
We didn't know where to go” ("Minds," 2007).   
 




for Montgomery County, recalled receiving a call from a police lieutenant at about 9:30 
a.m.  He said the conversation was semi-official in tone, more of a concerned tip by 
someone he knew than a deliberate component of an organized tactical response by the 
police command.  The lieutenant told him about three shootings in the previous two 
hours, all in different public places near residential communities and all fatal.  He suggested 
that children be brought off playgrounds at nearby schools (Hellmuth, personal interview, 
2007).   
At the time, the three known killings had been added to a similar shooting the 
night before.26  The combined shooting sites marked a swath through the center of the 
county.  The geographic area was later described as “roughly five miles long and three 
miles wide,” including several “densely populated” communities (Horwitz & Ruane, 
2003, p. 78).  In reality, as later revealed in court testimony, the assailants considered the 
potential killing field as much larger.27  Police had contacted a few schools five miles 
north of the third shooting, in an extension of the presumed murder route along Georgia 
Avenue toward Olney.28  Brooke Grove Elementary, the first school along that route, 
implemented its own Code Blue precautions as a result.  Other nearby schools took 
similar precautions, also on their own.  
                                                 
26 The shooting occurred at about 6:00 p.m., Wednesday, October 2, killing a man with a shot 
through his back as he walked across a parking lot of a shopping center in Wheaton ("John Muhammad v. 
Maryland," 2007, p. 3).   
27 Lee Boyd Malvo later testified that he and his older accomplice, John Allen Muhammad, 
“scouted out the entire Montgomery County” for potential shooting sites ("State of Maryland v. 
Muhammad," 2006, p. ¶ 10:16:27).  They had pre-planned routes marked on a computer.  “If there was 
nothing, we moved on because there were plenty of other areas,” he testified ("State of Maryland v. 
Muhammad," 2006 ¶ 10:16:27).  He said their plan was to kill five people the first day. 
28 Instead, as Malvo later testified, the assailants reversed course and turned south to another 
previously “designated spot,” after bypassing four to five other “potential areas” that they rejected as “too 
busy” ("State of Maryland v. Muhammad," 2006 ¶ 10:16:27).   
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 The actual number of schools and students within five miles of the shooting sites 
that morning (a large area measured linearly but consistent with the travel distance to 
some schools warned by police) was enormous—97 schools and more than 77,000 
students, as later calculated by school district staff (Figure 4.4).  At that size, the impact 
area represented nearly half the school district. 
Path to Code Blue 
During the half-hour following the police lieutenant’s call, a series of decisions 
were made that resulted in the implementation of a districtwide Code Blue at about 10:00 
a.m.  The decision was unprecedented, and the decision process was brief, as 
reconstructed years later from the recollections of participants and the school district’s 
archival file of notes, documents, and other artifacts from that morning.   
The process began after the police notified Hellmuth.  He alerted his on-site 
supervisor, James A. Williams, the deputy superintendent, and then Larry A. Bowers,  
the chief operating officer, was informed, among others (including me).  This was the 
typical notification process—in person or by phone, followed by a small group of senior 
staff taking a measure of what was happening and discussing options. The group gathered 
in Williams’ office.  He had the largest and most centrally located workplace in the 
building.  A big conference room was next door, the same room where the command 
team members conducted the table-top drill six weeks earlier.  Under the emergency 
response plan, the conference room was the designated command post, a non-descript 
space of cinderblock walls, florescent lighting, and office furniture.  A large table was 
surrounded by lots of chairs, all on wheels, positioned arm to arm, with another back row 
of stationary chairs, against the walls, for the overflow.   
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 The room was down the hall and around the corner from the superintendent’s 
office, on the first floor of a historic school building, located not far from the county 
government offices in Rockville, the county seat.29  The room overlooked a back parking 
lot rimmed by tall trees adjacent to a nearby school.  However, the building’s front door, 
                                                 
29 The building was once the George Washington Carver High School and Junior College, a 
segregated facility that closed in the 1950’s.  It was renamed the Carver Educational Services Center, in 










Figure 4.4  Impact Areas of Shootings on October 3 
Illustration prepared by the Division of Long-range Planning, Montgomery County Public 




opening to other parking areas, on the other side of the facility, faced the same highway 
where the first shooting occurred less than five miles away.30 
Weast was not part of the initial notification of staff.  Bowers notified him within 
10 minutes of the police warning and he joined the group in Williams’ office.  The 
gathering began informally but most of the participants were standing after Weast 
arrived.  In the room were Bowers, Williams, Matthew A. Tronzano31 who was Bowers’ 
executive assistant, Hellmuth, and me.  Weast wanted an update from police and directed 
Hellmuth to get the lieutenant back on the phone.   
The requested police update was concise:  an unknown suspect, three people dead, 
plus one the night before, each with a high impact injury, single shot, from a distance, 
apparently with a rifle.  Discussions turned to options. Weast had a secretary present to 
take notes.  He also had a large map spread across the deputy superintendent’s desk and 
looked closely at the locations of the shootings and nearby schools, describing his 
interpretations to others.  He later recalled observing their reactions. “It wasn’t like there 
was a whole body of people around me saying, yeah, this is what we ought to do.  It was 
like, what are you doing?” he said (Weast interview,” 2007).    
 Weast also discussed the police information from the perspective of an 
experienced hunter.  Robert B. Hellmuth, who was also trained in firearms, joined the 
                                                 
30 The shooting site was along one of oldest and most prominent commercial corridors in the 
region. Rockville Pike evolved from colonial roads (based, in part, on Indian trails) that connected the port 
of Georgetown on the Potomac River to the western crossroads at Frederick, Maryland, in the foothills of 
the Appalachia mountain range (Choukas-Bradley, 2003, p. 18).  The portion of the road in front of the 
school district’s headquarters was named Hungerford Drive. 
31 Matthew A. Tronzano was appointed executive assistant to the chief operating office in 2000.  
He previously worked in the district as a classroom teacher, administrative assistant, principal of two 
elementary schools, and director of school administration.  He became associate superintendent for human 
resources in 2004.  He is currently executive director, The Jones Center for Families in Springdale, 
Arkansas ("Board report," 2004a; Tronzano, personal communications, 2010). 
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discussion as it focused on the threat of an apparent marksman. Weast said years later, in 
a newspaper article, that the details of the shootings meant to him that “nothing’s safe” 
(Sedam & Ford, 2007).32  At the time, the hunting analogy was met with initial 
skepticism among others in Williams’ office.  The skepticism continued after Weast 
convened a meeting of the senior staff in the conference room next door.  Donald H. 
Kress,33 the coordinating community superintendent, recalled the challenge people had in 
understanding the superintendent’s suggestions of the unthinkable:  
I think the fact that [Weast] and I are both hunters made us understand that it was 
possible for a trained shooter to deliver a fatal shot from 200 yards or more. We 
had an earlier understanding of the vulnerability of kids at bus stops and on 
playgrounds and athletic fields than did some other team members (Kress, 
personal interview, 2007). 
 
Unprecedented Idea 
As the earlier discussions continued in Williams’ office, Bowers suggested to 
Weast that a districtwide Code Blue was possible.  At the very least, it would keep 
students and staff indoors until things settled down.  For schools, this was the purpose of 
a Code Blue.  At the district level, no such plan existed.  The idea was unprecedented. 
The district had never been locked down essentially, with all students sheltered in place. 
                                                 
32 Police later that morning were quoted describing the killings as the work of a “skilled shooter” 
(Manning, 2002).  The term “sniper” was used widely in the media the next day, from descriptions of “a 
sniper who killed five people” in The Washington Post  ("For parents," 2002) to “roaming sniper picks off 
five in suburban terror” in The Times of London (Watson, 2002).    
33 Donald Kress began work for the school district in 1969 as a junior high school teacher and later 
served as a resource teacher, administrative intern, assistant principal at two schools, and principal of a 
junior high school and then a high school.  He became a director of school accountability in 1996 and then 
a community superintendent, prior being named coordinating community superintendent.  He is currently a 
consultant in Germantown, Maryland ("Board report," 1999b; Kress, personal communications, 2010). 
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Weast later called it “the far end of the extreme in terms of protection” (Sedam & Ford, 
2007). 34 
The idea evolved as calls were made to various offices, especially student 
transportation, placing them on alert.  Weast shared the outlines of the idea with county 
officials and wrote them down in his notes, referencing the time of 9:48 a.m. He also  
wrote “Head Shots” in the notes, as he received more details, and described the victims as 
both male and female with no pattern as to gender, race, and age ("Sniper crisis," 2002).   
The decision window was about to close.  It was almost lunch time for high 
schools, including schools that allowed students to leave their campuses to eat at local 
restaurants.35  The mid-day transportation of nearly 6,700 students for morning and 
afternoon kindergarten and early childhood programs also was scheduled to begin soon.36  
Bowers asked me to draft an announcement and wait for a decision.  In the adjoining 
conference room, a computer was tucked into a corner.  There was much commotion in 
the room, as people arrived for the meeting with Weast, initially unaware of what was 
taking place. 
 The Code Blue decision occurred about 28 minutes after the police lieutenant’s 
warning.  Based on a timeline reconstruction from archival records and interviews with 
participants, there were seven primary decision points along the way.  Analytical coding 
                                                 
34 The next morning, an editorial The Washington Post described the school district’s actions as 
part of a heroic progression:  “[As] courageous police officers and citizens rushed in vain to assist the 
victims at the various bloody sites…thoughts turned immediately to the safety of children” ("Roving 
gunfire," 2002). 
35 Off-campus travel also was available for high school students with internships and special 
education students engaged in life-skills activities in local communities.   
36 The half-day kindergarten programs involved 4,300 children, as well as another 2,380 children 
in Head Start and other pre-kindergarten programs (Schools at a glance, 2003).  The schools most affected 
were those in the immediate impact area of the shootings. 
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of the decisions suggested that each faced a different aspect of crisis management, in 
terms of the critical leadership tasks, social systems, reliability principles, and 
management targets in the conceptual framework developed for this study.  When 
envisioned together, the result was a complex image of overlapping focus areas, 
illustrating the dynamics involved in the process of crisis management (Figure 4.5).    
The decision also overlapped events elsewhere.  A fourth victim was shot in the 
middle of the county, not far from the first three shootings, at about the same time as the 
superintendent ordered the Code Blue.37  Weast and the others learned about the shooting 
later, and the location suggested an ominous turn.  The shooting occurred near the first  
incident, on the same highway as the second, and on a route heading south from the 
third—in effect, doubling-back toward the beginning.   
The school district’s decisions created a ripple-effect in the region as private and 
public schools “near and far followed suit,” sheltering students indoors in nearby 
Maryland counties and limiting outdoor activities in some Virginia counties ("For 
parents," 2002).  News media coverage increased rapidly, adding drama to already 
intense circumstances.  I later told a conference: “We entered into what can easily be 
called a media frenzy” (22 days of crisis, 2003).38   The coverage translated, in part, into 
an aggressive and repetitive cycle of news reporting and commentary.  Televised reports 
flowed into the conference room, where the coverage was monitored and recorded in the  
                                                 
37 The shooting occurred at about 9:58 a.m., killing a woman with a shot in the back while she 
vacuumed her car at a Shell gas station on Connecticut Avenue (Horwitz & Ruane, 2003, pp. 75-77; "John 
Muhammad v. Maryland," 2007, p. 7) 
38 An editor at The Washington Times, in an online posting, for example, later described the effort 
taken to photograph “a female victim sitting on a bench covered in a bloody sheet” and publish it “as the 
lead photo [the next day]…This play set the tone for our staff. Our editors made an aggressive decision to 
show the impact of this senseless killing and we were not about to let them down” (Owen, 2002). 
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team meeting notes (Meeting notes October 3).  Television stations interrupted their 
regular programming with live, seemingly breathless reports that gained in frequency and 
length, if not banality, as the day continued.39   
                                                 
39 An article in The Baltimore Sun the next morning illustrated the dramatic storyline: “From its 
bloody epicenter in Montgomery County…[the] stunning burst of…random killings sent waves of fear and 
disbelief through schools and stores from Northern Virginia to the Pennsylvania state line…As word 
spread…so did fear” (Kiehl, Hopkins, & Bishop, 2002). 
 
Figure 4.5  Patterns and Outliers in Conceptual Path of Code Blue Decision 
Underlying framework adapted from “social system model” by Hoy & Miskel (2008); “critical 





The media reports became controversial in their own right, sparking debates 
within the journalism community about whether the reporting was responsible or 
sensational (see, for example, Kurtz & Kalb, 2002; Lisheron, 2002; Smolkin, 2002).  
One television station, in particular, was found later in a study of media coverage to have 
“purveyed fear from the outset” (Censer, 2006).  
The coverage was seen across the country.  A school board member from Weast’s 
former school district in North Carolina, for example, called to offer encouragement 
about “this crisis today in Montgomery County,” after seeing reports on television while 
attending a conference in Seattle (Trevino, 2002).  The communications manager for the 
Alabama Department of Education sent an e-mail to me saying, “Just heard your 
interview on Fox News Channel…Let’s hope they catch the guys soon” (Salter, 2002). 
In the meantime, the emergency took on a life of its own and emotions were 
running high.  The events tested my own resolve when talking to the news media about 
steps being taken to keep children safe.  I commented later, in recalling the experience for 
an interview in a newsletter article, that there was little room for error:    
No matter how emotionally challenging the stress becomes, and no matter how 
chaotic the rest of the world may look at any given moment, you must always 
remain calm, controlled, and purposeful in your public comments…a panicky 
spokesperson just breeds more panic (Grunig, 2002). 
 
I had made two mistakes that morning, both as statements in the first Code Blue 
announcement.  The announcement incorrectly said “a man has been seen using a rifle” 
and “people have been injured, including fatalities” (Porter, 2002c).  The first mistake 
resulted from a misunderstanding of police reports; there was no sighting of a man with a 
rifle, only speculation about a likely scenario.  The second resulted from haste and hope.  




A few minutes after Weast made the Code Blue decision, the larger emergency 
response group assembled around the table in the conference room.  This was the first  
gathering since the table-top exercise six weeks earlier.  The conference room had been 
outfitted with new equipment.  In addition to the computer, there were extra telephone 
lines, electrical outlets, an emergency radio, a special kit with supplies, and a television 
mounted high on a wall.  Weast sat at the head of the table, a huge slab of dark walnut  
laminate that dominated the comparatively small room.  Weast had his back to the 
windows, facing the team and the television.  The television was on, tuned to a news 
channel.40  Virginia Brooks, an administrative secretary, sat to his left, taking notes 
continuously.41  To his right was Larry A. Bowers, as was the typical arrangement.  
James A. Williams, the deputy superintendent, sat farther along the side of the table, 
towards the middle, where he often conducted his own meetings.  Others were distributed 
in a seating order that reflected their familiar places.  (I typically sat at the far end, 
directly opposite Weast, near the computer and the door.) 
There were new people in the room.  The group included most of the executive 
staff and others who were not involved typically in the district’s emergency management.  
Some were given assignments and left soon after, and others stayed as the group settled 
in. One of the early participants was Roland Ikheloa,42 the staff assistant for the Board of 
                                                 
40 The television remained on for the entire day, with staff taking notes and highlighting breaking 
news as a description about the unfolding events (Meeting notes October 3, 2002). 
41 Brooks also collected “pertinent documents as a permanent record of the…school system’s 
actions” (G. R. Murphy & Wexler, 2004, p. 107). 
42 Roland Ikheloa was appointed staff assistant to the Board of Education in 1995.  He was 
previously a high school business manager and an adult education teacher, and a management and budget 
(Continued next page) 
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Education office. Years later he recalled encountering Weast in the hallway, and asked if 
he could attend the meeting.  “He said, yeah, take good notes,” Ikheloa recalled (Ikheloa, 
personal interview, 2007).  Another was Michael L. Subin,43 then chairman of the County 
Council’s education committee.  He remembered years later a flurry of activity at the 
council’s offices about the shootings that morning. “And then I got a call from the 
superintendent asking me to come over, that he was calling a meeting,” he said (Subin, 
personal interview, 2007).   
When Kress arrived, he recalled knowing little more than what he had heard from 
the news on the radio at a secretary’s desk next to his office.  “I knew that there had been 
these two [shootings], but I’m not sure if I heard about the third,” he said (Kress, personal 
interview, 2007).  Matthew J. Kamins,44 supervisor of psychological services, 
remembered the reaction he received from school district staff in a class on crisis 
strategies he was teaching that morning.  He told them about the shootings and he had to 
leave.  “People in the audience thought we were…putting them on, that this was part of 
our plan…that a crisis can happen at any time.…It was no plan, it was real,” he said 
___________________ 
(Continued from previous page) 
specialist for the school district.  He also previously worked as a financial accountant, college lecturer, and 
resource teacher.  He is currently the chief of staff for the Board of Education ("Board report," 1995; 
Ikheloa, personal communications, 2010) 
43 Michael L. Subin, J.D., was elected to the Montgomery County Council in 1986.  He was 
appointed to the public safety and education committees, the latter as chairman.  Reelected four times, he 
served 20 years on the council, the entire time as education committee chairman.  His tenure also included 
three terms as council president.  He served in the U.S. Naval Reserves, retiring as a captain.  He is 
currently an attorney in private practice and executive director of the Montgomery County Criminal Justice 
Coordinating Commission in Rockville, Maryland (Subin, personal communications, 2010).  
44 Matthew J. Kamins was named supervisor of psychological services in 2001.  He began work in 
the school district as a school psychologist beginning in 1989 and became a psychologist services specialist 
in 1999.  Previously, he worked in private practice as the owner and director of a learning center and 
director of behavioral support at two private schools.  He is currently a school psychologist in the school 
district’s student services unit (Kamins, personal communications, 2010). 
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(Kamins, personal interview, 2007).  Weast later told a conference audience: “We were 
reacting before the public was reacting” (22 days of crisis, 2003).   
When he entered the team meeting room for the first time, Roland Ikheloa, the 
staff assistant to the Board of Education, recalled a feeling of unease, if not rejection, 
from some others. “They were in war mode…and here their leader comes in with 
someone who they are probably comfortable with on an informal basis, but they had not 
been told ahead of time that this was going to happen,” he said (Ikheloa, personal 
interview, 2007).   
Weast said later that “establishing the team,” after having already made the Code 
Blue decision, was part of an effort to demonstrate the district’s independent authority 
and ability to take care of itself (Weast, personal interview, 2007).  Five years later, in a 
newspaper article, Weast characterized the group as part of his “kitchen cabinet,” in 
recalling the events of that morning (Sedam & Ford, 2007).45   
Permanent Command 
Weast had the option of delegating the role of leading the school district under the 
Emergency Response Plan adopted the previous spring, but he continued to direct the 
response, without acknowledging the formal plan or the need for one.  He became the 
incident commander in form and function and the other members of the emergency 
response team adjusted (see Figure 4.6).  “From a leadership standpoint, he was in charge  
                                                 
45 The term “kitchen cabinet” originated during the presidency of Andrew Jackson, initially as a 
derogatory reference by his critics to an unofficial group of advisors, and the group likely had the modern 
“appearance of a close-knit, informal group of aides” who were highly trusted and involved in political and 
personal activities that reflected “Jackson’s determination to direct his administration and to make himself 




Figure 4.6  Change in Command Structure, October 3 
Illustration adapted from Emergency Response Plan (2002). Rockville, MD: Montgomery County 
Public Schools.  Copyright 2002 Montgomery County Public Schools. Used with permission.
 
and everybody knew it,” recalled Michael L. Subin, the member of the County Council 
who also joined the team (Subin, personal interview, 2007).  Bowers, who was the 
designated incident commander under the Emergency Response Plan approved the 
previous spring, acknowledged the change later, in comments to team members, and 
described it as a permanent modification in the authority structure, with him as second in 
command.  “I will take over if he has to leave,” Bowers said then (Lessons learned, 2002, p. 1).   
 Weast recalled being unwilling to walk away from the situation, believing it 
would have been unfair to do so.  “I wasn’t going to duck and dodge,” he said (Weast, 
personal interview, 2007).  He referred to the leadership choice as similar to the 
improvisation of a military commander on the battle field:   
Any general…will tell you the best battle plans are changed immediately when 
the battle opens, and any leader that I’ve ever read about…[who] not only had the 
courage, but also opened themselves up to the criticism, led from the front” 




Weast’s choice was unavoidable, given the unique conditions that day, recalled 
Donald H. Kress, the coordinating community superintendent. “So, in that sense, I wasn’t 
surprised that the incident command structure broke down rather quickly,” he said (Kress, 
personal interview, 2007).  The decision made little difference at the time in terms of the 
goal of an organized command response, recalled Edward A. Clarke, the director of 
school safety and security.  “I’m not sure that we set out initially following the model, but 
when the superintendent convened that body of decision makers, or leaders, it kind of 
followed the natural construction of our plan,” he said (Clarke, personal interview, 2007).   
Focus on Structure  
 Over the 90 minutes following the Code Blue, Weast made a series of rapid 
decisions, several as a result of recommendations by Bowers (Figure 4.7).  Other actions 
were taken by command team members.  The events during that period of time were 
reconstructed, based on interviews with participants and the school district’s archival file.   
The decisions and actions formed a cascade of activities, built one on top of the other, as 
the clock ticked toward mid-day.  At one point, school district vehicles were sidelined as 
the police investigation widened, and personnel at training sites were told to stay where 
they were and not travel back to schools.  Matthew A. Tronzano, executive assistant to 
Bowers, remembered the calls made to the maintenance supervisors and other 
departments with vehicles on the road:    
We explained…do a general call to everybody, to stay put where you are, either 
get to the closest school or just pull over on the side of the road and stop driving 
until we can find out what’s going on (Tronzano, personal interview, 2007).   
 
The decisions resulted in extensive efforts to alert staff and parents, with formal 
and informal activities overlapping each other as different members of the team began  
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contacting their respective areas of responsibility (Figure 4.8).  As reconstructed from 
interviews and archival records, the process reflected a network of decision 
communications chiefly aimed at school communities from multiple sides.46  The 
redundancy was designed to offset a basic shortcoming in the e-mail system at that 
time—there was no quick way to prompt anyone to read the messages, let alone a natural 
cue (such as snow falling) to suggest an emergency message might be waiting.   
Principals were told to expect more changes, monitor their e-mail, and watch “current  
 
  
                                                 
46 An elementary school teacher later described the reaction when the decision was announced: 
“Code Blue, Code Blue, people going up and down the halls saying this really loud…running up and down 
the halls to check that outside doors are locked…I pull the blinds down and close them tight…” (Ochs, 
2002). 
   
   
   
   
   
   



















          Training ended 
        School vehicles sidelined 
       Afternoon kindergarten cancelled 
       Principals urged to monitor updates   
      Code Blue decision announced to staff, public  
     Incident command team assembled for initial meeting 
    Code Blue ordered, prohibiting all outside student activities 
   Superintendent conferred with police, county on response plans 
  Superintendent notified, began assessment and planning with key senior staff 
 School security notified senior staff about warning from police about three shootings 
            
9:35 9:40 9:48 9:57 10:00 10:02 10:14 10:15 10:50 11:32 
 
Decision/Action Times after Police Warning at 9:30 a.m. 




television broadcasts of breaking news regarding today's events involving the random 
shootings” (Porter, 2002m).47   
The actions and decisions of the team, over the course of the day, focused 
overwhelmingly on making sense of the crisis and attending to the structural and 
operational components of the school district in an effort to keep students and staff safe 
(Figure 4.9).  These focus areas were evident when 70 crisis actions involving one or  
  
                                                 
47 The county government also lacked means for emergency communications.  Kathleen Henning, 
program manager for the county’s Office of Emergency Management, told a Congressional committee two 
years later:  “We went from calls to our public information office immediately to the broadcast industry 
[which] started putting the information out…and the story was picked up”  ("Hearing," 2004, p. 19). 
 Figure 4.8  Complex Decision Communications Network, October 3 
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more members of the team, including 32 crisis decisions primarily by the superintendent, 
were identified through a reconstruction based on participant interviews and archival 
records and an analysis in relation to the conceptual framework developed for this study  
(see Table J.1 in “Appendix J: Tables”).  The analysis identified a general symmetry 
among the top two associations for actions and decisions, except in two areas—“making 
sense of the crisis,” in which there was a higher associated percentage of actions than  
 
Figure 4.9  Conceptual Focus Areas of Crisis Actions/Crisis Decisions, October 3   
Data reflect highest two percentages of crisis activities and crisis decisions associated with one or 
more conceptual framework components (see Table J.1 in “Appendix J: Tables”). Data overlap. 
Percentages rounded. Crisis actions include crisis decisions. 
Underlying conceptual framework adapted from “social system model” by Hoy & Miskel (2005); 




decisions, suggesting more information gathering activities; and “deference to expertise,” 
in which there was a higher associated percentage of decisions than actions, suggesting 
more reliance on others with pertinent knowledge and skills.   
Authority Demonstrated in Decision Delay 
On Thursday morning, October 3, after the Code Blue decision, there was an 
argument brewing over the authority to open and close schools.  Weast and others, 
including James A. Williams, deputy superintendent of schools, worked to prevent 
county officials from asserting control over the schools.  Weast announced to the team at 
mid-morning, according to notes of his remarks and his recollections and those of others, 
that he had received assurances from county officials that he had the authority, unless 
there was a state of emergency (Meeting notes October 3, 2002).  He later recalled there 
was little room for debate about the issue.  “We’re going to be the ones making the 
decision to open and close the schools.  It’s not going to be somebody else” (Weast, 
personal interview, 2007).    
A demonstration of the authority occurred later that morning, regarding a decision 
on whether to dismiss schools on time or hold students in place under the continuing 
Code Blue.  Based on a reconstruction of events from archival records and interviews 
with participants, the decision was made shortly after 11:00 a.m. to dismiss on a normal 
schedule, pending any further incidents.  School safety and security staff, along with the 
police, began making plans for controlling traffic and looking after children as they 
departed the school buildings.  The decision, however, was not shared with the team by 
Weast until more than an hour and a half later, at 12:38 p.m., prompting a rush of last-
minute communications to principals, who had been promised a decision by 1:00 p.m.    
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Police Chief Charles A. Moose did not delay.  He announced the decision during 
a press conference televised on CNN that began at 11:19 a.m.  A few minutes into the 
conference, according to a transcript of the televised conference, he said:   
We've been in constant contact with Dr. Weast and his staff…We have no 
information that this has anything to do with the schools. None of the victims 
have been of anything close to school age. None of the locations are close to the 
schools…I think the school kids are safe. They're being educated. They will be 
released under normal schedule….("Montgomery police," 2002) 
 
 The reaction was swift.  In the meeting room at the school district’s headquarters, 
about an a hour later, Weast emerged from a conference call in Williams’ office next 
door and told the team, according to the notes of his remarks, that his “decision making 
procedures” now included “working in concert with Police Chief Moose,” and he added 
that he had received “assurances” there was to be “as much police presence at schools as 
possible” for dismissal (Meeting notes October 3, 2002 ¶ 12:28 p.m.).  A short while 
later, a police spokesperson, in another press conference telecast on CNN, corrected the 
chief’s earlier statement:  “…in terms of the schools, Chief Moose has been in 
consultation with Superintendent Weast.  They will be announcing how the schools will 
be released shortly” ("Maryland authorities," 2002b).   The announcement was made at 
12:55 p.m., about 17 minutes after Weast informed the team. 
Weast described the decision, in a letter released to parents and staff that 
afternoon, as based on “the police department’s advice and the recommendations of the 
county’s emergency management team” and, as a result of working with the police and 
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county officials, “it was deemed safe and appropriate to dismiss children from school at 
the regular time” (Weast, 2002g).48       
The police spokesperson said that officers were deployed “not because there are 
any threats to the schools,” but because they wanted to make “sure our kids are safe when 
they're released,” in reference to traffic control ("Maryland authorities," 2002b).  Moose 
later wrote in a book he co-authored that the assignment of police and low-flying 
helicopters at and around schools were made “partly in case there was a sniper lurking in 
the woods, but largely because we wanted the community to see that we were there” 
(Moose & Fleming, 2003, pp. 31-32).  The county government was under intense 
pressure from parents to protect the schools, recalled Douglas M. Duncan,49 the county 
executive.  He said he supported the Code Blue decision and the “show of force and just 
the public display of police officers,” as necessary to maintain public confidence and 
sense of security (Duncan, personal interview, 2008).50   
Years later, Matthew A. Tronzano, the executive assistant to the chief operating 
officer, recalled the problem faced by principals in not knowing sooner.  Tronzano, who 
was also a former principal, said he knew principals had few options if students were not 
dismissed on time. As the day progressed, he said, their questions would have multiplied 
                                                 
48 Note:  As the director of communications, I wrote or assisted in the writing of the 
superintendent’s correspondence to parents and others during the events of the case, including those 
excerpted in the narrative report of this study. 
49 Douglas M. Duncan was previously a city council member and mayor of Rockville.  He was 
elected Montgomery County Executive in 1994 and re-elected twice, leaving office in 2006.  He later 
worked for the University of Maryland, College Park, as vice president of administrative affairs.  He is 
currently a consultant in private practice in Rockville ("Former County," 2008; Duncan, personal 
communications, 2010). 
50 By then, the assailants were not in Montgomery County.  Malvo testified they spent the 
afternoon near Howard University in Washington, D.C., scouting potential targets but finding none because 
there were “too many witnesses” ("State of Maryland v. Muhammad," 2006 ¶ 10:16:27).    
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along with their anxieties: “What do I do with my children, where do I put them, where 
do I send them?” (Tronzano, personal interview, 2007).   
Reaction of Parents  
Parents swarmed at schools early in the day, especially near the shootings sites.51  
Clarke later told a conference audience that such parent behavior was expected: “As we 
saw on September 11th [2001]…parents were coming to retrieve their school children, 
their loved ones, and that was a natural reaction” (How to lead, 2003, p. 73).  His 
department prepared for more of the same. 
There were thousands of young children from morning kindergarten classes who 
were held at schools at mid-day, unable to leave.  Security personnel at high schools were 
deployed to elementary schools. The scenes at schools were unlike anything ever seen by 
Clarke, a police veteran.  He later testified in court that the security measures, especially 
the presence of low-flying helicopters, “clearly left me with an eerie feeling and a sense 
of uncertainty” ("Commonwealth of Virginia v. Muhammad," 2003 ¶ 4277).52   
The subsequent media coverage mixed parent fear with images of police at 
schools (Figure 4.10). The police were described as standing “guard in groups of two at 
campuses, directing anyone away except for parents” ("For parents," 2002).  Among the 
parents were frightened moms and dads who “arrived at their children's schools, their 
faces harried and drawn, scared” (Fisher, 2002).  One parent wrote later: “I had been  
                                                 
51 Police Chief Moose, in statements at a press conference, asked parents to “not make a rush on 
our schools,” and saying that while he could not “arrest a parent” who insisted on coming to school, “it 
doesn’t help the situation at this point” ("Montgomery police," 2002). 
52 The use of helicopters flying over schools was a point of contention later.  A federal study said 
some experts thought “the aggressive use of military-style helicopters induced more fear than they 
alleviated,” while others valued the tactic “to suppress sniper activity” (G. R. Murphy & Wexler, 2004, p. 85). 
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riveted—and shaken—like everyone else I knew.  The mere sight of my two sons after 
school on Thursday had released in me a sense of relief so profound that my boys smelled 
my fear” (Frerking, 2002).   
Ease Back to Normalcy 
At mid-day, Weast was described telling the team that, preliminarily, he planned 
to open schools on time the next morning unless something happened (Meeting notes 
October 3, 2002 ¶ 12:50).  Still unresolved was the question of the Code Blue, which 
remained in place.  Elsewhere, however, the county government moved to keep school 
buildings available for public use that afternoon and evening, including outdoor use of  
 
 
Figure 4.10  Media Focus on Fear and Police at Schools. 
Excerpt of page reproduction from The Washington Post, October 4, 2002, p. A-13.  




athletic fields and courts, despite the school district’s decision to cancel school activities 
for students (Meeting notes October 3, 2002 ¶ 1:05).53   The sense of urgency was 
evaporating.  In the superintendent’s office, for example, a letter was received that 
afternoon from the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry offering 
assistance for students “in response to today's shooting spree” (Benoit, 2002).  The office 
staff forwarded the letter to another office to prepare an appropriate a response, attaching  
a routing slip with a due date of October 16, two weeks away (Sniper crisis, Week 1, 
2002).   
That evening, in events reconstructed with all participants, Bowers called me at 
home and alerted me to a probable decision about ending the Code Blue for the next 
morning and asked me draft a statement.  We discussed the details, and I then conferred 
with Weast on the final wording.  The announcement was released to principals by e-mail 
just after 8:30 p.m. and to the news media a half-hour later   Schools were to open on 
time and the Code Blue was lifted, but the prohibition on outdoor activities remained.  
The continuation was described as “a precautionary measure only to address parental and 
staff concerns about potential threats to student safety and security,” and the 
announcement noted the school district “continues to work closely” with the police and 
county government (Porter, 2002b). 
At just after 10:00 p.m., a little more than an hour after the statement was 
released, County Executive Douglas M. Duncan said in a television interview on CNN 
that police protection remained in place for schools the next day ("Baffling," 2002).  This 
                                                 
53 After-hour community use of school facilities was controlled by the county government, not the 
school district, and the program operated independently of school district decisions. 
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was information not contained in the school district’s announcement, nor communicated 
to principals and other staff.  Duncan, in the television interview, went on to describe the 
actions being taken to protect schools as part of a coordinated effort:  “After September 
11, we instituted a good security plan for all the schools…They performed that plan 
today....We had extra police security at the schools. We're going to do that tomorrow. 
We're going…to school at normal times…. ("Baffling," 2002).  
Football as Symbolism 
On Friday morning, principals received an announcement that all outdoor student 
activities were back on schedule for that afternoon and evening.  The decision meant the 
resumption of athletic events for 23 high schools, including several Friday night football 
games under the lights in stadiums, typically attracting large crowds of students, parents, 
and community members.  The games were seen as symbolic.  Duncan was quoted  later 
in a newspaper article saying that resuming high school football that night was “a sign of 
determination to maintain community life” (Johnston & Van Natta Jr., 2002).   
The decision to resume outdoor activities was made Friday morning, largely in 
the same manner as the night before.  There was no record of the decision, except the 
message sent to principals and staff in an e-mail and the later public announcement.  
There was no command team meeting to discuss it or review options.  There was no 
meeting at all.  Weast received a report indicating that student attendance was mostly 
normal, except for a few secondary schools near the shooting sites.  The report was 
provided by Donald H. Kress, the coordinating community superintendent, who 
conveyed the information in a brief summary table.  The report, which was retained in the 
district’s archival record, showed a few secondary schools with drops in attendance of as 
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much as 12 percentage points (Sniper crisis, Week 1, 2002). Whether the spike indicated 
a small or large problem, residual fear or an opportunistic holiday, was not known.  
No reference to the previous day’s events was made in the decision 
announcement, except indirectly in a statement that noted “every effort is being made to 
return to normal operations…No changes are anticipated, unless otherwise notified” 
(Porter, 2002n).  The announcement did not mention activities beyond Friday, but the 
decision was interpreted as covering the entire weekend.54  Bowers and Tronzano, his 
executive assistant, had been working with the athletic department since the previous day 
and produced an impact statement and contingency plan if something happened to cancel 
athletic events.  The remaining schedules included games prior to league championships 
and the competition for athletic scholarships among graduating seniors. 
Weast sent no letter sent home to parents. Instead, a letter of appreciation was sent 
from him to three groups of employees—cafeteria workers, transportation staff, and 
security staff—to acknowledge their roles in helping to maintain calm and order during 
the previous day’s events.  The letter to the food services personnel, for example, noted 
that by maintaining uninterrupted breakfast and lunch service “…you added a sense of 
stability and care to a difficult situation” (Weast, 2002c). The recipients of the letters 
numbered in the thousands.    
  
                                                 
54 An e-mail shortly afterwards by the assistant director of transportation, for example, informed 
bus depot managers that “all sports trips and activity runs” were to resume for Friday afternoon and 
Saturday (Watkins, 2002).  
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Later in the day, there were reports of two shootings, one the night before and the 
other that afternoon, but neither were connected initially to the previous attacks.55   
Before leaving work Friday evening, based on a reconstruction of the event with 
all participants, Bowers and I spoke about arrangements for weekend announcements to 
confirm that activities at schools were ongoing and schools were opening on time on 
Monday.  Such announcements were typical after a major disruption, such as weather 
emergencies, in order to reaffirm normal school operations.  The statement did not 
include any information about plans to have police assigned to schools.  The information 
was then known, but deference was given to the county government and police regarding 
disclosures on law enforcement matters.  The announcement included the same 
cautionary hedge from the morning’s statement:  “No changes are anticipated, unless 
otherwise notified” (Porter, 2002j).   
Police Plans for Monday 
Additional police were at the football games Friday night and Saturday. At 
Richard Montgomery High School in Rockville, police officers guarded the gates to the 
field (Potter, 2002).  Crowd attendance was down, including less than half the normal 
attendance at Albert Einstein High School in Kensington, which was located between two 
of the shootings sites ("Safety gone," 2002).  On Sunday evening, at a press conference 
televised by CNN, Police Chief Charles Moose announced that police were returning to 
schools the next morning for the start of the new school week.  Moose said he planned to 
                                                 
55 The first shooting occurred at about 9:20 p.m. on Thursday evening, October 3, killing a man 
with a shot in the chest as he crossed a street in Washington, D.C.  The second shooting occurred Friday 
afternoon, October 4, at 2:27 p.m. in Fredericksburg, Virginia, wounding a woman in a parking lot ("John 
Muhammad v. Maryland," 2007, p. 10). 
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have “increased visibility around each and every school” ("Montgomery," 2002). He also 
cautioned, however, that officers were not expected to be standing guard “at every 
school, every minute. But we will absolutely do our best” ("Montgomery," 2002).  The 
plan was to move officers from school to school over the course of the morning.   
Duncan recalled years later that he offered the protection of police at schools to 
Weast during a conversation about how to maintain community security and manage 
public perceptions of safety.  “We said, okay, here are some things we’re doing and, by 
the way, we want to offer some more security [for schools],” he recalled (Duncan, 
personal interview, 2008).  Weast also recalled the offer years later, and said he 
welcomed the assistance of the police.   Their presence initially was one of the “symbolic 
things,” he said, that were necessary to address parent concerns and later became an 
irreplaceable stop-gap as shootings continued and fear increased (Weast, personal 
interview, 2007).  He noted the police deployment’s actions reinforced the image of 
cooperative and proactive county leadership at a time of great uncertainty.  He said 
parents needed the reassurance that first weekend, not the worries associated with 
cancelled activities.  “As often is the case, when we close down school for the weekend, 
people start getting more hysterical rather than less hysterical,” he said (Weast, personal 
interview, 2007).   
The deployment of police was consistent with the school district’s efforts earlier 
in the year to strengthen its ties to police through the facilities officers program that 
assigned police to schools.  The size of the deployment was noteworthy, but not the basic 
idea.  “We never objected to having the police presence in front of buildings, around 
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buildings, stopping in at buildings, checking them. We wouldn’t have objected to it,” 
recalled Bowers (Bowers, personal interview, 2007).    
Clarke later testified in court that he assisted police in designing the plan “to 
ensure that there would be some level of police presence, uniform police presence, in and 
around our schools during arrival times and departure times” ("Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. Muhammad," 2003 ¶ 4277). Clarke recalled years later that he worked with a police 
lieutenant over that weekend “to address our needs” regarding schools that were “within 
the ‘impact zone,’ and possibly the surrounding ring of the impact zone” of the initial 
shootings (Clarke, personal interview, 2007).  The deployment plan was outlined in a 
memorandum on Sunday, October 6, from the deputy chief of police to district 
commanders.  It identified certain schools as priorities for police protection because of 
publicly accessible locations near major highways and “their proximity to shopping 
centers” (B. O'Toole, 2002).  As such, the police prepared for a shooting based on the 
earlier incidents.   
That Sunday night, in the City of Bowie in neighboring Prince George’s County, 
preparations were under way for an entirely different spectacle.56   
The next morning, Moose said at a press conference he wanted the officers “to be 
visible, to be diligent, to be aware, hopefully provide some comfort to the parents, to the 
young people” ("Montgomery County," 2002).  He acknowledged later the risks were 
much higher than suggested at the time.  “From an officer safety perspective, the dumbest 
strategy was assigning officers to high visibility posts, such as in front of the schools,” 
                                                 
56 Malvo later testified that he prepared Sunday for a shooting the next morning.  He described 
digging a shallow hole behind some bushes in a wooded area, covered the hole with leaves, and sat there 
through the night, waiting with his rifle ("State of Maryland v. Muhammad," 2006 ¶ 1:33:51 to 3:06:04).  
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Moose said (G. R. Murphy & Wexler, 2004, p. 81).57  The deployment included county, 
state, municipal, and park police at both public and private schools.   
The plan was unique in the Washington area.  Robert B. Hellmuth, the assistant 
director of school safety and security, recalled years later that school security staff at the 
time viewed the attention given to student safety, beginning after the initial shootings and 
continuing through the weekend, as wrongheaded.  He said it presented students as a 
challenge to the assailant, an attractive target, and that if the focus of attention did not 
shift away from students, “we’re going to get somebody shot” (Hellmuth, personal 
interview, 2007).  Duncan came to a similar conclusion later.  “I do think that we learned 
while this was going on, that all the attention on kids backfired,” he recalled (Duncan, 
personal interview, 2008).   
Shared Responsibility 
During a press conference on Monday morning, at about 6:30 a.m., which was 
telecast on CNN, reporters asked Moose about the decision to allow outdoor activities for 
students after police guarded their arrival at schools.  Moose said it was Weast’s decision, 
“and we have certainly agreed with his decision, that it be a full school day, regular 
hours, regular activities” ("Montgomery County," 2002). In a separate event about a half-
hour later, Duncan told an interviewer on the NBC Today Show that the decision was 
arrived at mutually. “We talked about it with the superintendent, and the feeling was that 
let's get back to a normal day and let kids go outside a bit, let them have open lunch,” he 
said ("Duncan NBC," 2002).   
                                                 
57 Two police commanders later described the risk:  “They stood, morning and afternoon, in front 
of schools like sitting ducks, and they knew they were vulnerable” (Demme & Fitzgerald, 2004, p. 17). 
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Duncan also described, in the televised interview, another decision involving the 
schools. “We’ve also said, if there are parents who are uncomfortable with [outside 
activities], please contact your local school.  We’ll make provisions to keep people 
indoors if parents feel…that's the way to go,” Duncan said ("Duncan NBC," 2002).  At 
the morning press conference with Moose, the idea was described as having originated 
with Weast.  “Dr. Weast, our school superintendent, also has said…they will make 
arrangements for the children…to stay inside,” Duncan said ("Montgomery County," 
2002).   
The idea reflected an accommodation typically available at schools for any 
student whose parents might request an indoor assignment during recess.  But this was 
different, with the potential of prompting requests for alternative activities for a much 
larger number of children.  Schools were not informed of the offer.  Donald H. Kress, the 
coordinating community superintendent, recalled years later that there was nothing done 
in advance of that Monday as “special in preparation for the opening of schools” (Kress, 
interview, 2007).     
Within a few hours, Duncan’s announcements about parents opting to have their 
children stay inside were no longer relevant.     
At the time, Weast was host for a long-scheduled breakfast meeting with the 
president and officers of the Montgomery County Council of Parent-Teacher 
Associations (MCCPTA).  Also in attendance were Larry A. Bowers, who as chief 
operating officer, was expected to talk about the upcoming budget.  James A. Williams, 
the deputy superintendent, was there, too, to handle issues related to instruction.  They 
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were joined by the superintendent’s chief of staff, Frieda K. Lacey.58  The breakfast was 
held in the conference room adjoining the superintendent’s office, beginning at 8:00 a.m. 
It was to be followed at 10:00 a.m. by a staff briefing on the monthly human resources 
report prepared for the Board of Education.  The breakfast ended early and the later 
meeting was cancelled as events of the morning altered everything.    
Matthew A. Tronzano, the executive assistant to Bowers, recalled years later that 
there was little mention before that morning of the possibility of someone actually 
shooting a student.  It seemed so far-fetched.  “I’m not sure I was thinking much about 
children being shot,” he recalled (Tronzano, personal interview, 2007).   Even Moose 
publicly expressed more anxiety about the safety of commuters than students during the 
press conference early Monday morning.  He described the pending rush hour as “an 
enhanced target-rich environment,” adding that he and Duncan were “both very 
anxious—remain very hopeful and positive, but we’re very anxious” ("Montgomery 
County," 2002).   
Although reporters asked about student safety at the police chief’s press 
conference, there was no mention of concerns about school safety in The Washington 
Post that morning in the stories about the status of the investigation and the funerals of 
victims.  The day before, one of the newspaper’s local columnists chided community and 
police leaders for their concerns about school safety “in a relatively wealthy suburb” 
                                                 
58 Frieda K. Lacey, Ed.D., was appointed chief of staff to the superintendent in 2001.  She 
previously worked in special education as a teacher, teacher specialist, assistant supervisor, supervisor, and 
principal of a learning center.  She was also an equity assurance officer and director of equity assurance and 
compliance before being named executive assistant to the superintendent in 1999.  She is currently the 
deputy superintendent of schools  ("Board report," 2004b). 
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compared to longstanding conditions at an elementary school in Washington, D.C., where 
nearby “gunfire is a common occurrence” (Milloy, 2002).   
Student Shooting Came as a ‘Wakeup Call’ 
Reality replaced speculation a few minutes after 8:00 a.m. on Monday, October 7.  
A teacher at Benjamin Tasker Middle School in Bowie later described her initial 
astonishment after hearing a loud noise and then someone banging on the school’s front 
door.  She thought it was a student horsing around and opened the door:   
I saw the boy close to the curb, doubled over and on his knees. ‘What are you 
doing?’ I asked….‘I’m shot,’ he said….I was unsure what to think. Was this kid 
playing with me? Would he joke about something like that given recent events?  
‘Are you kidding?’ I asked…. (Pumphrey, 2003). 
 
The injured boy was a 13-year-old student, wounded by a single bullet that struck 
him in the chest “as he waited in front of the school for the doors to be opened” ("John 
Muhammad v. Maryland," 2007, p. 12).59  The shot came from a wooded area on the side 
of the school, across from the entry way. The site had a clear field of vision along the 
entire front sidewalk (Figure 4.11).  Malvo later testified in court that a single victim was 
not the plan.  He said the original “mission” was to “take at least five shots,” selecting  
from among the first group of children exiting from a school bus and shooting them one 
at a time, and then shooting one or more students at a nearby elementary school ("State of 
Maryland v. Muhammad," 2006 ¶ 1:33:51 to 3:06:04). The victim arrived at school early, 
a half-hour before the school was scheduled to open.  It was also the time middle schools 
opened in Montgomery County. 
                                                 
59 Malvo also allegedly aimed for the body, not the head, in order to avoid a mess in front of other 
children, according to a reported statement to investigators (Horwitz & Ruane, 2003, p. 112). 
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As details of the shooting became better understood, the dynamics of the threat 
facing schools in Montgomery County also changed, as it did for all schools in the 
region.  “It was a wakeup call about…our level of exposure,” Weast said years later 
(Sedam & Ford, 2007).  The investigative details of the shooting later established a well-
planned assault, far beyond anything expected by police or school officials.  “Before then 
we were still a little relaxed, if I may use the word,” recalled James A. Williams, the 
deputy superintendent (Williams, personal interview, 2007).   
 
Figure 4.11  School as Potential Killing Field 
Excerpt of page reproduction from The Washington Post, October 8, 2002, p. A11.  





Police Chief Charles Moose, in his later book, referenced the shooting as 
transformational: “We had no reason to be worried about the schools.  That wasn’t true 
anymore” (Moose & Fleming, 2003, p. 105).  Students became potential targets of 
opportunity.  Schools became potential killing zones. The assailant entered the rarified 
world of potential child killers.60  Michael L. Subin, who was the chair of the County 
Council’s education committee, and joined the superintendent’s command team as an 
inter-agency liaison, said the clarity of the threat became obvious.  “It was the first hard 
evidence that nothing was safe…and nobody was safe,” he said (Subin, personal 
interview, 2007).   
‘Scared Us to Death’ 
The shooting “just scared us to death…it really changed everything,” recalled 
Edward W. Shirley,61 who also later joined the command team as president of 
Montgomery County Association of the Administrative and Supervisory Personnel, 
which represented principals (Shirley, personal interview, 2007).  Donald H. Kress, the 
coordinating community superintendent, recalled that “everybody’s anxiety went up 
about 10 notches once the kid was shot” (Kress, personal interview, 2007).   
                                                 
60 Even among sniper victims, the shooting was rare.  The FBI later reported that victims 18 years 
old or younger represented about 13% of sniper killings in the United States between 1981 and 2002 
("Special Report," 2003). 
61 Edward W. Shirley, Ed.D., was named the first full-time president of the Montgomery County 
Association of Administrative and Supervisory Personnel in July 2002.  Previously, beginning in 1967, he 
was a high school teacher, assistant principal, and then principal of a middle school and three high schools, 
and a director of school administration in Montgomery County.  He is currently superintendent of the 




Judith Madden, supervisor of counseling, said she was at a training session for a 
high school’s guidance staff at a community center in Wheaton, Maryland, when they 
took a break and saw a news report on the lobby television: 
The counselors were very concerned, wanting to go back to be available to 
support their students….but they were also scared to drive back to school, scared 
to get out of the car, worried about their own children, their spouses, their 
mothers, you know, anyone else who was part of their lives in the community,” 
she said (Madden, personal interview, 2007).   
 
At an elementary school that morning, a teacher later described the panic among 
her colleagues when they heard the news: “A woman yells out ‘My son goes to that 
school’ and trips and falls as she tries to run out” (Ochs, 2002).  One county parent later 
wrote, as a newspaper columnist: “We were trying mightily to be good citizens and obey 
school administrators who asked that we leave our children in area schools, because they 
were safer there.  We tried that—until the latest victim was shot at school” (Frerking, 2002).   
A few hours after the shooting, Douglas M. Duncan, the county executive in 
Montgomery County, described the public response:  “I think this community is in a state 
of fear, a state of anxiety…” ("Shooting," 2002). 
Kress said the shooting cast a shadow over whether schools could operate safely.  
“It made us talk about, should we close?  It made us go back and re-visit that whole 
decision that we had made before about—we’re going to keep the schools open,” he said 
(Kress, personal interview, 2007).  The threat seemed immediate and close.  Matthew A. 
Tronzano, the executive assistant to the chief operating officer, said his thoughts were 
about potential dangers nearby, given that the shooting occurred “within miles of schools 
in Montgomery County” (Tronzano, personal interview, 2007).  There was little regard 
for jurisdictional boundaries after the shooting.  Edward Clarke, the director of school 
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safety and security, recalled measures being taken as if the threat was imminent.  “That 
was a pretty chaotic day…for all of us, because of a student, so close to us, being shot,” 
he said (Clarke, personal interview, 2007).62 
Decisions with Police 
Clarke recalled learning about the shooting from a television news report.  He 
contacted his counterparts in the neighboring school district “to glean as much 
information as we could,” he said (Clarke, personal interview, 2007).  At 8:53 a.m., an 
emergency message was sent by me to all school personnel, citing security information 
from Prince George’s County, but the message was guarded and ultimately mistaken.  
The message said the shooting “doest not appear to be related to the incidents last week” 
(Porter, 2002o).  It was corrected later.  Moose described the situation in his book, saying 
the initial information from the crime scene as too little and initially wrong: “We didn’t 
know much…It sounded like some kind of school fight” (Moose & Fleming, 2003, pp. 
103-104).   
The few details were enough to prompt a decision by Weast. Around 9:00 a.m., he 
met with a few senior staff and decided to cancel all outdoor activities. It was initially 
intended as a temporary measure, until more information was available. There was no 
record of the decision, except the school district’s announcement at 9:12 a.m. (Porter, 
2002p).  There was also a statement released by the police.  Moose received the 
information quickly and reacted almost immediately, releasing the information to 
                                                 
62 Montgomery County shared a common mission with its neighboring school district, served 
adjoining communities, and many of the command team members knew the district’s leaders and other 
staff.  I also grew up there, worked for the Prince George’s County school district for 11 years, and knew 
well the site of the shooting.  
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reporters at a press conference televised on CNN, about 6 minutes before the school 
district’s announcement.  “We’ve talked to Dr. Weast. It is not—and I want to 
specifically say—it is not a Code Blue at this time.  It is simply a precaution to close 
lunch and to close recess,” he said ("Police hold," 2002).   
Moose’s timely access to the information reflected his new relationship with 
Weast.  Moose noted to reporters that the superintendent’s decisions were based, in part, 
on personal collaboration, and he expressed confidence in him:  
Clearly, Dr. Weast will stay on top of this situation with us. As it changes, he will 
make any and all necessary adjustments….There is a set of protocols for Code 
Blue, and I think Dr. Weast is making a wise decision that until he has more 
information, specific information, then this is the proper step ("Police hold," 2002).  
 
Weast reinforced the closer ties, as well.  In a letter to parents that day, he used 
stronger language about the level of cooperation than he did the previous week, saying 
school security decisions were made “in consultation with” county police and that he was 
“confident that we are receiving the best advice possible” (Weast, 2002l).  Clarke went 
further.  Speaking on Weast’s behalf at a press conference with the police chief that 
afternoon, which was televised on CNN, Clarke described the decisions as part of a larger 
public safety strategy:  “Dr. Weast continues to be in contact with Chief Moose in terms 
of joint decisions that need to be made…” ("Police news," 2002).  
More School Security  
Moose commented two years later to researchers conducting a federal study of the 
police investigation that the shooting left little alternative other than to keep posting 
officers at schools.  “We had no choice, and the officers gallantly accepted these 
assignments,” Moose said (G. R. Murphy & Wexler, 2004, p. 81).  The lack of choice, 
Moose later wrote in his book, was influenced by strong public demand for school 
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protection that was impossible to reject.  He described the demand as reminiscent of 
lopsided public policy battles with the county’s powerful school lobby:    
We see this in the budgeting of county money….You’re not allowed to say 
anything about the schools getting an unfair percentage.  We joke around the 
police department that if we want money for something we have to paint it 
school-bus yellow first (Moose & Fleming, 2003, p. 105). 
 
 The political influence was evident a few hours after the shooting.  At his noon 
press conference, televised on CNN, Moose announced participation of the uniformed 
division of the U.S. Secret Service in guarding schools in Montgomery County ("Police 
news," 2002).  The unprecedented deployment of federal officers was in addition to state, 
municipal, and park police already enlisted.  Guarding hundreds of public and private 
schools was still a mammoth task.  Moose urged parents to stay home and out of the way 
and to leave their children in place, suggesting as he had the week before that thousands 
of parents arriving early everywhere was beyond the capacity of the police.  “It will 
simply confuse matters to a point that we really will not be in a position to handle it,” he 
said at the press conference ("Police news," 2002) 
Team Command Again 
The command team settled into a meeting with Weast just after 9:30 a.m. in the 
conference room adjoining the deputy superintendent’s office (Meeting notes October 7, 
2002 ¶ 9:35).  This was the same room where they met the previous week.  Weast was 
again at the head of the table, his back to the windows.  To his left was Virginia Brooks,
the administrative secretary who had been the person tasked to create a paper trail of the 
emergency response the week before.  She was again taking notes at his side, at times a 
verbatim record of ongoing discussions.   
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There was pressure to act, but there was some time to discuss options.  Outside 
activities had been prohibited a half-hour earlier.  The issue was whether to escalate and 
return to Code Blue.   
Kress informed the group that he had placed field trips on hold pending a decision 
on other activities.  Weast responded by saying he wanted the district to stay unified and 
consistent.  He was quoted in the notes saying he did not want “staff making independent 
decisions” about school security measures (Meeting notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 9:35).  He 
asked for recommendations about next steps.  Clarke proposed moving to a districtwide 
Code Blue until more was known, and others agreed.  The team discussed cancelling 
afternoon kindergarten.  Bowers suggested giving more guidance to principals on 
implementing the security measure.  Weast dismissed the idea on the premise, as quoted 
in the notes, that “most principals” understood what was already required (Meeting notes 
October 7, 2002 ¶ 9:35).   
Weast subsequently ordered the districtwide Code Blue, along with the 
cancelation of afternoon kindergarten and the field trips (Meeting notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 
9:48).63   Kress recalled from his own notes of the meeting that he quoted Weast urging 
everyone to be “abundantly cautious” even if it meant overreacting for safety purposes 
(Kress, personal interview, 2007).  The total discussion and decision time was about 18 
minutes. The Code Blue was announced three minutes later at 9:51 a.m. in an emergency 
e-mail to all staff, describing the Code Blue as “heightened level of security” taken only 
                                                 
63 By then, schools in Prince George’s County also were in a Code Blue, the middle school was a 
crime scene, and the school’s students were being sent home ("Maryland boy," 2002).   
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“as a precautionary action” (Porter, 2002f).   The quick announcement meant the 
statement was prepared in advance, pending the outcome of the meeting. 
In the meantime, Bowers raised again his concern about procedural 
misinterpretations at schools and the need for guidance for staff, and this time Weast 
agreed.  The statement was released at 9:54 a.m., three minutes after the Code Blue 
announcement (again reflecting advance preparation).  The statement addressed problems 
regarding local understanding of security measures, in which some schools opted for 
extreme interpretations.  The update clarified, for example, that teachers were “allowed to 
open windows for ventilation” and “school lunch should continue with proper 
supervision” (Porter, 2002d).  It also reminded schools that a Code Blue did not mean to 
stop teaching.   
The variance among schools in implementing the Code Blue was greater than 
Weast understood when he initially rejected Bowers’ recommendation.  He later told a 
conference audience that the variance reflected a wide range of interpretations, in which 
“some principals locked down their buildings and the kids didn’t even get to go to the 
bathroom. Other people said, I’m not going to pay attention to that—I’ve never paid 
attention to the central office” (22 days of crisis, 2003).  Robert B. Hellmuth, the assistant 
director of school safety and security, said years later that the variations depended on 
where the schools were located—the closer to the original shooting sites, the stricter the 
interpretations: 
We had to laugh a little bit because in some schools we had more of [a] purple, it 
was more of a Code Red-Code Blue. In other schools it was like—Jerry [Weast] 
liked to call it a ‘light blue,’ because they weren’t necessarily locking the doors,  





Weast informed the team that he told Duncan about the Code Blue and other 
decisions at about 9:58 a.m.  The records of the team meeting noted that a police 
spokeswoman announced the decisions on television about 12 minutes later (Meeting 
notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 9:58-10:10).  A few minutes later, the district’s announcement 
was released.  The sequence of events meant the county’s communications to the media 
and public were ahead of the internal notification of principals and staff.   
By noon that day, the police press conferences literally supplanted the school 
district’s announcements.  Moose had invited Weast to participate in the press 
conferences, but he declined, sending Clarke to represent him, as he had the previous 
week. Clarke joined Moose at the mid-day press conference and announced that schools 
were to close at normal times ("Police news," 2002).  There was no corresponding district 
announcement about school dismissal, nor was there an internal record of the decision.  
Clarke’s statement was the only one, other than a notation in the meeting notes that 
suggested the television in the team meeting room was being watched when Moose made 
the same announcement a few minutes later (Meeting notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 12:12).   
Weast urged principals that morning to rely on the district’s formal 
announcements. He told them in a memorandum, forwarded by e-mail at 11:40 a.m., that 
he planned to “do everything possible to keep you informed of changes in the situation as 
quickly as possible.  Please be attentive to the announcements being made on [e-mail]. 
There will be changes, frequently, as the day proceeds” (Weast, 2002u).   
One such change involved the decision about after-school activities.  Weast, in his 
memorandum to principals at 11:40 a.m., said a decision was pending within the hour.  
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Just prior to noon, according to the meeting notes, Bowers recommended cancelling the 
activities (Meeting notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 11:50).  The scheduling issue affected 34 
athletic games in various sports across the county.  A decision was made sometime 
afterward.  The only record was an emergency e-mail to all staff that announced the 
cancellation at 12:33 p.m. (Porter, 2002l).  At the same time, a press conference televised 
on CNN was ongoing.  Duncan and Moose told reporters that a school district decision 
was still pending ("Police news," 2002).  Two hours later, Moose introduced Clarke at 
another press conference, also on CNN, and he relayed the information on Weast’s behalf 
as part of an update on school district activities ("Shooting," 2002).   
Focus on Avoiding Failure 
By early afternoon Monday, there was no confirmed connection to the earlier 
shootings when Weast sent a letter home to parents, students, and staff.  The letter served 
as his formal statement about the incident.  He referenced the shooting in context of the 
limited information available:  “…the events of the past week require all of us to 
maintain a sense of vigilance and flexibility” (Weast, 2002l).64   The letter was written in 
anticipation of further changes but was unspecific about details.  “Events may require 
continued changes in school operations, and I ask that everyone be patient and 
understanding,” he said (Weast, 2002l).  The request was an advance notice that Weast 
wanted room to maneuver and support for decisions not yet made.   
A report by mid-afternoon from Nancy S. Grasmick, the Maryland state 
superintendent of schools, indicated that heightened security and cancellation of activities at 
                                                 
64 A federal agent later underscored the potential connection, speaking at a press conference with 
Moose: “All of us have children in school today. We're just as concerned, even more concerned now, that 
it's stooped to the level of shooting children” ("Police news," 2002). 
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schools were widespread throughout the state.  The reported security measures included a 
"lock down in effect" in Anne Arundel County, which bordered Prince George's County near 
the shooting site, to an "increased police presence" and "indoor activities only" in St. Mary's 
County in Southern Maryland (Grasmick, 2002c, pp. 2, 4).65  By the end of the day, the 
manhunt involved a growing number of local, state, and federal agencies.66   
Over the course of the day, there was a new component to the actions and 
decisions of the team—a preoccupation with failure—as efforts focused on greater 
meaning making for others and attending to the structural and operational components of 
the school district in an effort to keep students and staff safe (Figure 4.12).  These focus 
areas were evident when 70 crisis actions involving one or more members of the team, 
including 33 crisis decisions primarily by the superintendent—nearly the same as the first  
day of the crisis, October 3—were identified for analysis.  The analysis included a 
reconstruction of the day’s actions and decisions, based on participant interviews and archival 
records, and the analytical coding in relation to the study’s conceptual framework  
(see Table J.2 in “Appendix J: Tables”).  The analysis identified a greater preoccupation with 
a failure among the crisis decisions than the crisis actions, suggesting greater caution.  The 
other associations were closely aligned, suggesting continued agreement among leadership 
and implementation as the crisis entered a completely new phase.   
                                                 
65 In the Washington area, extensive security precautions were reported:  “Some restaurants sat 
empty, and others removed their outdoor seating.  Private security officers guarded supermarkets.  Even 
members of Congress were advised to limit their outdoor activities” (Horwitz & Ruane, 2003, p. 113). 
66 The agencies included the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
















Figure 4.12   Conceptual Priorities of Crisis Actions on October 7
Data reflect highest two percentages of crisis activities and crisis decisions associated with one or 
more conceptual framework components (see Table J.2 in “Appendix J: Tables”). Data overlap. 
Percentages rounded. Crisis actions include crisis decisions. 
Conceptual framework adapted from “social system model” by Hoy & Miskel (2005); “critical 











The wounding of a student during the sniper shootings of October 2002 marked 
the dividing line in the study of crisis management and decision making by leaders of the 
Montgomery County Public Schools.  The events prior to the wounding reflected short-
term crisis management, as presented in the previous chapter.  The events afterward were 
different.  The crisis continued another 19 days, all part of a single case, bounded within 
a time and place, and the actions and events of the participants.  Presented as a 
comprehensive portrait, the narrative continues, informed by a conceptual framework in 
Chapter 2, an analytical methodology in Chapter 3, and the description of prior events in 
Chapter 4.   Chapter 5 presents the rest of the case, beginning about nine hours after the 
shooting of a student in a neighboring school district.   
Moment of Silence Honored the Dead 
On Monday afternoon, October 7, 2002, a few minutes before 5:00 p.m., a few 
senior leaders of the Montgomery County Public Schools paused at the doorway of a 
conference room.  It had been a long day, and it was far from over.  The television on the 
wall overhead featured a news report about a new development.  Law enforcement 
officials linked the bullet fragments retrieved from the wounded student that morning in 
Prince George’s County to seven shootings the previous week.  The most senior member 
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of the group, Jerry D. Weast, superintendent of schools, nodded and said he knew that.  
The others did not.  He also shared that county officials supported continuation of the 
Code Blue implemented that morning and endorsed the effort to keep schools open  
(Meeting notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 4:55).  The information about the bullet fragments 
reinforced the description of the assailant as a serial attacker who killed six people and 
wounded two more since the previous Wednesday.  It also strengthened the belief that 
students were at risk, a paradox given the decision to keep schools open.  
With this backdrop, Weast and the others, including me, walked down the hall 
and started a hastily-called meeting with some 200 principals and central office 
administrators and staff.  Weast began by asking for a moment of silence.  Reference was 
made to the deceased and wounded, including “the parents of our students” who were 
buried earlier in day, as quoted in notes from the meeting (Principals meeting notes, 
2002, p. 1).67  It was an emotional moment.  Principals were praised for “the way you 
have held schools together,” as evident by good student attendance and staff who were 
“continuing to come to work” (Principals meeting notes, 2002, p. 1).   
The audience included people already stressed by the events of the day who had 
left their school buildings early to get to the meeting or who had wanted to be home with 
their own families. Hours earlier, Larry A. Bowers, the chief operating officer, noted this 
as an important problem, likely to backfire, and urged that the meeting be held later in the 
day, not earlier as originally suggested (Meeting notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 1:50).  “We 
debated, quite frankly whether or not that was the right thing to do,” said Frieda K. 
                                                 
67 The five people who were killed on October 2-3, 2002, in Montgomery County included the 
mother of one student, the father of another, and the uncle of two others (Sniper crisis, Week 1, 2002). 
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Lacey, the superintendent’s chief of staff, in public comments later to the Board of 
Education ("Dialogue," 2002).  Donald H. Kress, the coordinating community 
superintendent, invited the principals with an e-mail message at 2:10 p.m., less than three 
hours before the meeting was to start, and noted it was scheduled at “a difficult time,” but 
he urged their participation in “a timely discussion” about school issues and the district’s 
“response to this tragic wave of shootings” (Kress, 2002).   
The audience sat on folding chairs on an old wooden basketball floor in a high-
ceilinged auditorium, a gymnasium when the headquarters building was a segregated 
high school in the 1950’s.  Over the course of the meeting, they received information and 
asked questions about Code Blue procedures, law enforcement, mental health materials 
and counseling support, building security, field trips, parent visits, community use of 
schools, and staff and student attendance and absenteeism, among other topics 
(Principals meeting notes, 2002, pp. 1-5).  
Student Safety 
The meeting settled into a litany of top-down pronouncements, somewhat 
ordinary even under the circumstances, until principals learned that student safety patrols 
were prohibited from their posts in the morning and parents were needed to walk children 
to school.  The decision had been made an hour earlier (Meeting notes October 7, ¶ 4:05). 
It reversed a position taken the previous week when Donald H. Kress, the coordinating 
community superintendent, said principals were worried about the exposure of their 
safety patrols and Weast responded, as quoted in the notes of the meeting, that such 
decisions were “for individual principals to make” (Meeting notes October 3, ¶ 12:38).   
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It was a stunning announcement, along with learning that outside activities 
including athletics would likely be prohibited for a while.  After all, schools remained 
open and tens of thousands of students still walked to school.  Edward A. Clarke, director 
of school safety and security, later testified in court about the safety patrol decision, 
saying “we could not guarantee their overall safety” ("Commonwealth of Virginia v. 
Muhammad," 2003 ¶ 4275).  The student patrols presented too inviting a target, with the 
brightly colored uniform belts and shiny badges and the isolated assignments on street 
corners.  Police Chief Charles A. Moose endorsed the decision, saying in a press 
conference televised on CNN the next day that he “felt very comfortable advising and 
agreeing with Dr. Weast that the student safety patrols need to be in the schools” ("Sniper 
on the loose," 2002).  School officials in Prince George’s County also restricted their 
patrols, as did other jurisdictions.68   
The meeting concluded after nearly two hours, with principals urged by Weast to 
be mindful of their leadership responsibilities and, as quoted in the notes, to be careful in 
“what you say, how you say it, and carry yourself as a leader and role model to our 
employees and parents” (Principals meeting notes, 2002, p. 5).   Weast’s overall message 
to principals was summarized by me in a newspaper article the next morning: “We are 
going to be in for a long siege.  We need to be prepared physically and emotionally” 
(Leonard, 2002). 
  
                                                 
68 The American Automobile Association, Mid-Atlantic, announced the next day: “This is the first 
time in our memory—going back more than two decades—that areas schools have opened without their 




The meeting with principals came just a few hours after news coverage featured a 
riveting image of the police chief crying.  James A. Williams, deputy superintendent of 
schools, recalled watching the scene with amazement and surprise: “He just broke down, 
he just broke down” (Williams, personal interview, 2007).  The image of Charles A. 
Moose was shown during a press conference and later photographs with his eyes moist 
and a cheek wet from a tear as he lashed out at the person who shot the student that 
morning.  He set the shooting apart from the earlier attacks, calling the incident “really, 
really personal,” and saying the attacker stepped "over the line because our children don't 
deserve this" (Horwitz & Ruane, 2003, p. 114; “School shooting,” 2002) .  He also spoke 
directly to parents and urged them to “do your job tonight, engage your children, be there 
for them,” suggesting their help was needed to maintain calm in the community and 
schools:  "We're going to need it.  We're going to need you to support them" ("School 
shooting," 2002).   
The police chief’s statements struck a cord for people who viewed the shooting as 
an emotional wound, especially those who cared for children as a parent or as a 
profession and envisioned themselves and their children as potential victims.  The 
extraordinary image was described later as “a dramatic moment, replayed on national 
television" (Horwitz & Ruane, 2003, p. 114).  On the other hand, it did little to calm an 
already tense situation.69  
                                                 
69 The snipers reportedly targeted the student, in part, to upset the police chief and his 
investigation:  “It worked, because he cried on TV,” Malvo told prison guards later, according to a 
newspaper article about testimony in a Virginia court hearing (Ahlers, 2003). 
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When schools dismissed on Monday, parents descended onto schools in large 
numbers, similar to the week before.70  Tensions were high.  A middle school security 
aide used a clipboard to hit a television news photographer who had ventured too close to 
the school (Meeting notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 3:00).  Earlier in the day, just before noon, 
principals received a memorandum from the superintendent, urging them to ask for 
assistance if counseling support was needed “for anyone in the school” (Weast, 2002u).  
There were reports that suggested some staff were not coping well.  Another reminder, 
for example, was necessary about appropriate security procedures, reiterating the 
previous week’s guidelines that it was alright, during a Code Blue, to open the windows 
for ventilation, eat lunch at the regular times, continue instruction, and use the portable 
classrooms (Porter, 2002k).  The latter option was controversial.  Some principals opted 
to have students packed into hallways, media centers, and other open spaces instead of 
portable classrooms, which required students and teachers to walk outside to reach them.  
Mental Health 
The shooting of the student changed the focus of the command team’s actions and 
affected the team’s perspective.  Kress recalled the situation as challenging the team’s 
basic understanding of the school district’s operations: 
I think there were people out there who were struggling and they were struggling 
with the decision to come to work themselves every day, and principals that were 
dealing with keeping their staffs calm, teachers that were keeping kids calm 
(Kress, personal interview, 2007).  
 
                                                 
70 A parent later wrote in an article that she was too afraid to stay away, stricken by “a most 
disturbing and obvious thought:  What if the sniper had traveled back our way and chose our kids’ school to 
strike again?  We would never forgive ourselves for not being there” (Frerking, 2002). 
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Hours after the shooting, psychology and counseling staff were brought into the 
team meeting to discuss the “best way to talk with principals” and how to address directly 
the “mental health of employees and students” (Meeting notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 12:30).  
The specialists advised taking preemptive steps to stave off any erosion of confidence 
and preserve the abilities of staff to remain calm and functional.  Weast subsequently 
ordered the preparation of more mental health materials and other resources, including 
recruiting volunteers, to assist schools and families. The effort evolved into a major 
undertaking and a primary focus of the school district as the crisis continued.71  In his 
letter after the student shooting, for example, Weast urged the use of school district 
mental health resources “to address fear, anxiety, and other worries that children and 
adults may have in response to recent events” (Weast, 2002l).72  
The mental health strategies provided the school district with a specific, high 
profile part to play in a crisis management arena otherwise dominated by police and 
government agencies.73  Aggie Alvez,74 then the superintendent’s director of special 
                                                 
71 For an extended description of the mental health and volunteer initiative during this incident, see 
“Appendix H:  Mental Health and Volunteers.” 
72 A later federal study of the police investigation cited the “crucial” need for school counseling 
and other mental health efforts in the management of the crisis, noting that “parents looked to schools for 
advice on what to tell their children, how to reassure them, and for leadership” (G. R. Murphy & Wexler, 
2004, p. 110). 
73 A study of news media coverage during the sniper incident also examined the actions by school 
districts, including the Montgomery County Public Schools, in addressing the sense of fear and anxiety (in 
part, created by the media) and concluded the districts acted as an important counterpoint:  “Schools 
accepted the reality of the fear and then sought to mitigate its significance and convince parents, students, 
and teachers and personnel to themselves remain firm” (Censer, 2010, p. 208). 
74 Aggie Alvez, J.D., was appointed director of special projects, Office of the Superintendent of 
Schools, in 1999. She previously worked for the school district as a human relations compliance officer and 
a high school teacher.  She was also a television news producer and worked as the public affairs director at 
a non-profit organization.  She is currently the school district’s director of communications and family 
outreach ("Board report," 2004c; Office of communications," 2010). 
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projects, recalled the focus on mental health as a role the school district leadership 
understood politically:  
What do they have some authority over?  That’s the communication, that’s the 
discussion about mental health, because we have counselors and psychologists. 
And so it was—the ability to carve out a role that was unique to the school 
system” (Alvez, personal interview, 2007). 
District Viability 
Weast approached the mental health issue from the perspective of a basic threat to 
the school district’s operations.  He told principals in a memorandum on Monday 
afternoon, forwarded by e-mail, a few hours before the meeting:  “For our educational 
program to continue, it is important to help everyone feel physically and emotionally safe 
in school and to have strategies to deal with their emotions and stress” (Weast, 2002q).  
In other words, schools could not function safely with unchecked emotions, and it was 
the principals’ responsibility to ensure the well-being of their students and staff.  The 
issue was more than the physicality of safety.  It was the perception of safety, conveyed 
not through uniformed police stationed outdoors but through the actions and behavior of 
the adults and children indoors.   
The psychology and counseling staff had advised earlier in the day that school-
based personnel were likely to be emotionally fragile but unaware of the potential mental 
health dangers.  They outlined responses that Weast approved.  His memorandum to 
principals described two sources of assistance—more materials for self-help and onsite 
assistance from mental health professionals.  He told principals that the school 
psychologist or pupil personnel worker assigned to each school was to call them each day 
for the foreseeable future to “determine if you have a need for additional support” 
(Weast, 2002q).  The message was tempered with the suggestion that this assistance was 
187 
 
not to be intrusive or invasive.  They were assured that any mental health personnel coming 
to their schools would “report directly to you for specific instructions” (Weast, 2002q).  
This act of deference had an important side benefit.  It gave the mental health personnel 
legitimate access to the principal to make their own observations and assessments.  It was 
thought that some principals might not ask for help until it was too late.   
Likely Shootings 
After the principals meeting on Monday evening, the team gathered again in the 
conference room, where they had spent the day.  Weast reviewed their assignments for 
the evening and the next morning.  He wanted community superintendents to contact 
principals individually that night to ensure they had parent volunteers for the morning 
and to make sure principals of the 56 schools in the economically impacted areas near the 
original shootings knew they were to receive assistance from more than 100 police cadets 
offered by the county government.  He requested an attendance report from schools as 
soon as possible the next morning, Tuesday, October 8.  He wanted close monitoring of 
mental health issues, with an emphasis on classes continuing as normal as possible 
(“Meeting, Oct. 7,” ¶ 7:00).   
The tone of the meeting changed when Larry A. Bowers was told to ensure that 
site and building plans for every school were available in the command meeting room in 
case of an emergency.  Weast instructed Edward A. Clarke, the director of school safety 
and security, to let his police and county government contacts know that if an incident 
occurred at a Montgomery County school, he needed immediate access to the scene 
(“Meeting, Oct. 7,” ¶ 7:00).  The last statement was reminiscent of the superintendent’s 
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responses to emergencies from an earlier time.  Nonetheless, the implication was clear—
be ready for another shooting. 
Decisions Came from ‘The War Room’  
The impact of the student shooting intensified the work of the team. The team’s 
permanent composition changed, as well.  New members were added, and at any given 
time they were as many as 19 people in the room ("Superintendent's follow-ups," 2002).  
Weast later described the participants as a “cross-functional” team of individuals who 
represented key areas of the organization (Weast, personal interview, 2007).  The 
participants had expertise in district operations, school security and law enforcement, 
school supervision and operations, communications and the news media, community 
outreach, mental health, interscholastic athletics, and local politics.  
The addition of people with mental health expertise—Matthew J. Kamins, the 
supervisor of school psychology, and Judith Madden, supervisor of school counseling—  
“changed the structure of the command team and who was sitting at the table, from what 
was actually on paper,” recalled Larry A. Bowers, the chief operating officer (Bowers, 
personal interview, 2007).   
Edward W. Shirley, president of the Montgomery County Association of 
Administrative and Supervisory Personnel, a union representing principals, joined the 
team mid-way in the crisis.  No other union representative was asked to join, although 
one attended a meeting toward the end of the crisis.  Weast recalled later, in response to 
an inquiry, that the exclusion was intentional, and his rationale underscored his view of 
how the command team functioned and how he expected principals to manage their own 
schools: “This was not a total collaborative effort, this was command and control, and he 
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[Shirley] was representative of the command and control leadership” (Weast, personal 
interview, 2007).   
The team meetings were often crowded.  Individuals squeezed around the table, 
papers and materials spread in front of them.  Coffee perked in a nearby pot, and the 
overhead television silently displayed news reports about the police investigation.  The 
team meeting notes chronicled the daily sessions:  morning meetings every day, usually 
at 7:30 a.m., and again nearly every late afternoon usually at 5:00 p.m., and again 
sometimes at mid-day.  There already had been two all-day meetings, once after the first 
shootings on October 3 and again after the student shooting on October 7.  The team 
would meet all day once more before the crisis ended—14 meetings in all.   
At every meeting, people were expected to come well prepared and ready to 
contribute.  Punctuality was the norm, recalled Frieda K. Lacey, the superintendent’s 
chief of staff, noting that there was little choice in the matter.  “There were no acceptable 
excuses—you figured out a way to get here at 7:30 in the morning,” she said (Lacey, 
personal interview, 2007). There was a routine to the strategy that reinforced expectations 
and improved team and individual productivity through practice.  Larry A. Bowers later 
recalled that people gained experience with each passing day, helping everyone to “hone-
in all our skills” (Bowers, personal interview, 2007).   
Weast recalled the meetings as part of a strategy to maintain a reign on the actions 
of the team members.  Within the team, he wanted consistency, continuity, and 
accountability.  He described it as a form of command and control in which expectations 
were established to keep people accountable through their daily reports and follow-ups, 
dutifully recorded in the daily meeting notes.  The daily reports were intended to 
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encourage faster and more concentrated inter-team communications.  The goal, Weast 
said, was to establish a mindset and a readiness to respond quickly and correctly when 
necessary, probably without warning.  He said readiness determined a team member’s 
“ability to make it through the crisis” (Weast, personal interview, 2007).   
 It was a steep learning curve. Members of the team were not prepared for the 
implications of such a wide-ranging, undefined threat, recalled Donald Kress, the 
coordinating community superintendent.  “None of our incident command training was 
ever focused on a countywide incident, an area-wide incident, in which no one 
specifically was threatened, no specific school was threatened—we had everyone in 
every school… threatened,” he said (Kress, personal interview, 2007). 
The conference room came to be known as “the war room” early in the process, in 
reference to the military and political use of intense strategic planning sessions.  Weast 
was heard using the term.  James A. Williams, the deputy superintendent, later recalled 
going “into the war room” every morning and finding out “who the strong leaders were, 
who could stand under pressure” (Williams, personal interview, 2007).  There was a 
suggestion of boastfulness about the term that caught some disapproval at the time.  
Roland Ikheloa, staff assistant to the Board of Education, later recalled the nickname 
being mocked by a few female board members who joked that the participants were 
“playing their war games” (Ikheloa, personal interview, 2007).   
Information Access 
The meetings included access to information that was confidential or at least 
sensitive, often times involving reports about police activity and the status of the 
investigation from Edward A. Clarke, director of school safety and security.  There was 
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intense interest in the police matters among everyone, but especially for those who had 
children in the schools or whose family members worked there.  Kress, the coordinating 
community superintendent, recalled being impressed by a report by the state police on the 
vulnerability of certain schools, given their location and physical characteristics, and 
state’s plan to assign extra officers to schools deemed the most vulnerable.  His said his 
confidence was tested that same evening when his wife talked about the school where she 
was employed:    
I remember my wife saying how pleased everybody at her school was that a state 
police officer showed up, and that a state police officer would be there the rest 
of—and, I remember, I did not tell her why that state police officer was 
there…until after it was all over….That was one of the most, I think, most 
troubling times for me (Kress, personal interview, 2007). 
 
The topics of police and schools were part of discussions organized around 
potential threats to the district’s viability in four basic areas, based on an analysis of the 
meeting notes and participant recollections:  school district operations, security, 
communications, and mental health, and not necessarily in that order or within strict 
boundaries.  Many of the focus areas overlapped (Figure 5.1).   
Most meetings began with a report either on security or the news media, followed 
by other subjects.  Bowers credited Weast for encouraging people to contribute.  “He 
would often times go around the table and ask people what they thought…to speak up,”  
Bowers said (Bowers, personal interview, 2007).  It was sometimes a competitive 
atmosphere, with points of view jockeying for attention.   
Bowers noted that the participants were considered the school district’s “top 
players” and they were in the room for a purpose, with the expectation “to give advice, to 
give suggestions, to give reactions, to be able to really speak about their thoughts” 
(Bowers, personal interview, 2007).  Kamins, the school psychology supervisor, recalled 
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being asked by Weast at his first meeting for daily updates on all aspects of mental health 
affecting the school district: “He immediately turned to us and he said, and mental health, 
I want mental health reports.  So we reported” (Kamins, personal interview, 2007).  
The reporting process meant different things to different people.  Clarke, for 
example, described the process as demonstrative, with a responsibility “to keep the 
superintendent as informed as we could, with accurate and timely information, because 
that allowed him to make critical decisions based on the best information that we had”  
(Clarke, personal interview, 2007).  Alvez, then director of special projects in the 
superintendent’s office, recalled the process as reflective, with a “sense that folks were in 
more of an observer role…it was to learn, it was to do things as necessary, it was to 
provide information from various parts of the school system” (Alvez, personal interview, 
2007).   
 
 





‘Tight to Loose’  
Decision making was one-directional, with all major decisions regarding the 
school district being made by Weast or by others on his behalf, based on an analysis of 
archival records and interviews with participants.  When the team was involved, Weast 
conferred with them, discussed options, listened, and made decisions, quickly and often 
with little debate, if any. He was open to reconsideration, from time to time. “It was not, 
I’m the superintendent and I’ll tell you what to do,” recalled Frieda K. Lacey, the 
superintendent’s chief of staff (Lacey, personal interview, 2007).  Another participant, 
ironically, said: “Jerry made the decisions and told us what to do” (Interview, personal 
communications, 2007).   
The superintendent’s position as decision maker was a given, with team members 
having clearly secondary roles.  In a letter from Weast to a parent after the crisis, for 
example, the decision-making process and the role of the team were described:    
Decisions regarding school operations during the three-week period were made on 
a daily and sometimes hourly basis.  These decisions were made in the presence 
of a crisis response team that was formed to guide the school system through this 
difficult period” [emphasis added] (Weast, 2002d).   
 
Weast sometimes asked team members to indicate their support for an option.  
Other times he did not.  He recalled later that his decisions reflected the circumstances.  
He illustrated the point by describing the change in a leader’s relationships with others 
when conditions required, from making requests to giving orders.  He described it as “the 
ability…[to] say, you will move and you will move quickly, and we will do this, and 
bing, bing, bing, bing” (Weast, personal interview, 2007).  He acknowledged that when 
more time was available, when a critical deadline was not near, more time was taken for 
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discussion.  He described the process as the same for supervisory functions.  “You’re 
always moving from tight to loose,” he said (Weast, personal interview, 2007).   
Weast often tested ideas in the form of trial balloons.  Matthew A. Tronzano, the 
executive assistant to the chief operating officer, recalled that Weast took people’s 
suggestions and then “would think out loud about what he might to do, sort of get a 
reaction from people sitting around the table to see if there was agreement or not” 
(Tronzano, personal interview, 2007).  It was a complicated process to observe and 
required familiarity with the superintendent to understand that his first idea was not 
always his best or last on a given topic.  His style was idiosyncratic and reflected the 
situation at that moment.  Aggie Alvez, the superintendent’s director of special projects, 
recalled that Weast used his own internal processes for gathering and cataloging 
information from multiple sources and making sense of it.    
It’s the syntheses of everything together, and his own experience, and his instinct. 
And, so, while people around the table weren’t necessarily making the ultimate 
decision, they played a role in the decision making because that’s the way he 
operates (Alvez, personal interview, 2007). 
 
Weast often acted independently.  There was no corresponding control over him 
other than the typical legal and governmental oversight.  The Board of Education was not 
present in the team meetings, nor did he seek its approval.  He kept members informed. 
Command Status 
There was an exclusive quality about being on the team and participating in the 
crisis management of the school district.  The new members were selected the same way 
as the original set—for their expertise not necessarily their position in the bureaucracy.  
Matthew J. Kamins, the supervisor of school psychology, and Judith Madden, the 
supervisor of counseling services, for example, were included while several layers of 
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their supervisors were not.  Kamins recalled feeling “very proud to be part of that group” 
but also experienced “some negative feelings from those who were not there—why them, 
not me?” (Kamins, personal interview, 2007).   
At the principals meeting on the first Monday night, the team received a dose of 
recognition from Weast.  He directed them to sit on a raised area where the Board of 
Education held its public hearings, facing the audience.  He introduced them to the 
principals as his “decision making staff” (Principals meeting notes, 2002, p. 1).  A week 
later, several members of the team joined Weast in a public presentation before the Board 
of Education (Minutes October 15, 2002).   
Several team members achieved some level of notoriety in the national and local 
media, which was unique for them, including Clarke who represented Weast at press 
conferences, Madden who appeared on CNN, and Kamins who appeared on MSNBC and 
a national crime program.  Clarke recalled the role as an enormous responsibility.  He 
said he worried that he would “overstep my bounds speaking on behalf of the 
superintendent or understate—or overstate—the position of the superintendent” (Clarke, 
personal interview, 2007).  Early in the crisis, a newspaper article described the team as 
“a dozen top school officials deciding how best to keep children safe” ("9/11 lessons," 
2002).  Another article described the group as an example of the school district’s efforts 
to “confront a new kind of crisis” (Bowler, 2002).   My public profile was elevated, 
as well. 
Whatever notoriety occurred, it was fleeting.  When Douglas M. Duncan, 
the county executive, later recalled working with Weast during the sniper incident, he 
described the team as Weast’s “little group” (Duncan, personal interview, 2008). 
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There was an informal hierarchy within the team.  Donald H. Kress, the 
coordinating community superintendent, recalled that it seemed “there were some 
people’s opinions who [Weast] valued more than others, just general opinions. And that 
may have varied from time to time, again depending on what the subject was” (Kress, 
personal interview, 2007).  Weast acknowledged there was “variance” in terms of how he 
viewed the responsiveness of team members to the crisis management functions he 
imposed (Weast, personal interview, 2007).  Madden, then school counseling supervisor, 
recalled the meetings being intimidating at first, leaving her feeling she was not 
“empowered” to speak freely or taken seriously when she offered opposing points of 
view until she decided “to empower myself” and speak more forcefully (“Madden 
interview” 2007).   
County Insider  
Weast achieved a team status of a different kind.  He worked closely with 
Duncan, in a behind the scenes role.  After appearing at one press conference, the day 
after the shooting of the student, he stepped out of the spotlight.  This was deliberate, part 
of a strategy that he and Duncan worked through to coordinate their respective activities.  
Duncan later recalled that Weast, as well as other public officials, voluntarily took 
secondary public roles in deference to him.  They did not try to “to vie for who’s going to 
the [public] face of this,” he said (“Duncan interview”, 2008).  He noted that the 
superintendent’s decision to work with him was particularly helpful and avoided “an 
absolute disaster” of two powerful organizations acting independent of each other 
(Duncan, personal interview, 2008).   
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Duncan recalled that it was important to convey a sense of unity among 
government leaders as a measure of reassurance to the community.  He said Weast 
volunteered to refrain from the normal public position available to him in the news media 
and offered to share information and assistance: 
So, we batted forth ideas, back and forth, on different things, and [he] gave me 
some great advice, and I tried to give him some advice…It was very helpful that 
we could present one message to the public through this (Duncan, personal 
interview, 2008).   
 
Weast recalled the relationship as a natural byproduct of the county executive’s 
overall responsibility for community safety and welfare, a responsibility that—in this 
instance, especially—superseded his own.  While he retained authority over the operation 
of schools, he said the county officials “were in a command and control [mode], too,” and 
he willingly took a secondary role to show that he was a team player and that “we could 
subordinate to a larger cause” (Weast, personal interview, 2007).   
The arrangement provided Weast with access to behind-the-scenes information, 
separate and apart from formal communication channels, in addition to the role of 
Edward A. Clarke, the director of school safety and security, as liaison with the police 
department; and the role of Michael L. Subin, the county council member, as a liaison to 
the County Council.  Subin recalled that the collaboration resulted in “very good 
communications…at the county level in the sense of how to react and a consensus of 
what to do” (Subin, personal interview, 2007).  
Double Team 
In essence, Weast and Clarke were on two teams, their own and their respective 
relationships with the county government and the county police (Figure 5.2). Clarke 
recalled that the new roles were challenging to maintain, given his association with  
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former colleagues and the pressures of his new assignment.  “Trying to balance the     
superintendent’s need for accurate and timely information and getting that information   
from the investigators, or members of the chief’s leadership team, was a very 
tenuous…balancing act at times,” he said (Clarke, personal interview, 2007).   
The relationship between Weast and Duncan reflected a continuation of an 
established pattern of collaboration in emergencies.  Duncan recalled viewing Weast as 
“part of our group” and said that when the two of them talked about county and school 
activities, his assumption was that Weast would “relay what…we were doing to his 
group” (Duncan, personal interview, 2008).  Such a relay of information did not always 
occur or was not widely shared. 
Weast later described the collaboration in terms of political relationships that 
were necessary in an environment of shared authority and shifting demands and 
expectations.  In comments to researchers conducting a study of the police department’s 
activities, Weast said he relied on such relationships, both formal and informal, with 
 





county government and police leaders, in making decisions. “It’s all about relationships, 
and if you do not see the need for these relationships, you are bound to fail,” Weast said 
(G. R. Murphy & Wexler, 2004, pp. 108-109).   
The high value that Weast placed on his relationship with Duncan was illustrated 
later when he expressed his appreciation in a letter after the crisis, thanking the county 
executive for “our continued daily collaboration and the insights you provided me” 
(Weast, 2002p).  The relationship with Duncan, as well as with the police, school board 
and County Council, also was cited in letter to a parent, as part of his defense against a 
complaint about a decision:  “I was personally in regular communications with the county 
executive and his staff…” (Weast, 2002d).   
Weast described the value of such associations in conveying legitimacy, if not 
actual authority, when he spoke later at a conference.  He told the audience that such 
associations “gave credibility” to his letters to parents, allowing his messages to be 
accepted with authority and legitimacy, because “we were insiders and they knew we 
were insiders” (22 days of crisis, 2003).75   He also said the county’s press conferences 
provided a useful conduit for his own communications: “[Police Chief] Moose was 
delivering my messages. He always talked about schools….The county executive [too]—
I suspended my ego about having to talk about the schools, and talked through them” (22 
days of crisis, 2003).  He made the point again, later in the same conference, in reference 
being out of the media limelight and deferring to me as his spokesman:  “It was really 
                                                 
75 For an extended description of the communications effort involving the superintendent’s daily 
letters, see “Appendix I: Letters from the Superintendent.” 
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hard because I’m used to being the face [of the school district], but…he became my face, 
because it wasn’t Brian—it was Brian speaking for me” (22 days of crisis, 2003).    
No ‘Safe’ Schools 
In the days after the student shooting, there were concerns within the team about 
the news media’s effort to dramatize the situation in schools and the efforts by some 
political and community leaders to gain publicity.  Weast talked about the “rise in 
political activity” associated with the media coverage, as quoted in the meeting notes, and 
told the command team it was “obvious now...there are people who want ‘face time’ and 
want to be quoted” (Meeting notes October 10, ¶ 7:30).76  The next day, Clarke told the 
command team that FBI agents urged officials “not to talk about schools” anymore in 
their comments to the media (Meeting notes October 11, ¶ 7:30).  Clarke said the agents 
were concerned that the attacker was following the media coverage and making plans 
accordingly.77  The fear of another school shooting was unmistakable.  
The media coverage on all matters related to the accumulated attacks continued 
seemingly non-stop.  The school district remained in the middle, surrounded by an 
ongoing police investigation and the reporters looking for new stories.  A week after the 
student shooting, during which time two more attacks occurred, Weast worried about the 
risk to schools when “the entire nation is talking about” the shootings (Meeting notes 
                                                 
76 One of the most prominent examples was a photograph of County Executive Douglas M. 
Duncan speaking to a class of students, which appeared in The Washington Post on Wednesday, October 9, 
after he accompanied Weast on visits to schools the previous day ("Photograph," 2002). 
77 The Washington Post later reported that investigators also urged government leaders to tone 
down their rhetoric about the shootings, such as the Maryland governor who called the sniper “a coward,” 
and said investigators thought “that kind of language could prove counterproductive and evoke a dangerous 
response” (Witt, 2002a). 
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October 14, ¶ 7:30).  The conversation prompted Michael L. Subin, the County Council 
member, to assure Weast that political leaders recognized the implications of visiting 
schools or saying something.  “Politicians are keeping a low profile,” he said 
(Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 7:30).  Later in the day, Subin said he urged members of the 
council “to please stay away from schools” (Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 11:00).   
By that point, the school district was denying requests from the media for access 
to schools and on-camera interviews of school staff and students.  Instead, we provided 
district information over the phone and through written announcements and the 
superintendent’s letters, by fax and e-mail, on the district’s website and cable television 
station, particularly about mental health issues.78  The goal was to avoid any on-camera 
interviews.  The exceptions were Matthew Kamins, supervisor of psychological services, 
and Judy Madden, supervisor of counseling services, who appeared in settings unrelated 
to school locations to talk about mental health.   
The media clamored for information about schools, the effects of the crisis on 
children and staff, and anything else that might fill the void between police 
announcements and the continued shootings.  I told the team, as quoted in the notes, that  
“no school in the country would honor” a media request to report on students under these 
circumstances (Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 7:30).  The news media, however, were 
persistent.  A complaint relayed to the command team from a high school principal, for 
example, said reporters were “taking advantage of parents who are walking their children 
to school” (Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 11:00).   
                                                 
78 For an extended description of communication efforts related to mental health, see “Appendix 
H: Mental Health and Volunteers,” as well as “Appendix I: Letters from the Superintendent.” 
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Kress reported to the team, as quoted in the notes, that some principals saw the 
district’s actions—the ongoing release of the superintendent’s letters, the commentary 
about mental health, the distribution of information via the Internet—as “trying to make 
this into a press event” and he told them it was just the opposite, “trying to keep press out 
of the schools” (Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 7:30).  In practice, the problem was 
difficult, if not possible to control.  At the meeting, I responded after Kress spoke, saying 
that, while “we don’t want reporters on school grounds…we have not prohibited this…if 
principals want them there, it is hard to keep them out” (Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 
7:30).  Weast was to the point about the risks involved:   
We must be careful about attracting attention.  If there is another shooting at a 
school, I don’t want it to be Montgomery County…I am trying to keep our head 
down.  People do not realize how much exposure we have even operating under 
Code Blue (Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 7:30). 
 
Weast was careful to avoid becoming a source of attention, rejecting several 
invitations to appear on national television programs.  His only appearance after the press 
conference following the student shooting was an ABC News interview on October 8 
about school security improvements since the terrorist attacks in 2001 ("A closer look," 
2002).  In a newspaper interview two weeks later, he explained his reticence to be in the 
media: “The position I'm in is a very precarious one. I'm trying to keep people informed 
but not create an attraction to schools” ("Questions," 2002).  
At the time, the overall news coverage appeared to reflect a residential bias for 
journalists in the Washington area, and I commented to the team at one meeting:   
“Reporters and editors are writing from personal viewpoint, this is personal for them.  If 
this had happened somewhere else you would not get this type of coverage.  It happened 
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in their backyard” (Meeting notes October 16, ¶ 7:30).79  The temptation for media 
coverage grew too much for some principals, particularly those with friends or relatives 
in the media, and I informed the command team: “Most principals are saying no, but a 
few have succumbed.  One will be featured tonight” on a national television news 
program (Meeting notes October 16, ¶ 5:00).  
Ambiguity Prompted ‘Conservative Approach’ 
There was pressure to close schools and pressure to cancel outdoor activities 
indefinitely.  Demands came from parents and school-based staff in the form of telephone 
calls, e-mails, letters, and comments in the media.  From the outset, Weast rejected such 
overtures.  At the meeting with principals, he said schools would not be closed “based on 
fear,” nor would schools be closed “for an indefinite period of time,” as quoted in the 
notes of the meeting (Principals meeting notes, 2002, p. 1).  Part of the reasoning 
stemmed from the large percentage of students who depended on schools for breakfast 
and lunch and other forms of assistance, including those with disabilities and those with 
nowhere else to go.  “Some of these kids need our food, shelter and support,” he said 
(Principals meeting notes, 2002, p. 4).   
Weast told principals further restrictions on schools would make “life more 
stressful for parents, students, and staff” (Principals meeting notes, 2002, p. 1).  As 
                                                 
79 Two reporters from The Washington Post confirmed part of this observation later in a book  
about the sniper investigation:  “We too were deeply affected by the killings.  We lived and worked in the 
threatened communities.  Our children attended schools in the area, in one case within a mile or two of the 
Maryland shootings.  We felt the same fear” (Horwitz & Ruane, 2003, p. xiii).  However, another reporter 
for the newspaper, in an interview after the crisis, acknowledged a personal interest but downplayed its




principals well knew, there were repercussions when schools closed or cancelled 
activities for inclement weather, even for a day or two. There was also the fatalism 
inherent in appearing to give up by closing schools, and no reasonable way to know when 
to reopen if the attacks just stopped, without an arrest. 
Weast promised to use a “conservative approach” in his decision making about 
school operations and student activities—evaluating the circumstances one day at a time 
for the foreseeable future (Principals meeting notes, 2002, p. 1).  It was his way of 
maintaining some level of consistency, a point he made with the principals.  He told them 
the school district depended “on your good judgment” in the decisions they made and 
“parents need to be reassured that there is going to be consistency with the way situations 
are handled” (Principals meeting notes, 2002, p. 1).  
Caution, Fear 
Other school districts also imposed various restrictions on students, some more 
limiting than others, throughout the Washington and Baltimore areas metropolitan areas, 
and Southern Maryland (Desmon & Wilber, 2002; Schulte & Trejos, 2002b). Caution 
about public activities on school property spread to the county government, when it 
switched positions Tuesday and banned the community use of county and school athletic 
fields, tennis courts, and other outdoor facilities (Meeting notes October 8, ¶ 11:00).  
The Maryland state superintendent reported on Tuesday afternoon, the day after 
the student shooting, that school districts were maintaining safety provisions until at least 
the next day, pending developments (Grasmick, 2002d).  Their predicament was reflected 
in an editorial Tuesday morning.  The editorial, titled “A New Level of Fear,” appeared 
in The Washington Post: 
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This is what terror is about, after all…When the police chiefs and school 
superintendents tell us not to panic, they are right; we know they are right, 
because chances of any one of us encountering danger remain minuscule.  Yet, we 
also know that, as long as the assailant follows no pattern and betrays no sign of 
conscience, no one can make us any guarantees (New level, 2002). 
 
The media coverage seemed to emphasize the heightened sense of anxiety, amplifying 
dramatically the concerns of parents,80 the apprehension of public officials,81 and the 
presence of police officers.82   
Counseling Role 
Weast took on the role of counselor.  In a letter to parents, students, and staff on 
Tuesday afternoon, he said “children need our constant love and support, especially as we 
seek explanations ourselves about these difficult circumstances” (Weast, 2002f).  The 
well being of children was linked to the welfare of the school district.  That point was 
made more directly at a press conference Tuesday morning, in which Weast again noted 
the responsibilities of school staff for taking care of children amid fear and anxiety:   
Little students, the younger the age, the more difficult it is for them to understand 
these types of issues…we're trying to deal with it in a way that is positive and 
helps keep them focused, not only on their teaching and learning but how to deal 
with it at home ("Press conference," 2002b).   
 
The press conference was held by Police Chief Charles A. Moose and County 
Executive Douglas M. Duncan in front of a contingent of television cameras, 
                                                 
80 One article summarized the implications of “the shooting of a teenager in front of his school” as 
having “jolted parents and school systems across the region and raised an already intensive police 
investigation to a new level of urgency” (Kovaleski & Ruane, 2002). 
81 County Executive Douglas M. Duncan was featured saying:  “We’ve got evil in our community.  
We’ve got someone going around randomly shooting innocent victims and stooping so low as to shoot a 
child, a 13-year-old child, who is walking to school” ("Area residents," 2002).   
82 Another article described schools as having the “feel of fortresses,” and said, that while the 
“show of force” by police was “designed to reassure frightened parents and students returning to school,” it 
had the opposite affect for “many parents” (Schulte & Trejos, 2002b).   
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microphones, and reporters in a parking lot next to the police headquarters. This was 
Weast’s first press conference since the crisis began (and ultimately his last).  He focused 
almost exclusively on the school district’s mental health initiative and returned to the 
subject of staff responsibility to take care of themselves and look out for one another, and
to avail themselves of counseling and resource materials about controlling stress,  
“because we expect them to remain as calm and as focused as we possibly can in this 
very trying time” ("Press conference," 2002b).   
The expectations for staff to remain on duty and to do their jobs were underscored 
by Duncan at another press conference later in the day.  He used the term “obligations” in 
commending school-based staff for doing their part in the crisis, noting that “students feel 
safe in school” and teacher attendance was “even better than normal” ("Press 
conference," 2002a). In a television report, he was described speaking positively about 
bus driver attendance ("Sniper on the loose," 2002).  His comments came as a counter-
point to a little-known incident that morning, in which some adult crossing guards failed 
to arrive at their posts to direct traffic near schools.  Duncan later recalled the situation as 
a tough choice for people who otherwise placed their lives at risk for student safety.  
“Some people just said, I can’t do this, I’m not going to stand out here, be in a uniform 
and be a sitting duck,” he said (Duncan, personal interview, 2008).  The crossing guards 
were part-time personnel employed by the police department.  Their only back-ups were 
police officers and volunteers, and their absence was made more challenging amid the 
safety patrol restrictions.  
Weast also recalled the incident, describing it later as an illustration of the tenuous 
nature of government service in a crisis and the limited resources available to the county 
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government when public safety personnel were already stretched thin. The limited 
resources, he said, were magnified by the size of the school district and the need for 
nearly 200 crossing guards across the county.  Weast said he resisted parent and 
community demands for more police protection, in part, because he knew the resources 
were unavailable and the demands imprudent.  “We could paralyze police and fire just 
because of our magnitude of size,” he said (Weast, personal interview, 2007). 
‘Vital Signs’ 
The positive references to the attendance of teachers and bus drivers reflected a 
deliberate strategy to use such data as benchmarks.  The effort began Friday, October 4, 
the day after the initial shootings.  County Executive Douglas M. Duncan used 
attendance data at a press conference to illustrate the “mood of the county” and said, 
“We've got great attendance from teachers, from the students in the county, from the 
county workers, the libraries, [and] all of that” ("Maryland authorities," 2002a).  In this 
context, the attendance data was a measure of normalcy.  Similarly, at a press conference,
Police Chief Charles Moose noted the accomplishment of opening schools “on time" that
morning ("Police chief," 2002). 
The following week, after the student shooting, the collection and use of 
attendance data intensified.  On Monday night, October 7, Weast urged principals to 
report attendance as a way to spot potential problems (Principals meeting notes, 2002, p. 
4).  After the meeting, when the command team reconvened, Weast listed his priorities 
for the command team’s work.  Attendance reports were first, followed by monitoring 
mental health (Meeting notes October 7, 2002 ¶ 7:00).  The next morning, Donald H. 
Kress, the coordinating community superintendent, changed the attendance reports from a 
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count of students present to a count of students missing.  The new report used the term 
“absenteeism” for the first time (Absenteeism, 2002). The change signified a shift in 
perspective.  Instead of measuring normalcy, the data were used to indicate 
abnormalities.   
The following Wednesday, Weast used the term “vital signs” in describing the 
attendance data (Meeting notes October 9, ¶ 5:00).  By then, attendance and mental 
health were linked, one as the potential barometer of the other.  Kress recalled that the 
absence of such data would have fed rumors and misinterpretation about conditions in 
schools. “It could have led to more of a panic sense within the community and people 
keeping their kids at home,” he said (Kress, personal interview, 2007).   
Weast recalled later that he came to view attendance as a correlate of the mental 
health conditions of the community during a crisis, using the school as the focal point.  
He said attendance was a by-product of a school’s ability to sustain itself as a functional 
organization, a reflection of its culture.  In a crisis, he said, a school’s culture was 
affected by the mental health of the students and staff.  If they were afraid or stressed, 
they stayed home.  It was important, therefore, to reassure staff and students, to address 
their fears and anxieties, and to encourage their attendance with the mental health support 
in order to sustain schools and, by extension, the school district.  It meant, he said, 
“sending a message that we’re really interested in not only dealing with the crisis and 
keeping you safe, but we’re interested in you as a person” (Weast, personal interview, 
2007).   
For nearly two weeks, Weast required daily reports of attendance for internal use 
and summary data for export to public officials and the media.  The reported attendance 
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rates remained relatively constant and high for the school district overall, with 
fluctuations among some schools, especially near the original shooting sites.  Such results  
were characterized as good news, reflecting public confidence in the schools.  I told the 
Associated Press a week after the student shooting, for example, that “people are keeping 
their kids in school.  It’s been a very good turnout” (Hastings, 2002).   
Distorted View 
Judy Madden, the supervisor of counseling services, later recalled that the 
attendance data created “a public face of calm” on a district level that may have distorted 
an understanding of reality at the local level (Madden, personal interview, 2007).   
I mean the schools were certainly not in chaos but they weren’t calm. But I had a 
sense, in the sort of daily report outs, everyone had a need on the whole to 
report—yes, things are fine, everyone is fine. Whereas the emotional climate was 
very tense…. There was sort of almost two levels of reality, sort of the higher 
level, big-picture up [on] the balcony—yes, we’re calm—but then when you 
moved down to the dance floor, it wasn’t quite so calm (Madden, personal 
interview, 2007). 
 
Kress acknowledged later the inherent disadvantage the team had in getting an 
“accurate picture” of the crisis from afar, with limited first-hand information largely 
based on personal contacts: 
I think it varied from day to day and from the person you talked to….Every once 
in a while some of us got a glimpse of just how frayed people’s nerves were 
becoming, and I suspect if we were seeing that from some of our principals, I 
suspect our principals were seeing it from some of their staff, some of their 
parents, and [so on]….I think we were aware at our level that there were mental 
health issues that [we] needed to be sensitive with, but I’m not sure any of us had 
an accurate picture of how deep some of those issues went (Kress, personal 
interview, 2007). 
 
Larry A. Bowers, the chief operating officer, recalled that managing the crisis 
over the entire district required a reliance on key principals, who were viewed as capable 
210 
 
of giving reliable information and feedback.  He used the metaphor of checking the oil in 
a car engine to illustrate the method of checking on the status of schools:  
That’s one of the things we try to do, and it’s how we would dip stick [by] calling 
five or six principals who you can really count on in terms of being honest and 
open, and not the complainers and not the people who are going to hold 
everything close to the chest, but [principals who] are really going to tell you like 




Collecting data about student attendance was a problem from the beginning.  
There was no automated system for producing same-day figures (unlike the personnel 
system that tracked teacher requests for substitutes as a measure of absenteeism).  The 
student attendance system produced reports only after receiving data from schools, and 
the school submissions were dependent on tedious data-entry tasks after teachers took 
attendance each morning.  Even the centralized reports took at least a day to compile. The 
only option was to spot check as many schools as possible, getting an early estimate from 
principals and focusing on schools where problems might occur, with the assumption of 
normalcy everywhere else.  Kress recalled the process:  
We ended up having to call the schools and say, what’s your attendance today?  
We had a tremendous amount of push back from principals, and even from 
community superintendents and their secretaries, about why, you know, why do 
we have to call these schools?  And we got a lot of angry principals about—I have 
more important things to do than count heads.  And, so, it started to get pretty 
ugly after a while (Kress, personal interview, 2007).  
 
Kress said he felt the pressure not only from principals.  “One of the issues 
became the superintendent’s need for data and our inability to get that data,” he said, 
noting that the reports were due to Weast by mid-day at the latest (Kress, personal 
interview, 2007).    
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Two weeks into the crisis, the daily attendance reports ended.  Kress secured the 
discontinuation from Weast after saying, according to notes from the meeting, that he 
was receiving “a little pushback” from principals and urged sensitivity about the requests 
for information, which had grown to include other topics (Meeting notes October 16, 
2002 ¶ 5:00).  After a brief discussion and agreement about stopping the daily requests, 
as described in the notes, Kress said: “The principals will view this as being responsive to 
helping them reduce stress” (Meeting notes October 16, 2002 ¶ 5:00).   
At the time, Kress was holding back on the extent of the problem. He had been a 
school-based administrator, primarily as a principal, for 17 years—longer and more 
recently than anyone else at the table (other than the principals’ union president). As the 
head of the office in charge of their supervision, he had more daily contact with 
principals directly or through his community superintendents.  He knew many of them 
personally as colleagues and friends, and he acted as a buffer when reporting about what 
they said.  He understood their need to vent and his responsibility to be judicious.  He 
later recalled receiving an e-mail from a principal who reacted uncharacteristically in 
response to a school district decision: “That was an email that never went beyond me” 
(Kress, personal interview, 2007).  
Matthew A. Tronzano, who also had been an elementary principal, later recalled 
the isolation of the principals in comparison to the command team.  The team had the 
benefit of inside information from the police and other authorities.  The principals, he 
said, had information provided by the school district or obtained on their own.  The 
seclusion compounded the problems they faced in the decisions they had every day.  
“When you’re isolated in the school and you’re being left to make…decision[s] by 
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yourself, that’s awfully difficult to have to deal with,” he said (Tronzano, personal 
interview, 2007). 
 Lingering Criticism 
 The demand for daily attendance data remained a sore point in the relationship of 
some principals and the central office.  Edward W. Shirley, the principals’ union 
president, described the problem in a letter to Weast after the crisis ended:   
The number two issue in the minds of school-based administrators [behind 
inconsistent security rules for public use of school facilities] was the impact on 
staff in responding to central office initiated information requests.  Unfortunately, 
many administrators feel that the only contact they received from the central 
office during this period was a request for staff and student attendance (Shirley, 
2002).  
 
Shirley recalled later that principals he talked to never had the same sense of 
urgency for the attendance data as the command team leadership. “From a principal's 
point of view, central office could get this as soon as it was sent in on-line,” he said 
(Shirley, personal interview, 2007).  He said it was issues such as this that prompted him 
to lobby successfully for a role on the team.  “[Weast] kept sending out stuff that was—
we’re working on this as a team. I said wait a minute—no, we’re not working on this as a 
team. You all are doing this, and you have nobody in your inner circle who is a 
principal….Don’t tell people we’re a team, because we’re not a team” (Shirley 
interview,” 2007).83 
                                                 
83 Five of the 15 team members were former principals, with various backgrounds and years 
removed from schools.  Jerry D. Weast, the superintendent, was the most removed, having become a 
superintendent 26 years earlier. Donald H. Kress, the coordinating community superintendent, was the most 
recent, having been a high school principal six years earlier.  Edward W. Shirley became the most recent 
former principal on the team.  He was a high school principal three months earlier, before becoming the 
full-time principals’ union president.  He was added to the team near the end of the second week. 
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Weast recalled, in response to an inquiry, the tensions that arose with principals 
and said he took the criticism in stride:  “They did what they needed—they grumbled, 
they second guessed, they Monday-morning-quarterbacked—that was the way things 
were at that point in time” (Weast, personal interview, 2007).  He noted, however, that 
the criticism never rose to the level of open insurrection; and, in the end, the principals 
managed their schools consistent with the directions given to them. “They didn’t have 
anybody stand up and say, no we won’t go, or yes we will go and do our own [thing] and 
the hell with these people,” he said (Weast, personal interview, 2007). 
Weak Point in Plan 
Weast was not immune to the plight of school staff.  The day after the student 
shooting, he visited three schools, and he was accompanied by County Executive 
Douglas M. Duncan and Councilmember Michael L. Subin.  Duncan’s presence was 
highlighted in media reports, with his picture in the next day’s newspaper talking to a 
high school government class.  Subin was pictured in the background.  Weast was 
elsewhere.  He went to talk to staff.  The visits made an impression about the crush of 
additional responsibilities and little available support.  Later in the day, he directed James 
A. Williams, the deputy superintendent, “to push for parent volunteers” from among the 
PTA, businesses, and community leaders (Meeting notes October 8, 2002 ¶ 5:00).  By 
Friday afternoon, after Williams’ staff reported more than a 1,400 volunteers tallied by 
schools, Weast raised the stakes.  He wanted 2,000 volunteers and a database for keeping 
track of them and their expertise, possibly as “reading tutors,” for future reference once 
the crisis ended (Meeting notes October 11, 2002 ¶ 5:00).   
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The need for volunteers identified a weak point in the plan to keep schools open.  
Schools were not staffed to handle the extra security duties—including monitoring the 
hallways and checking visitors at locked front doors—let alone the voids created by 
cancelled field trips, and the indoor recess, and the impact of worried students, parents, 
and staff.  In a “lessons learned” review later with staff, Weast noted the risks faced by 
the school district if “we get hit with something that overruns our resources” (Lessons 
learned, 2002).  As the crisis progressed, the need for volunteers increased.  Staff 
reported that outreach efforts expanded to include non-English speaking volunteers, 
especially those fluent in Spanish (Meeting notes October 15, 2002 ¶ 5:00)  A private 
security firm from Bethesda was described offering trained personnel to assist schools in 
the Silver Spring area (Meeting notes October 21, 2002 ¶ 7:30). 
‘Fine Line' of Stress 
A week after the student shooting, the team meetings discussed the effects of staff 
and students being confined to their schools and worries about the ongoing attacks. On 
Monday morning, October 14, Weast told them he was considering “loosening up a little” 
and moving toward resumption of outdoor activities (Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 7:30). 
The idea of relaxing restrictions was a risk.  Edward A. Clarke and Robert B. Hellmuth, 
director and assistant director, respectively, of school safety and security, reported that 
police sources agreed the assailant would strike again, based on the pattern thus far.  
By mid-day, Clarke reported that police did not support resuming outside 
activities.  There were no officers to spare to cover activities on playing fields.  Donald 
H. Kress, the coordinating community superintendent, also reported back after contacting 
18 secondary principals about whether they wanted to resume outside activities, and most 
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said no (Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 11:00).  Weast reported on a visit that morning to a 
high school and said he discerned “a fine line” about potential stress-related problems 
when he talked with staff and he could tell the situation was “affecting the students” 
(Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 11:00).  
Weast’s observations were in addition to a report by Kress the previous Friday.  
He said principals were “starting to show more signs of stress as they try to ensure that 
everyone is safe” and the elementary principals were “showing the most signs of stress” 
(Meeting notes October 11, ¶ 5:00). At the time, Lacey suggested that “fear is increasing” 
in schools, and she was told to get data to back up the claim (Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 
5:00).  Lacey’s staff worked over the weekend contacting counselors, and Lacey returned 
to the next team meeting with a report on stress and anxiety in schools.  
The report summarized responses to open-ended questions from 58 guidance 
counselors from 32 elementary schools, 16 middle schools, and 10 high schools (Figure 
5.3).  The responses were based on what the counselors felt about themselves and 
observed among students and other staff in their schools ("Touching base," 2002).  The 
report indicated that staff and students across all school levels exhibited signs of stress 
that affected their work and activities in increasingly negative ways.  Staff, in particular, 
felt “overwhelmed” and exhausted, physically and emotionally, due to increased demands  
on their personal and professional time, concerns about safety, and feeling unrecognized 
for their work ("Touching base," 2002). 
Judith Madden, supervisor of counseling services, joined Lacey in presenting the 
report, and said school-based staff were dealing with others before taking care of 
themselves and they needed “emotional oxygen” before they can be called on to be more  
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helpful (Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 5:00).  She said the continuing stress of the crisis 
was taking a toll.84    
Weast knew the problem was affecting more people than the report indicated.  He 
told the Board of Education the next day, Tuesday, October 15, during a presentation on 
the status of the school district and its response to the crisis, according to an audio 
recording of the meeting, that the impact was universal:  
In normal times, our teachers are under a great deal of stress.  In abnormal times, 
they feel stress even more so.  
 
                                                 
84 An elementary teacher later described the stress in a letter excerpted in a newspaper: “The staff 
and children never knew what kind of day would unfold…At any moment we might be forced to turn out 
lights and huddle in the back of the room, on the floor (many in a fetal position), as our only defense from 
killers that may have gotten into our school" (Schulte, 2002a). 
 
 
Figure 5.3  Excerpt from Summary of Mental Health Concerns 
From Sniper crisis: Week 2, superintendent’s crisis management communications. Copyright 2002, 




It isn’t just the teachers. The guy who has to maintain the building to make sure 
the doors are locked, he’s worried doing his job. The cook who is trying to get the 
nutrition—she or he are worried about their job. The secretary who had a tough 
job before is beginning to answer the phone more and more rather than less and 
less. The principal who feels the ever present security issues, along with the 
educational issues, feels the weight of this on their shoulders. The teacher 
assistant, the bus driver—everybody, in all walks of life.  
 
Even the parent who has always had a little bit of anxiety about bundling them up 
and sending them out, feels that anxiety at a much greater level than they were 
before ("Dialogue," 2002). 
 
 Weast said there were few options available to address the problem, describing it 
as a matter of resources.  “We have tried to maintain a very cost [effective] approach and 
a prudent approach with safety,” he said ("Dialogue," 2002).  
 In the meantime, he remained adamant about keeping schools open, and he 
thought there was a possibility of resuming outside activities.  On Monday, October 14, 
at the late afternoon meeting, as quoted in the notes of the meeting, he requested a phase-
in plan by the end of the week, “if things continue to be quiet” and told everyone to 
“make no announcement about this plan yet” because the decisions were pending 
(Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 5:00).   
Later that evening, another shooting occurred.85  Two days later, Rosemont 
Elementary School went into a Code Red with police patrolling the grounds after 
someone left a phone message threatening the school (Meeting notes October 16, 2002 ¶ 
5:00).  The same day, The Washington Post published a list of “tips” provided by police 
on how to stay safe outside, which included walking “briskly in a zigzag pattern” and 
                                                 
85 The shooting killed a woman at 9:15 p.m., Monday evening, October 14, while she helped her 
husband load their car on the ground-level lot of a parking garage at a store in Falls Church, Virginia 
(Horwitz & Ruane, 2003, pp. 149-150).   
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“While outside, try to keep moving. A moving target is more difficult to hit than one that 
is standing still” ("Tips," 2002).   
Kindness for Staff 
Parents were asked to be more supportive of teachers and staff.  Weast was 
straightforward in his request, suggesting it as a challenge, in his daily letter:  
This would be a good time to do something nice for school-based staff…Right 
now, this week, our school-based staff need the support of parents and community 
members who value the good deeds of the people who work each and every day 
in their schools (Weast, 2002h).   
 
The letter did not refer to the mental health report received the day before, but the 
message drew from the report’s findings and presented an argument on why school-based 
staff deserved the extra attention.  The message was meant as much for teachers and staff, 
as for parents:   
They have been managing their duties under a great deal of stress.  Everyone who 
works in a school has been keenly aware of the heightened responsibilities in 
supporting our core mission of teaching and learning while taking care of the 
anxieties and concerns of children (Weast, 2002h). 
 
The letter reached for sympathy and guilt, placing the responsibility for the 
emotional well-being of teachers and staff partly on the shoulders of parents:   
All too often it is easy to take for granted the professionalism and dedication of 
teachers…Each of these professionals has responsibilities that have become much 
harder in recent days.  They need recognition from parents for a job well done, 
even if the recognition is a simple thank you (Weast, 2002h) 
 
Such activities were already under way in some schools.86  One high school 
principal noted that, while Weast’s idea was not unique, it was important and timely and 
                                                 
86 In a personal journal entry prior to the letter, an elementary teacher described increased parent  
support, as published later as a newspaper article: “It’s gone to a whole new level. To help relieve the stress 
of the teachers, parent volunteers, licensed massage therapists, are giving massages to the teachers during 
(Continued next page) 
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well-received.  In an e-mail on October 15, the principal described a “wonderful 
breakfast” provided to staff by parents that morning before they received Weast’s letter 
and said, “…his idea was a good one and his sentiments were ‘right on’ the money.  Our 
staff really appreciated the food, but more importantly they felt valued” (Doran, 2002). 
Later that same day, Kress reported the establishment of voluntary opportunities 
for principals to meet confidentially with mental health staff (Meeting notes October 15, 
¶ 5:00).  Kress later reported that no principals asked for the assistance. 
The appeal to parents was followed by another effort that began the week before.  
Weast asked staff whether something “symbolically” would be appropriate to send to 
principals and other key staff to let them know the system “cared about them," as quoted 
at the time (Meeting notes October 11, ¶ 5:00). He asked Matthew J. Kamins, supervisor 
of psychological services, for something appropriate. Kamins worked with others, 
including Frieda K. Lacey, the superintendent’s chief of staff, and Aggie Alvez, the 
director of special projects in the superintendent’s office.  They proposed thick pads of 
notepaper in pastel colors that featured a cover sheet with the words “Grace Under 
Pressure” and individual sheets with an adaptation of a quote from Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. and a note of appreciation from Weast (Figure 5.4).  The idea was to send the  
notes to principals as a token of appreciation, so they could share comments with their 
own staff, and so on.  A printer in Gaithersburg donated the entire project.    
It was a small gesture, reflecting the symbolism Weast was looking for.  He was 
impressed with the results and showcased the notepads during a presentation to the Board  
___________________ 
(Continued from previous page) 
lunch. I'm stunned to see a teacher hunched over in a massage chair getting a massage, soft music playing, 
silence everywhere else” (Ochs, 2002). 
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of Education on how the school district was responding to the crisis.  In the process, as 
quoted from an audio tape of the meeting, he changed the meaning of the phrase to 
something more akin to divine intervention: “It does symbolize how much we care about 
our people in a very small way, that they are being graced while they’re under a great 
deal of pressure” ("Dialogue," 2002).  There was no assessment of how the pads were 
interpreted by the recipients.  Lacey recalled hearing that principals appreciated them and 
she saw the pads on their desks when she later visited schools (Lacey, personal interview, 
2007).   Ironically, the gesture also suggested something else entirely—that the school 
district’s resources were paper thin.   
The phrase “grace under pressure” became a metaphor for how the school district 
responded as the crisis progressed.  An article in the school district’s newsletter, for 
 
Figure 5.4  Recognition for ‘Grace Under Pressure’ 
Photocopy of notepad presented in October 2002 to Virginia Brooks, who took most of the team 
meeting notes and managed the archival collection.  Shown approximately 50% of original size.  




example, described activities under way during the early part of the crisis: “Each school 
and office has its own story of grace under pressure and devotion to students…” 
("System responds," 2002, p. 1).  Weast used the phrase years later in recalling the 
response of employees to the crisis:  “I mean this was grace under pressure, and it 
happened in every job we had” (Weast, personal interview, 2007). 
Cancelation Pressure  
The swing in events, from one shooting to the next, affected decisions on whether 
to resume outside activities.  One week after the student shooting, for example, plans 
were initiated to loosen the restrictions, only to be placed on hold after the shooting that 
night, Monday, October 14. The next morning, the frustration was evident in the 
command team meetings.  “It doesn’t look like we will be able to relax yet,” Weast said 
(Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 7:30).  At this point, schools operated with locked outside 
doors and limitations on inside access but not the full interior restrictions of a Code Blue.  
These were described as “baby blues” by a principal in an article later about his 
experiences (J. M. Sacco, 2003).  Command team members and police often called them 
“light blues” (Meeting notes October 21, ¶ 11:30).87 
The Monday night shooting identified a split among superintendents in the region 
over how to cancel outdoor student activities—daily, as in Montgomery County, or for a 
longer period of time, as wanted elsewhere, particularly in Virginia. The issue was the 
main topic of discussion in an afternoon conference call on October 15, sponsored by the 
Washington Metropolitan Area Council of Governments.  The call included local 
                                                 
87 The similarity in terminology led to the common misunderstanding that the school district 
operated under a Code Blue for the entire crisis, which it did not. 
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government leaders, police commanders, and others.  Weast used the speaker on his 
office phone to let staff in his office hear the conversation, including me.  
The superintendents in Virginia, especially those in areas where the three most 
recent shootings occurred, advocated for longer cancellations. Weast disagreed. The 
discussion eventually focused on whether a uniform decision could be made among all 
area school districts to cancel activities indefinitely, as a way to manage planning 
consistently in the region for outdoor programs, athletic teams, and their support groups, 
including parents.  The idea was similar to informal discussions that typically occurred in 
regional weather emergencies, when district transportation departments shared decision 
information among themselves and encouraged uniformity, if possible.  On this day, no 
agreement was reached.  Weast later explained his position to a reporter, saying that 
simply cancelling activities for several days or an indefinite period of time eliminated 
options and the ability to “maintain some optimism” in the face of the continuing police 
manhunt (Strauss, 2002).88   I summed up the problem facing the superintendents for the 
reporter:  “The dynamics of acceptable risk have changed…We are now trying to deal 
with the boundaries of that risk. What are they? That's what we have to find out" (Strauss, 
2002).   
After the conference call, Weast suggested to the team that the Virginia 
superintendents might be right after all.  He asked the team members for their advice and, 
as quoted in the meeting notes, Weast presented his position before the others spoke:  
“Suspending indefinitely would be sending a message to the shooter that we are 
                                                 
88 The article described the different strategies saying, “Virginia superintendents are learning 
from…Weast, who was the first to order school lockdowns….Though they share common problems, the 
region's superintendents make their own decisions” (Strauss, 2002).  
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succumbing…giving up hope, and I do not think it is good public policy” (Meeting notes 
October 15, ¶ 5:00).  The discussion that followed, transcribed in the meeting notes, 
offered a vivid example of the give-and-take in the meeting room. 
Larry A. Bowers, the chief operating officer, was the first to respond.  He said, as 
quoted in the notes, that making a blanket statement about cancelling activities was 
unnecessary and counterproductive:    
I think, as a general statement, that people are expecting that we are not going 
outside, so we really do not have to say anything.  If you take the other position, 
there is no way out.  You have approached it in a way so that you can 
systematically ease off (Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 5:00). 
 
As Bowers and others knew, the cancellations did not apply to all outdoor 
activities.  Some student activities received permission to participate in events elsewhere, 
including parades and athletic competitions in other states.  Those decisions happened 
quietly without any public notice, on a case-by-case basis.   
Matthew J. Kamins, the supervisor of psychological services, also responded, 
saying indefinite cancelations affected behavior management among students, as well as 
staff:  “We cannot take hope away from our kids and staff…If we take that away, we 
have backed ourselves into a corner” (Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 5:00).  Michael L. 
Subin, the County Councilmember, agreed with Kamins: “They are looking for a ray of
hope.  If you throw indefinite at them, it will compound the problem” (Meeting notes 
October 15, ¶ 5:00).   
I offered a potential middle-ground, suggesting that the daily decisions be 
maintained by making the decision one day in advance and “giving people feedback the 
day before” (Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 5:00).  Kamins agreed, saying it provided 
 flexibility and calling it “the 24-hours approach” (Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 5:00).  
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Donald H. Kress, the coordinating community superintendent, summarized the 
advice: “I agree on having some lead time.  Twenty-four hours is smart.  I don’t think we 
should go with an indefinite decision” (Meeting notes October 15,  5:00).  Others 
around the table also agreed, and Weast asked whether the plan was consistent with 
making “the decision tonight about activities tomorrow” (Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 
5:00).  The team agreed again, and he cancelled activities for the next day.  
At the end of the discussion, Weast admitted that the problem worried him and he 
thanked the team for the advice saying, as quoted in the notes, “I would hate for this to 
have been laid on me without the benefit of staff counsel” (Meeting notes October 15, ¶ 
5:00).  Weast remained under pressure both to make long-term cancellations and to 
restart outdoor activities.  His office received correspondence urging a change.  One e-
mail from a parent, for example, urged him to “consider making a blanket statement 
that all outdoor activities are canceled until further notice” (After school, 2002).  Another 
parent questioned the practicality of canceling outdoor activities when students 
congregate outside on their own: “Would several hundred students on…playing fields 
really [be] at more danger…than they would be hanging out at the 7-11 or what not 
during the same hours?” ("Sports season," 2002). 
Alternative Fields 
As the crisis continued, the pressure intensified to allow interscholastic athletics 
to resume as football and soccer programs approached the end of the fall season.  On 
Wednesday, October 16, Weast informed the team that he had formed a work group to  
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identify alternatives.89  The effort followed two attempts to restart outside activities that 
were shelved when the attacks continued, first on Friday, October 11, and again on 
Monday, October 14.   
At the time, athletic teams continued to hold modified practices indoors—with 
team members wearing socks and tennis shoes instead of cleats on gym floors and 
hallways—in the hopes of staying in condition if outdoor practices resumed.  The team 
received a  preliminary impact report on the continued cancellation of games and 
practices for interscholastic athletics, describing the specific effects for football, boys and 
girls soccer, field hockey, girls volleyball, cross country, golf, and girls tennis 
("Summary," 2002, pp. 1-3). The report noted that student athletes had not practiced on 
school district athletic fields and tennis courts in 10 days, which the report identified as a 
potential safety concern for students when they returned to competitions lacking proper 
conditioning.  The report also noted the limited options regarding make-up games and 
alternatives based on rules for state competitions ("Summary," 2002, p. 3).  Those rules 
involved counties elsewhere in the state where competitions continued unfettered by the 
attacks in the Washington area or resumed after a short hiatus.   
The effect of the restrictions was particularly hard for football teams.  Make-up 
games had already been cancelled (Meeting notes October 14, ¶ 5:00).  The county’s 
sports community, which included parents of students vying for college football 
scholarships and booster clubs that partly depended on funding from refreshments sales





                                       




 booster club, for example, reference was made to the recent Redskins football game: 
“What evidence or information do you have [that] a few thousand can’t make it safely to 
Churchill High School this Friday night to see Whitman play Churchill?” (Higgins, 
2002).   
Weast was sympathetic to the sports program, highlighting the situation in his 
letter to parents and staff on Wednesday, October 16,  
The long-term consequences of the canceled events are important to all of us, but 
more so for the players, coaches, and families who now face the potential of 
continued cancellations.  They need our support and understanding as these events 
unfold (Weast, 2002n). 
 
The workgroup appointed by Weast finished a preliminary report quickly and 
presented options to the command team the next day.  Michael L. Subin, the County 
Councilmember, who chaired the group, described the factors involved in scheduling 92 
teams involved in fall sports at secure locations either inside the county or elsewhere and, 
as quoted in the notes, concluded that such an effort was “a logistical nightmare” 
(Meeting notes October 17, ¶ 7:30).  At the center of the discussion was safety.  Edward 
A. Clarke, director of school safety and security, summarized the problem, as quoted in 
the notes:  “You have a low probability of an incident, but if do [have one], the 
consequences are unacceptable” (Meeting notes October 17, ¶ 7:30). 
Weast shared the information with parents and staff in his letter that day.  
“Several scenarios are being pursued, including out-of-county sites and centralized 
county facilities that would offer the best security and accessibility,” he said (Weast, 
2002i).  He expressed optimism about the progress made in finding an alternative and 
sought support, holding out the hope of a resolution in order to keep peace: 
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…I want parents, students, and staff to know that experts in school athletics, 
logistics, security, transportation, and high school administration—along with 
county government leaders—were trying to find the best way for student athletes 
to play, if at all possible (Weast, 2002i). 
 
Later that day, after the meeting with athletic directors, the school district 
announced additional details about the “continued development of potential options,” 
including resumption of tennis at indoor sites, golf and cross-country at alterative sites, 
and progress made on finding sites for football and other sports (2002g).  The 
announcement said athletic directors and others were to meet the following Monday, 
October 21, to work out a way to resume outdoor sports.90  The next morning, Friday, 
October 18, Edward W. Shirley, the president of the Montgomery County Association of 
Administrative and Supervisory Personnel, said the high school principals were 
unanimous in their opinion, as quoted in the notes:  “They do not want to take kids 
outside” (Meeting notes October 18, ¶ 7:30).  
Over the weekend, on Saturday night, October 19, near the Richmond, Virginia, 
suburbs, another shooting occurred.91  Subsequently, Fairfax County canceled further 
plans to hold football games at undisclosed sites (Witt, 2002b).92    
The team continued working alternative sites for playing fields, including the 
potential use of the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) campus in 
Gaithersburg, as well as Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland.  Both sites had large, 
heavily-secured campuses in which students could play out of site of a potential sniper. 
                                                 
90 On Saturday, several Virginia school districts, as well as public schools in Washington, D.C., 
played football games at undisclosed sites outside their school districts (Sandoval, 2002). 
91 At 7:59 p.m. Saturday, October 19, a man was wounded while walking with his wife in the 
parking lot of a restaurant in Ashland, Virginia ("Commonwealth of Virginia v. Muhammad," 2003, p. 16). 
92 An article later reported that one of the Fairfax County football teams visited the restaurant the 
same night where the shooting took place (Schulte, 2002b). 
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Choices Made in Managing a Threat 
On Monday, October 21, at the late afternoon meeting, the command team heard a 
story about a letter found at the shooting site in Virginia the previous Saturday night. The 
letter, as the tale went, contained a threat against schools or children, and an elected 
official in the county knew about the letter and contacted the headmaster of his children’s 
private school and warned him to keep students indoors.  The headmaster’s wife was a 
county music teacher, and she passed the story along, and eventually Donald H. Kress, 
the coordinating community superintendent, heard it and shared it with the team (Meeting 
notes October 21, ¶ 5:00).    
Kress shared the story after being prompted by Weast.  When Kress finished, 
Weast said, as quoted in the notes of the meeting: “I think we’re going to look back on 
this and be glad we kept notes every day” (Meeting notes October 21, ¶ 5:00).  He did not 
mention that he also knew about the letter and the message it contained.  He had known 
for some time and kept the knowledge from the team.  He acknowledged this years later, 
in response to an inquiry, explaining that the letter was evidence from the investigation. 
“I was sworn to secrecy,” he said (Weast, personal interview, 2007).   
The next day, Police Chief Charles A. Moose released the relevant portion of the 
letter—“Your children are not safe anywhere at anytime”—at a press conference 




Also, at the press conference, County Executive Douglas M. Duncan disclosed 
that regional elected officials met the night before in his office with the joint police and 
federal task force.  They discussed, he said, the implications of the letter on school 
operations in the metropolitan Washington area.  “The consensus was to keep kids in 
schools,” he said ("Authorities hold," 2002).  He also said information about the letter 
was provided to officials at the meeting as part of efforts in “sharing information with the 
elected leadership, with the police chiefs, and then the information's getting around to 
those who need to be involved in making decisions” ("Authorities hold," 2002).   
Duncan later recalled that the decision about schools was based on advice from 
the task force investigators that the letter did not constitute a different level of warning in 
the context of the previous attacks.  He said the consensus was not to recommend closing 


















Figure 5.5  Excerpt from Threat to Children on October 19 
From “Exhibit #7” (2006). In Commonwealth of Virginia v. Lee Boyd Malvo Plea Agreement, 




The decision at the end was, we’ll keep doing what we’re doing, there is no 
reason to close anything down, there’s no new threat here.  If anybody thinks 
children were safe in this, wasn’t paying attention.  I mean nobody was safe, at 
any time, anywhere.  You never knew when they were going to strike next 
(Duncan, personal interview, 2008). 
 
There were no school officials at the meeting, including elected members of 
boards of education or superintendents.  Duncan recalled that their participation, at that 
point, was unnecessary and, if the group’s decisions had been different, school authorities 
would have been notified and informed of the recommendation.  He said he had already 
talked to Weast and found agreement before the meeting. “When they told me the 
information,” Duncan recalled, “I shared it with him…and we both had decided there’s 
nothing new here, we just keep going” (Duncan, personal interview, 2008).   
Weast acknowledged receiving the information and agreeing with Duncan. “We 
had already decided what our stance was going to be,” he said later, noting that his 
attendance at the meeting “wouldn’t have changed anything” (Weast, personal interview, 
2007).  His decision was made exclusively with Duncan.   
Confidential Letter 
Weast’s knowledge of the letter was not revealed until Tuesday afternoon and  
then only after an inquiry by a reporter from The Washington Post.  The inquiry followed 
the announcement by Duncan.  At the time, Weast told me that he had been informed 
about the message and received the “general nature of the note’s threat,” as noted in the 
school district’s archival file (Sniper crisis Week 3, 2002).  Weast was interviewed by the 
reporter that afternoon.  There was no further no reference to the letter by anyone, 
including me, at the team meeting that afternoon.   
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The subsequent article the next morning, Wednesday, October 23, included the 
following passage about the meeting in Duncan’s office and Weast’s knowledge of 
events, referencing an unidentified source:  
When the meeting broke up at 10:15 p.m., Duncan called Weast. “We told him 
what he needed to know in order to make an informed decision,” the source said. 
“The relevant passage was made clear.”  
 
Weast confirmed that he was not given specifics. “Law enforcement are working 
very closely with us on the threat assessment, what we need to be cautious about,” 
he said. “I don't get evidence shared with me” (Schulte, 2002b). 
 
Clarke also knew about the letter, and he later recalled notifying Weast when he 
found out early on Monday, before the team meeting and the Duncan conference later 
that day.  He said he called Weast and discovered that “he was already informed, 
had been informed" (Clarke, personal interview, 2007).   
Richmond Decision 
The meeting in Duncan’s office on Monday night about schools was prompted, in 
part, by a decision among superintendents of school districts near Richmond, Virginia, to 
close schools on Monday after learning about the letter from local police on Sunday, 
October 20.  The Richmond superintendents also kept the letter confidential.  Their 
decision was part of a strategy initiated Sunday evening, according to one of the 
superintendents who described their actions in an article he wrote for The School 
Administrator (Roberson, 2004).  They decided, according to his account, to provide 
another public rationale for closing schools, a decision that reversed an announcement  
made only hours before about opening schools on time:  
Having been asked [by police] not to share with anyone, including our senior 
staffs and school boards, the evidence provided to us 45 minutes earlier, we 
announce[d] that increasing community concern and anxiety has prompted us to 




Their strategy worked, initially.  The next day, Monday, October 21, The New 
York Times, for example, referenced one of the superintendents saying the closure of 
schools in the Richmond area was “not based on any public specific threats, but on 
‘the volume of concern’” [emphasis added] (Gettleman, 2002).   
However, by Tuesday morning, the Richmond Times-Dispatch disclosed the 
existence of the letter, but not the contents, and linked it to the closure of Richmond area 
schools again that day as well (Fischer & Akin, 2002).  The release of the letter by Police 
Chief Moose later on Tuesday was prompted, in part, by the article’s disclosures.  
Other superintendents in the Washington area were reportedly not aware of the 
note prior to the public release, and some expressed little surprise or plans to change 
school operations as a result (Schulte, 2002b).   
By the time the message was publicly disclosed on Tuesday, it had been followed 
by another warning in a telephone recording to police on Monday, as detailed years later 
in court records.  The telephone message gave a similar statement: “Your children are not 
safe” ("John Muhammad v. Virginia," 2005).  Police did not disclose the telephone 
message, nor did anyone else at the time. 
Another Shooting 
The release of the letter also was prompted by another shooting early Tuesday 
morning, October 22, just before 6:00 a.m., in the Aspen Hill area of Montgomery 
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County, not far from the original incidents nearly three weeks earlier.  The shooting 
killed a county transit bus driver.93   
By the time the command team assembled at 7:30 a.m., the school district’s bus 
fleet had been on the road for more than an hour.  John Matthews, then assistant director 
of transportation, was called into the meeting to provide an assessment.  He told the team 
that approximately 20% of the buses began moving by 6:20 a.m. and the number grew to 
about 80% some 20 minutes later (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 7:30).  Many of those 
buses, as well as cars bringing staff to work and students to school with their parents, 
landed in the middle of what was later described as “a massive dragnet over Montgomery 
County,” which included “checkpoints across the Washington region…trapping thousands 
of people in the most extensive and disruptive hunt yet for the sniper” (Layton & Shaver, 
2002). The dragnet lasted for hours.  An analysis of the impact area, similar to the 
analysis of the first shootings on October 3, later identified nearly 30% of the school 
district within five miles of the shooting site (Figure 5.6).   
There were few options available. One was to close or delay opening all 
remaining schools, including those outside the effected areas.  The other was to change 
the operations of only selected schools inside the effected areas.  Both options meant an 
abrupt reversal in the middle of transporting children on buses, most of which did not  
                                                 
93 At 5:55 a.m., the driver was shot in the chest while standing at the door of his bus just across 
from a wood area, while waiting to begin his route ("John Muhammad v. Maryland," 2007, p. 8). 
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have emergency radios.  Both options required special arrangements for children already 
at the schools or on their way.  The situation, as described in a letter from Weast to a 
parent later, was similar to weather emergencies:   
The fact is that if we had learned so late in the morning about an emergency 
weather condition, we probably would have brought the children to schools and 
then made certain that arrangements could be made to care for each child before 
they could leave the schools (Weast, 2002d). 
 
Matthews recommended to the command team, as quoted in the notes, that “we 
should ride it out”  and noted that “it is hard to close down specific schools” (Meeting 
notes October 21, 2002 ¶ 7:30).  Larry A. Bowers, the chief operating officer, described 
the problem as larger than simply buses caught in traffic.  He said some children who 
Figure 5.6  Impact Area of Shooting on October 22 
Illustration prepared by the Division of Long-range Planning, Montgomery County Public 





walk were likely already at the schools or on their way and, as quoted in the notes, “we’re 
going to have some schools where we cannot get staff in buildings” (Meeting notes 
October 22, ¶ 7:30).   
Frieda K. Lacey, the superintendent’s chief of staff, and James A. Williams, the 
deputy superintendent, both lived in the general area of the shooting.  They were among 
the staff caught in the traffic backups, and called into the meeting, saying they were 
heading instead to impacted schools nearby.  Weast asked Edward A. Clarke, director of  
school safety and security, to contact police “and ask them to let some of people through 
to get to the schools so they can take care of the kids” (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 
7:30).   
Eventually, any changes to school operations were deemed impractical. “We 
already have buses out there and we cannot go backwards,” Bowers said (Meeting notes 
October 22, ¶ 7:30).  The team coalesced around proceeding as scheduled.  Weast 
directed the announcement that schools were open saying, “…kids are at schools and we 
are keeping them there” (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 7:30).  In his letter to parents and 
staff later in the day, Weast defended the decision and cited “the importance of 
maintaining the operations of our schools…even under the most difficult of 
circumstances” (Weast, 2002k).  
The decision announcement at 7:57 a.m. said the opening of schools was 
proceeding “…with obvious difficulties associated with the traffic congestion in the area 
of the ongoing police investigation” (Porter, 2002h).  The announcement said the school 
district was providing transportation and assistance to schools. Police, though, were not 
at schools.  Clarke, as quoted in the notes, told the team that officers normally assigned to 
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schools were “assigned to the checkpoints…” (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 7:30).  That 
led to concerns about school safety, particularly if the assailant was still in the area.94 
Fast-Paced Decisions 
Donald H. Kress, the coordinating community superintendent, recalled the 
decision that morning as “probably the fastest decision we had to make over the whole 
three-week period” (Kress, personal interview, 2007).  In reality, it was not the fastest 
decision, but it was the most inclusive, involving Kress and other team members in a 
process that was previously limited to a few.  It was pressure decision-making for 90 
minutes in an environment in which no one knew what might happen next.  Weast, as 
quoted in later comments to the team, said the shooting that morning “moved us from 
tension to fear,” (Lessons learned, 2002, p. 5).   
Edward W. Shirley, the president of the Montgomery County Association of 
Supervisory and Administrative Personnel, later recalled that the tensions involved basic 
unknowns of whether the decision to keep schools open improved the safety of children 
and staff or placed them in greater danger.  There was no way of knowing.  He said the 
decision reflected a basic core value and confidence in the school district:  
We came down to our belief—I know I supported the final decision, that it was 
the right decision—that we were going to provide a safer environment for the kids 
by continuing to try to open the schools that day (Shirley, personal interview, 
2007). 
 
Weast ordered all schools to implement a Code Blue at 8:21 a.m.  In the 
meantime, staff began contacting schools in the impacted area to assess the number of 
                                                 
94 At that time, police had not linked the sniper to the shooting but were operating on that 
assumption and Edward A. Clarke, as quoted in the notes of the meeting, reported late in the morning that 
police were “still looking at all situations” (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 11:35). 
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students and employees present and any feedback about conditions (Meeting notes 
October 22, ¶ 8:25).  Just before 9:00 a.m., further restrictions were announced across the 
district, canceling afternoon kindergarten, field trips, and staff development programs, 
with morning kindergarten and pre-kindergarten students held at schools until the 
afternoon dismissal (Porter, 2002e).  
By that time, central office staff from the instructional and staff development 
areas were contacting schools and offering assistance, and Robert B. Hellmuth, assistant 
director of school safety and security, told the team that high school security staff were 
diverted to elementary schools (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 8:50).  At one point, the 
team received a report that police helped move a convoy of buses into a high school 
(Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 9:15).  Judith Madden, supervisor of guidance services, told 
the team that initial reports from some schools indicated a high level of stress and anxiety 
but that staff did not want help, just recognition for their efforts under the circumstances 
(Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 9:40). 
Kress reported that initial data on attendance indicated that one high school had 
only 40% of its students, one middle school had 26%, several clusters of schools were in 
the 30% to 35% range, and one elementary school had just 10 students.  Bowers said the 
attendance data would increase as the buses finally got through but that low attendance 
may occur because “kids have left the bus stops and gone back home” (Meeting notes 
October 22, ¶ 9:40 a.m.).  The absenteeism also affected staff.  Williams, in later 
comments to the team, said “in some schools the secretaries were in charge” because the 
administrators or other staff could not get there (Lessons learned, 2002, p. 5).  Weast 
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noted in his letter that day some schools opened “with just a few staff initially and many 
with parent volunteers” until more staff arrived (Weast, 2002k). 
Several times during the course of the morning, reference was made to the 
characteristics of schools caught in the dragnet.  Many of them had high levels of student 
poverty and, consequently, high participation in subsidized breakfast and lunch programs, 
among other services.  That characteristic was viewed as one of the primary motivations 
for not closing schools.  “We open schools for a reason,” Weast told the team, as quoted 
in the meeting notes.  “Some of the kids in the high target schools come because they 
need us” (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 9:40).   
The events provided a lasting memory.  Years later, in a speech to principals and 
the community on the operating budget, Weast recalled the actions of the cafeteria 
manager of Sligo Middle School that morning.  The then 37-year veteran of the school 
district demonstrated her “commitment to children,” he said, when she abandoned her car 
and walked the remaining two miles to school “because ‘her’ students needed breakfast” 
(Weast, 2006, p. 5).   
In his letter to parents and staff that day, Weast cited such “heroic efforts” by staff 
“to suppress their own anxieties and take care of our students” (Weast, 2002k).95  These
were qualities he most admired.  He noted in the letter, for example, that while
“absenteeism and late arrivals were high in certain schools,” every school opened and 
                                                 
95 In one incident, Strathmore Elementary School went into a Code Red after gunshots were heard 
behind the building, drawing police and two helicopters to the school, which was located near the shooting 
scene that morning (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 12:15).  Staff later learned the shots originated from a 
military veteran’s funeral at a nearby cemetery (Schulte & Trejos, 2002a, p. ). 
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“today’s response by teachers and their colleagues displays the great dedication and 
commitment that so distinguish our schools” (Weast, 2002k). 
Choice to Stay Open 
When the command team regrouped for the late afternoon meeting on Tuesday, 
October 22, the discussion settled on feedback from staff.  Judith Madden, the supervisor 
of guidance services, reported on another open-ended inquiry among guidance counselors 
in 13 schools in and around the area affected by the shooting.  She said, as quoted in the 
notes, “teachers and school staff are in survival mode” (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 
5:00).  Donald H. Kress, the coordinating community superintendent, reported that stress 
was high among principals, particularly in the schools near the incident.  He said, as 
quoted in the notes, there was much disagreement among the principals on whether 
schools should have opened that morning, “based on the feeling that we endangered staff 
and kids by putting them in the dragnet” (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 5:00).  
Edward W. Shirley, the president of the Montgomery County Association of 
Administrative and Supervisory Personnel, told the team, as quoted in the notes, that 
some principals were “scared they are going to make a mistake and someone will get 
hurt” (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 5:00).  Shirley later recalled that, when he said that, 
Weast turned to him and said: “‘How do you think I feel?’” (Shirley, personal interview, 
2007).  Shirley recalled being struck by Weast’s revealing response.  He said later, “And 
for him that’s almost like a sign of weakness, which he never says. That will stay with me.  
That was really profound when he said that to me” (Shirley, personal interview, 2007).  
The job of managing the crisis was taking a toll on the team.  “Everyone around 
the table was feeling the stress,” recalled Madden, and she said Weast took the brunt of 
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the strain:  “It was very clear that he felt the strain…you can’t not be affected by the 
responsibility of 140,000 kids’ safety,” she said (Madden, personal interview, 2007).  
The backlash over the decision to keep schools open included overtly personal 
criticism.  The staff of Georgian Forest Elementary School, which was located near the 
shooting scene, for example, wrote a letter to Weast that was hand-signed by 51 people: 
“Last week you spoke to us at the Kennedy Cluster writing conference and told us how 
valuable our contribution is to our students’ lives.  Yesterday, we did not feel valuable.  
We felt our lives and efforts were valued cheaply” (Letter to Dr. Weast, 2002, p. 1). 
Weast remained stoic throughout.  He ended the command team meeting Tuesday 
night reinforcing plans to continue with daily decisions, with the command team meeting 
three times a day, thanking everyone.  “I appreciate all of you doing your job,” he said, as 
quoted in the notes, and emphasized the decision to stay open, urging team members to 
let people know “that we took this man’s threat seriously from day one” (Meeting notes 
October 22, ¶ 5:00).   
At the time, there was no discussion about the sniper’s message from the previous 
Saturday night, which was publicly revealed earlier in the afternoon.  Not included in the 
police chief’s announcement, nor referenced at the team meeting, was a second note (in 
addition to the telephone threat on Monday), which was found at the scene of the 
shooting Tuesday morning.  It was revealed later in court records (Figure 5.7). 
 ‘Time Out’ Option 
The killing of a county transit bus operator brought the threat literally to the 





Figure 5.7  Excerpt from Second Note Threatening Children on October 22 
From “Exhibit #6” (2006). In Commonwealth of Virginia v. Lee Boyd Malvo Plea Agreement, 
October 24, 2006.  Retrieved October 11, 2007, at http://www.spotsylvania.va.us.  
the frenzy Tuesday morning, Weast said it was important to recognize bus drivers and 
attendants “symbolically” in response to the “moral courage” asked of them  
(Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 10:35).  Hellmuth reported that county police were assisting 
on security arrangements for school buses, including security staff riding on the buses, 
and buses were being provided for students who typically walked home through an area 
that was still a crime scene (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 11:00).  Later in the day, 
Tronzano reported that some drivers and attendants were receiving crisis assistance 
support (Meeting notes October 22, ¶ 5:00).96   
                                                 
96 Later disclosures revealed that the planned attacks included school buses, including one 
shooting that was called off “at the last minute” (Horwitz & Ruane, 2003, p. 162).  Other planned attacks 
reportedly included bombings of school buses, schools, and hospitals (Londoño & Rich, 2006). 
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Early the next morning, Weast made a personal effort to rally the bus operators 
and attendants.  Without them, the school district could not operate.  All bus operators 
and attendants received a letter in their buses from Weast:  
Please accept my sincere gratitude for the courage and dedication you are 
showing in the face of our continuing crisis situation…You are modeling a 
positive attitude that is reflected by our children and their parents...Your 
professionalism throughout this ordeal has set a new standard of work ethic of  
which we can all be proud (Weast, 2002s). 
 
The superintendent also visited one of the transportation depots early Wednesday 
morning before buses departed for schools, talking with bus operators, attendants, 
mechanics and other staff.   Matthew A. Tronzano, executive assistant to the chief 
operating officer, reported in the team meeting later that several drivers and attendants 
with routes in the area where the shooting took place called in saying they were “too 
afraid to work” and supervisors and others covered the routes (Meeting notes October 23, 
2002 ¶ 7:30).  At the same time, Tronzano reported that teacher attendance was up, with 
fewer than normal requests for substitutes (Meeting notes October 23, 2002 ¶ 7:30).   
The command team discussed ways in which to bring more reassurance about 
safety to schools, including having uniformed firefighters and other safety personnel visit 
schools during the day.  Weast said he had talked to people who attended the prayer vigil 
the night before and received positive feedback on the district’s management of the crisis. 
Nonetheless, he was open to the idea of a “time out” by closing the schools, as quoted in 
the notes, and deferred discussion until the end of the day (Meeting notes October 23, 
2002 ¶ 7:30).  Later in the day, the focus was on alternative sites for athletics.   
The superintendent’s office was inundated with complaints about the non-
disclosure of the sniper letter, on top of the decision to keep schools open on Tuesday.  
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The public release of the message had effects on the command team members, as well. 
Frieda K. Lacey, the superintendent’s chief of staff, for example, later recalled how the 
news greatly upset her grandson who was living with her.  She said the impact became 
apparent “when tears started rolling down his face” and she realized she had been 
distracted by the command team meetings and not available to console him (Lacey, 
personal interview, 2007).   
At mid-day on Wednesday, Mark Simon, then president of the Montgomery 
Education Association, the union representing teachers, joined the team meeting.  His 
presence marked the change in the way the crisis was being addressed internally.  Simon 
was not part of the command functions of the school district, as determined by Weast.   
In the meantime, the White House announced $600,000 toward school security 
improvements and counseling services for schools, including funding for two-way radios 
for school buses, in Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia (Lichtblau, 2002).  
Weast learned about the grants the day before from the state superintendent, (Meeting 
notes October 22, ¶ 4:20).  Weast had advocated for weeks for emergency funding for 
radios and other security measures. 
In his letter to parents and staff on Wednesday afternoon, Weast made an indirect 
reference to the sniper message.  The reference came in his explanation about schools 
remaining open following the shooting the day before.  First, he cited the advice of police 
and government leaders guiding him.  “This is not an easy decision, but it reflects our 
determination to provide students with as much opportunity for continuity as possible,” 
he said (Weast, 2002m).  Then he made reference to the subject that had caused 
considerable criticism.  “I am mindful that many parents, as well as staff, are anxious and 
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fearful about the continued threats being made about the safety of people, including 
children, in our community,” he said (Weast, 2002m).   
It was his last public reference to the issue as events over the next 24 hours 
eclipsed any further concerns about school sniper message and who knew about it. 
Caution after Arrests 
The next morning, Thursday, October 24, the arrests of two suspects were 
announced.  Schools remained under Code Blue, as the command team used caution 
pending confirmation that the two suspects were the sniper being sought by police.  The
team continued working on mental health issues and alternative sites for sports, but the 
tension and pressure to act were gone.   
At mid-day, Weast urged the preparation of a gesture of appreciation for all 
employees, "symbolically...something tangible to identify MCPS” and suggested the 
wording “You made it through the crisis of October 2002" (Meeting October 24, 2002 ¶ 
11:30).  Four days later, the district published a brochure that included a note from Weast 
and advice on how to handle the mental health aspects of recovery after a crisis.  
Throughout the day, employees were advised to be patient and wait for news on whether 
the arrests had ended the crisis. 
Later in the afternoon, Edward A. Clarke, director of school safety and security, 
informed the team that police units were told to “stand down,” as quoted in the notes, but 
Weast directed the team to wait until the county took specific legal actions against the 
suspects before relaxing any other security measures at schools (Meeting October 24, 
2002 ¶ 5:00).  Three hours later, the district announced to all staff that the crisis was over, 
the Code Blue was lifted, and all operations returned to normal.  The announcement 
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quoted Weast, in an expression reflecting probably universal sentiment:  “"All of us—
everyone who works in our school system—are breathing a sigh of relief this evening" 
(Porter, 2002a). 
The team met again the next morning and discussed general implications of the 
crisis concerning security, mental health, communications, and organizational variance.  
Weast directed the preparation of a final letter to parents. Plans were made to meet and 
debrief the following week (Meeting notes, October 25, 2002).  The meeting was 












The study of crisis management and decision making by the leaders of the 
Montgomery County Public Schools during the sniper shootings of October 2002 resulted 
in a comprehensive description of a single case, bounded by time and place and the 
experiences of participants.  The study revealed a rich depiction of their response in 
confronting the ugly reality of an unprecedented crisis.  Their collective story, as 
described in the preceding narrative report, provides a basis for drawing conclusions and 
identifying implications in light of the literary and conceptual framework of the study and 
its methodology.  Chapter 6 begins that process in the context of the research problem 
and the study’s central question. 
Problem and Question 
The purpose of the study was to understand school district crisis management 
within the context of a single case, as an illustration of issues facing district leaders in 
crisis situations.  It was a unique endeavor, entering a literal void in the literature about 
crisis management and decision making in school districts.  The void defined the 
problem, suggesting little academic and practical interest in (a) research-based crisis 
management and decision making, (b) improvement of such skills through training, and 
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(c) attainment of expertise in crisis management and decision making based on 
performance standards.  
Within this context, the study took a highly complex event, identified what 
occurred and who was involved, and explained it within the traditions of qualitative 
research as a non-evaluative portrait of a single case. A framework of literature on crisis 
management and decision making became a guiding conceptual basis for the analysis.  
The identified case encompassed the 23-day sniper incident in October 2002 and prior 
events that informed the response by the leaders of the Montgomery County Public 
Schools, Maryland.  In addition to my role as a senior staff member of the school district 
and as a participant researcher in this study, the participants included 15 individuals:  one 
superintendent, four senior staff, seven other district staff, a principals’ union president, 
and two elected officials (the county executive and a County Council member).  All but 
one (the county executive) served on the school district team involved in the school 
district’s response.   
The decisions they made formed the basis of the central question guiding the 
study:  what can be learned from their experiences? Within this framework, the study 
probed the contextual and procedural aspects of what occurred, exploring and describing 
the decision characteristics, the strategies and processes, the purpose of the decisions, and 
the main participants.    
Research Context 
The absence of substantial literature on crisis management and decision making 
by leaders of school districts placed the context of the study well outside the confines of 
research in education leadership. The absence implies that such knowledge lacks utility 
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for superintendents and their administrative teams.  Indeed, the research-basis for 
understanding organizational leadership during times of crisis exists largely elsewhere 
(Allison & Zalikow, 1999; Burns, 1978; Campbell, 1999; Grattan, 2004; Lipshitz & 
Strauss, 1997; March, 1988; Mintzberg, et al., 1976; Orasanu & Fischer, 2001; Wallace, 
2003; Weick, 1995, 2001a; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007), among others.   Deep 
research exists among such fields, for example, as fire and rescue services (Weick, 
2001b), the military (Gullatt & Long, 1996; Klein, 1993a), and corporations (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Research extends across a variety of contexts:  cognitive processes (Crozier & 
Ranyard, 1997), judgment and choice (Hertwig, et al., 2004; Kahneman, 2003); dynamic 
environments (Kerstholt & Raaijmakers, 1997); terrorist attacks (K. Sacco, et al., 2003); 
mass behavior (Gladwell, 2000); intelligence (Greenspan, 1997); and computer-based 
training (Sniezek, et al., 2002), among others.   
The application of such research seems largely to escape deep attention in 
education, except among mental health professionals (A. H. Fein, et al., 2008; Jimerson, 
et al., 2005; Knox & Roberts, 2005; Nickerson, et al., 2006; Poland, 1994; Reeves, et al., 
2008).  Vulnerable populations in schools during emergencies have extensive interest 
(Brock & Cowan, 2004; Greene, et al., 2004; Lindle, 2008; McGiboney & Fretwell, 
2007; Vossekuil, et al., 2002; Wendell, 2002), among others.  So does the effects on 
schools by the terrorist attacks in September 2001 (Brown & Bobrow, 2004; Hoven, et 
al., 2005) and the sniper attacks in 2002 (Westerman, et al., 2003).   
The lack of fresh analysis and application of even existing crisis management and 
decision making research is more remarkable given the duty of care within the 
educational profession for the safety and wellbeing of children, as a fundamental 
249 
 
responsibility under law (Alexander & Alexander, 2005; Bounds, et al., 2006; Jimerson 
& Furlong, 2006).   
This is not to say that education research has not focused on organization 
management and the functions of leadership.  It has, extensively (Bolman & Deal, 1997; 
Dunn, 2004; Hoy & Miskel, 2008; Leithwood & Steinbach, 1995; Senge, et al., 1999; 
Slater & Boyd, 1999, among others).  However, the empty space that appears for the 
topic of crisis management and decision making, even as an identifiable subset within the 
larger focus on organizational leadership, is hard to ignore.  For example, the most recent 
edition of Hoy and Miskel’s (2008) textbook series on educational administration 
continues to overlook the topic as an identifiable subject, separate from the presentation 
of management and decision making models and theories.   
 The research void is more startling given not just the history of violence in 
educational settings but also the findings of investigative reports after those attacks.  In 
the decade after the killings at Columbine High School, the issue of competence—not 
dedication or intelligence—in the management of a crisis were a central focus of 
inquiries into organizational preparation for, and responses to, acts of violence in schools 
and colleges campuses.  Examples include the incident at Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
and State University (Report of the review panel, 2007), and studies of school 
preparedness nationally (Ashby, 2007) and in specific states (Goldman, 2008; Kano, et 
al., 2007; Safe and secure schools, 2008).  And this has occurred when the profession of 
educational leadership has substantively changed in an era of terrorism (Bauer, et al., 
2008; Brickman, et al., 2004; R. A. Fein, et al., 2002), continued school violence (Dinkes, 
et al., 2009; Noonan & Vavra, 2007; Planty, et al., 2008), and requirements for school 
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safety and security preparations as a condition of federal funding (NIMS implementation, 
2008).   
Conceptual Change 
When the study began in 2005, the initial concepts identified about crisis 
management and decision making were found to be too broadly defined to adequately 
frame and guide the conduct of the study.  Much of the early thinking focused on the 
implications of intuition in crisis decision making, without clearly understanding a more 
nuanced view of intuition as a product of expertise, not simply native instinct.  Over time, 
continued development of the study’s research foundation revealed three important 
additions for a more relevant understanding of the topic within the scope of this study.  
One additional source was the work by Boin, et al., (2005), which described the leadership 
tasks for public officials in managing a crisis within a political environment.  Another 
was the work by Hoy and Miskel (2005), and updated in 2008, regarding their model of 
schools as a social system and the model’s application to school districts.  And, third, was 
the work by Weick and Sutcliff (2001), and updated in 2007, on organizational 
environments in which personnel become mindful of their responsibilities and reliable in 
avoiding expected human errors and skillful in fixing them.   
These additions led to a change in the conceptual framework for the study and my 
understanding of the case.  The modification resulted in a unique integration of the 
concepts of critical leadership tasks and high reliability within the context of social 
systems of school districts.  This led to an expansion of my understanding of the case as 





Portraiture, as a form of case study, provided the qualitative tradition from which 
the overall study was produced.  This included the collection and analysis of data, 
verification tasks for quality, and production of a narrative report. Within this 
methodology special care was taken regarding my role as a participant researcher. 
The voices of the 15 case participants (in addition to myself), through their 
recollections of the events of the case, became an integral part of the study.  Each was 
interviewed, based on standard research practices, with the added dimension that the 
study was public by design and each participant was identified.  Extensive data gathering 
was conducted in advance of the interviews, involving more than 700 records, largely 
archival documents of the school district, newspaper articles, press conference 
transcripts, and other artifacts from the case and subsequent sources of information.  A 
nearly equal number of research memos were prepared reflecting the interpretation of 
records, data, and the ongoing conduct of the study.  The data analysis was assisted 
through the use of relational-based research software to identify and categorize the large 
amount of information. 
The processes of verification included triangulation of data from multiple sources 
and perspectives, weighting of evidence through constant comparative analysis, and 
checks on researcher effects through feedback from participants during and after their 
interviews and two critical friends with independent knowledge and experience in the 
subject. 
Initial aspects of the study involved background information gathering and 
analysis to explore the full scope and context of the case. Major elements of the research 
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process, including the participant interviews, began in the late fall of 2007 following my 
retirement from the Montgomery County Public Schools as the chief of staff to the 
superintendent of schools.  With the exception of subsequent contract work on behalf of 
the district on a limited basis, the substantive portions of the study and preparation of the 
narrative report were conducted after leaving the district’s employment.    
Early Corrections  
Part of the challenge in being a participant researcher was thinking, at the outset, 
that everything was obvious because of personal experience with events in the study and 
that memories are clear because they are personally remembered.   I had assumed certain 
elements of the case to be true and found they were not.  I also made initial assumptions 
about events, based on my own recollections, only to find later that I remembered 
correctly but I knew only part of the story.  
Assumptions were made about crisis management and decision making because 
of personal insights developed from years of experience and academic preparation. These 
proved faulty and required a reassessment of the case, realignment of research strategies, 
redoubling of efforts to document events comprehensively, and reexamination of ideas 
about what the case was really about. 
One of the early assumptions was that the school district imposed the security 
restrictions of Code Blue and kept them in place for the entire crisis.  This was how I 
remembered those days, but it was not true.  A detailed and nuanced reconstruction of the 
events of the case clearly showed that a prohibition of outdoor activities was imposed for 
nearly the entire case, but not the Code Blue.  That procedure was initiated for only about 
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a third of the days.  The difference was important—it meant another series of decisions 
(on/off Code Blue) was part of the case.   
Another early assumption linked the “decision making experiences” of the 
participants in the case with “protecting students from the sniper,” as stated in the 
research question.  While true in the overall sense of the time and place of the case, the 
phrase did not reflect the nature of the decisions involving the participants.  Their 
experiences had little to do with the sniper, per se; their decisions were related to issues 
much more finely tuned to the day-to-day necessities, which included the safety and 
welfare of students and continuation of services, among which included daily breakfast 
and lunch for thousands of students.  In these decisions, the sniper was a contextual 
factor, not an objective or a purpose.  
The initial participant sample was selected on the basis of the people who were 
originally identified as important in the case, and these individuals were largely those 
whose participation was evident to me at the outset.  As noted earlier, initial impressions 
are often faulty.  The reconstruction of events in the case, particularly toward the end of 
the event timeline, revealed the involvement of other participants, such as County 
Executive Douglas M. Duncan, in ways that I did not know about or originally 
understand.  The emergence of Duncan’s participation and his relationship with Jerry D. 
Weast, the superintendent of schools, considerably changed my perspective about the 
case and the components I was exploring. 
Limitations 
The study involved a single case, bounded by an identified time, place, and set of 
participants.  There can be no generalization beyond the case for any of its findings and 
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interpretations.  It can be illustrative, but it can not be predictive or the basis for 
extrapolating any conclusions beyond the parameters of the case.  The study is limited as 
well by a conceptual framework that established the analytical perspective in the conduct 
of the study, the approach of the researcher, and the observations and interpretations of 
the results and creation of the narrative report. 
As a retrospective study, in which the events of the case occurred nearly eight 
years ago, the study is limited to the factual record available through archival records, 
historical documents, contemporaneous accounts in the media, and the recollections of 
the participants.  Their recollections are limited by personal interpretations of thoughts 
and meanings affected by the passage of time, subsequent events, and current thinking.  
Participant memories are inescapably self-limiting, either through an inability to 
remember, an imprecision in what is remembered, or a choice regarding selective 
memory. 
The participants themselves represent a further limitation, not just in the bounding 
of the case but also in the highly selective nature of the participant sample, in which the 
case focuses on the experiences of a comparatively small number of people in an 
otherwise large-scale crisis event.  The public identification of these participants further 
limits the study by the participants’ own self-awareness, concerns for privacy, or other 
personal issues.   
As a qualitative inquiry, the study is limited by the subjectivity of the researcher 
who, as a participant in the case, is further limited by the potential personal bias and 
reflexivity from other participants as a result of involvement and familiarity. These 
limitations were addressed in the design and conduct of the study. 
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Findings and Conclusions 
This was a non-evaluative study.  No attempt was made to measure the degree of 
success or failure or to characterize something as good or not.  The study followed the 
constructs of non-evaluation analysis, as suggested by Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis 
(1997), Hackmann (2002), and Pearson and Clair (1998).  However, this did not exclude 
drawing conclusions from the aggregate findings, in light of the study’s conceptual 
framework.  Indeed, the findings provide a rich source of data from which useful insights 
were gained about school district crisis management and decision making where none 
others exist.  
The findings in this study serve as illustrations, not absolutes, and provide an 
entry point for further exploration of the kinds of events and experiences described in the 
narrative report.  The events and experiences were unique, in that they occurred only in 
this case, but they illustrate on a much broader scale insights in the literature about crisis 
management and decision making and related areas of study.   
Contextual Setting  
At the outset, it is important to note the context of the case and the events that 
confronted the school district leaders.  Theirs was not an entirely unique experience.  
They dealt with well-documented effects of a typical crisis, characterized by uncertainty 
and fear in reactions and ambiguity in distinguishing real from unreal.  However, in this 
case the effects were multiplied in a cumulative fashion by the seemingly unending 
length of the event.  Over the course of more than three weeks, the shootings continued, 
along with the precautions taken against them, without an end in sight.  Even before it 
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was half over, the crisis achieved notoriety as the longest of its kind ever to face a public 
school district (Bowler, 2002).   
The effects were further intensified by the unified reaction among people to the 
crisis—the dread of being hunted, one of the most primal threats in the human 
experience, striking at the core of what Abraham Maslow described in 1970 as the 
powerful “human need” for personal safety and security (as cited in Hoy & Miskel, 2008, 
p. 137). People were shot and killed or wounded on such a random yet purposeful basis 
every few days that nowhere seemed safe, from the front sidewalk of a suburban middle 
school to the gas pump at a service station.  A local newspaper even provided tips to 
avoid being shot, noting that “a moving target is more difficult to hit than one that is 
standing still” ("Tips," 2002).  Some school district leaders recognized the hunting 
characteristic of the attacks at an early point in the case, comprehending the capability of 
the assailant and the risks involved.  The public reaction was from a different vantage 
point, reflecting the perspective of the prey, trying to stay alive.  
In that sense, the effects of the crisis were increased by their public nature, in 
which the expert skills of a marksman with the weaponry and intent of a sniper were on 
graphic display.  They were magnified many times over by the media-rich environment 
of the nation’s capital region and the involvement of federal law enforcement and the 
military.  The impact of the attacks was so intense that five years later the second highest 
court in Maryland compared them to the sensation caused by “Jack the Ripper,” the name 
given to an unknown English serial killer from the late 1800s ("John Muhammad v. 
Maryland," 2007).   
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The crisis was the most intense at its epicenter, which was Montgomery County, 
Maryland, where the killings began without warning on Thursday morning, October 3, 
2002, and a group of school district leaders reacted.  
Doomed Crisis Plan 
The school district’s new emergency plan for incident command was discarded 
before its first use, eight months after being implemented in January 2002.  The plan was 
originally intended to rectify problems identified in previous crises.  It gained impetus in 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in which the school district 
did not have a written plan to guide leadership actions for a coherent districtwide 
response.  In February 2002, a few weeks after its implementation, the superintendent of 
schools informed the Board of Education that the new plan established the basis for the 
district’s “collective ability to respond” (Weast, 2002r, p. 1). In that report, the 
superintendent identified the chief operating officer as the incident commander, 
responsible for the district’s response to an emergency.  Six months later, in August 
2002, the plan was put to a test, with a table-top drill designed as a clinical measure and 
the chief operating officer in charge, and the superintendent did not participate.  When 
the real thing happened six weeks later, the plan remained on the proverbial shelf.  
Instead, the superintendent led the district’s emergency response, and he was well within 
the authority of his office to do just that.  His choice to lead is not the immediate 
question.  Instead, the question is whether the plan, without him as the leader, ever had a 
chance of being formally operational in the first place?   
 In retrospect, the district’s emergency plan was probably dead on arrival, at least 
in terms of the superintendent’s management of a crisis.  When the crisis ended, plans 
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were announced to amend the plan to reflect his involvement (Lessons learned, 2002, p. 1).  
Before the crisis, the superintendent had a known history of being personally involved in 
crisis management. Episodes involving the bus accident in May 2000 (Appendix F) and 
the school light fixtures in September 2000 (Appendix E) provide detailed examples of 
his use of positional authority in response to an emergency.  His non-involvement in the 
table-top drill was a hint of how he viewed his role and the need to practice with others. 
However, the key to understanding what happened to the short-lived emergency 
response plan is the superintendent’s comment in a newspaper article several years later, 
on the fifth anniversary of the shootings.  At that time, he described the people who were 
with him on the first day as his “kitchen cabinet” (Sedam & Ford, 2007).  It was an 
expression that reflected his trust in a small group of aides, which included me.  In that 
sense it was not unlike the modern interpretation of the term originally given to a group 
of informal advisors who acted as political and personal aides to President Andrew 
Jackson in the 1830s, although initially the term was used in a derogatory manner by his 
critics (Latner, 1978).   
The superintendent’s use of the informal term “kitchen cabinet” suggests why the 
formal plan was not used.  The people advising him on the first day were not an informal 
group. They represented three of the four senior positions on the newly appointed 
incident command team—security, operations, and communications.  (The other was 
liaison to external emergency management, which the superintendent conducted himself.) 
They had already gathered in response to the initial police warning, consistent with the 
new plan and prevailing practice.  The superintendent remembered their involvement, not 
as the formal command team but as an informal group working at his behest.  This is 
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consistent with the recollection of the Montgomery County Executive, who characterized 
those working with the superintendent during the crisis as his “little group” (Duncan, 
personal interview, 2008).  The county executive’s primary source of information was the 
superintendent. 
The superintendent’s use of the term, with its origins in presidential history, also 
suggests an analogy—whether intended or not—of the superintendent as a presidential-
type authority figure.  If so, such an analogy would include the description given to 
Jackson, in his political and personal use of his own informal group, as being determined 
“to direct his administration and to make himself the center of the decision-making 
process” (Latner, 1978, p. 388).  The superintendent made a less direct but nonetheless 
parallel comparison of his own.  In characterizing his choice to lead, he referenced the 
decisions of generals and similar leaders who improvised under changing circumstances 
and “led from the front” (Weast, personal interview, 2007).   
As noted earlier, his decision to lead is not the central issue.  The question, 
rephrased, is what about everyone else?  By scrapping that portion of the plan, what does 
that say about the rest of the plan or planning in the first place?  Or, as the supervisor of 
counseling asked, in recalling the aftermath of the bus accident and the confusion among her 
staff when established plans were overtaken suddenly at the hospital:  “Who do you respond 
to, who do you take directions from—to make sure that there is a coherent response?” 
(Madden, personal interview, 2007).   
Weick and Sutcliff (2007), in their work on principles of “high reliability,” provide
some insights on why this issue is important.  They identify “deference to expertise” and 
“commitment to resiliency” as two of the five key elements of reliability in the successful 
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management of organizations against threats from the unexpected (2007, pp. 9-17).  They 
suggest that the ability of personnel to maintain a high level of mindfulness about their 
responsibilities in achieving organizational, rather than personal, objectives (in other words, 
their reliability) is dependent on both their expertise and the trust placed in them to use their 
expertise as a resource to solve problems as they occur.  That trust is expressed in different 
ways.  One expression includes the organizational supports and resources to maintain the 
resiliency of the personnel involved, in all manner and forms, such as training, assistance, 
respect, and consistency.   The last two are the most relevant here.  Disrespect breeds 
resentment.  Inconsistency breeds mistrust.  Resentment and mistrust undermine the choice to 
be mindful when it counts, especially in a crisis when the immediate challenges are 
uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Principal Absence 
The major effects of the crisis were on individual schools, particularly those near 
the initial shootings, yet the insights of active principals were not incorporated until near 
the end of the second week of the crisis—except indirectly, through sampling by various 
team members and conjecture filtered by previous experiences among the five team 
members who had been principals.  The most recent principal was the coordinating 
community superintendent who had been a high school principal six years earlier.  The 
least recent was the superintendent, who was a principal at the time of his first 
appointment as a superintendent 26 years earlier.  The void was filled, in part, when the 
president of the Montgomery County Association of Administrative and Supervisory 
Personnel (the principals’ union) was added to the team.   
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The absence of principals is noteworthy given the events that occurred regarding 
the collection of attendance daily data.  In the beginning, the attendance data were 
important, not only as a customary strategy in managing a school district crisis but also as 
a common sense approach to ensuring everyone is accounted for.  Even on a field trip, a 
teacher will count the number of kids getting off the bus and returning to it, as a way of 
ensuring no one’s missing.  And, the initial use reflected this concern, much in the way 
the superintendent described the data as “vital signs” (Meeting notes October 9, ¶ 5:00).  
But political use appears to have sullied the requests, based on a stinging letter written 
after the crisis by the principals’ union president who noted that the only personal 
attention some principals “received from the central office during this period was a 
request for staff and student attendance” (Shirley, 2002).  
Their attendance data was used, in part, as a vindication for the school district (as
in, the decision to stay open, and the superintendent’s leadership).  I was a part of this, in
my role as communications director and spokesperson, and I certainly contributed to the 
political use of the data.  The demand strain on the principals and the lingering criticism 
well after the end of the collection of such data, however, underscore how far the gap 
became between the needs of the central office and the reaction of the principals in 
schools.   
In reality, the data were not scrubbed to determine cause/effect correlations about 
whether students stayed home out of fear, etc.  As long as the overall data were within a 
“normal” range, the absentees were largely ignored, at least at the district level.  This 
occurred on the second day of the crisis and continued as long as the data were collected.   
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The superintendent’s reaction to the criticism by principals, accepting it as to be 
expected, is important beyond the seemingly cavalier approach.  In discussing the 
addition of the principals’ union president to the team, and not the president of the 
teachers’ union, the superintendent emphasized a recurring theme in his comments:  
“This was not a total collaborative effort, this was command and control…” (Weast, 
personal interview, 2007).  That reaction clashes with the research findings of studies that 
illustrate the weak points of the incident command system as a national model given the 
diversity of communities and crisis types (Buck, et al., 2006, p. 2001). 
Part of the gap that arose between principals and the superintendent may be 
related to the fundamental difference in the administration of schools and school districts.  
While they share some similar characteristics, they differ greatly.  Schools are focused on 
the management of children.  Districts are focused on the management of adults and the 
resources that support them.  Rarely does a district leader come into contact with a 
student, except on a school visit, and then only temporarily and infrequently, if at all.  A 
principal, on the other hand, is the true example of in loco parentis, working directly with 
parents and their children on a daily basis, possibly instead of parents, providing food, 
shelter, and attention, in addition to instruction, for three-quarters of any given year.   
On the other hand, the decision making styles consistent with leadership in a crisis 
do not exactly match the collaborative and inclusive, group-based methods taught as the 
typical model of decision making in the management of schools.  Management during a 
crisis, at least at the beginning, is the polar opposite.  It is not dictatorial, but the 
suggestion is close.   
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The management of districtwide crises invariably affects the unique operations of 
schools as administered by principals. Their understanding of operational implications of 
district decisions may equal or exceed comparative insights at the district level and their 
relationships with other principals provide an informal channel for communications.  
Their perspectives and insights should be a fundamental part of the district leadership 
team. 
Decision Style 
The school district’s approach to crisis management reflected the superintendent’s 
management style:  results-oriented, position-based, highly centralized, and personally 
controlled.  The new emergency response plan, which figuratively placed someone else in 
charge, represented the superintendent’s perspective on managing a crisis: centralized 
authority controlling personnel and resources.  In this case, it was the superintendent who 
ultimately exercised command and control.  As such, the outcome of the crisis, in so far, 
as the schools were affected, represents largely the leadership of the superintendent and 
his management and decision making over the course of the events of the case.   
Decision-making was not collaborative, nor intended to be, and this was plainly 
obvious from the start.  There were no allusions otherwise, and even the title of decision-
making position in the new emergency response plan (incident commander), while not 
necessarily used by the superintendent—he was the superintendent, after all—the term 
epitomized the essence of crisis management, from the perspective of the incident 
command model.  The superintendent acted largely as his own counsel in the beginning, 
and he modified this style over time, but he never abandoned the role of the final arbiter 
of what was to be decided and accomplished.    
264 
 
In a sense, the unified authority structure of an incident command system 
reflected the basic decision strategies of the superintendent—both have an audience of 
one, and no one else; and all of the decisions are political, from the perspective that 
regardless of their organizational or institutional role, a crisis creates contextual 
conditions and circumstances that require loyalty only to the incident at hand and the 
completion of the mission.  This requires political judgment in weighing options that are 
centered on the perspective of the decision maker, not necessarily the organization.  
This is not to suggest there were not opportunities for team input, discussion, and 
collaboration.  Clearly, there were, and the narrative report describes in detail examples 
where such episodes occurred.  But these elements came at times of the superintendent’s 
own choosing; they were not the norm.  Discussions were sometimes participatory and 
efforts were made for occasional inclusiveness, but this was not remembered as the 
everyday pattern by those who participated.   Meetings were performance-based, not 
necessarily reflective, and time was a commodity not lightly wasted or ignored.  The 
meetings provided opportunities to demonstrate expertise and knowledge about current 
events, which became a form of currency to be traded for recognition and inclusion. 
The study illustrated aspects of research that suggest crisis decision making 
ultimately relies on the skills of the decision maker, based on personal experience, 
training, expertise, and intuition (Eisenhardt, 1989; Klein, 1997, 2003; Rosenthal, et al., 
2001; Weick, 2001b).  This was evident in the actions of the superintendent, who often 
relied on his own personal frames of reference and points of view to interpret events and 
act upon them.  At the same time, the study identified aspects of the opposite corollaries 
from the research—that individuals without such skills do not, or can not, act decisively.  
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The study identified instances in which others relied on (or acquiesced to) the 
superintendent to make decisions.   
The relatively unique position of the superintendent, in terms of expertise and 
experience, occurred following the school district’s process of crisis management 
planning and implementation in which there was little crisis management training. 
Participants who were otherwise senior leaders of the school district felt unprepared as a 
result.   
Political Extremes 
The political nature of the decisions made during the course of the school 
district’s response to the crisis swung from two extremes, beginning with a fight over the 
independent administration of the school district and ending with subordination of the 
school district to the needs of the county and police.  The first part was evident in two 
episodes on the first day of the crisis, Thursday, October 3, one in the morning and the 
other at mid-day.  Shortly after the Code Blue decision was made and announced, there 
was a verbal tussle with county officials over the operation of schools.  The tussle ended 
with the superintendent announcing that he had been assured by county officials that he 
had authority over schools, unless there was a state of emergency (Meeting notes October 
3, 2002).   He later recalled:  “We’re going to be the ones making the decision to open 
and close the schools” [emphasis added] (Weast, personal interview, 2007).    
The second episode was a short while later, resulting in the police chief being 
publicly corrected on television by his own spokesperson and the superintendent 
withholding the announcement of the decision to dismiss schools until the last possible 
moment—more than 90 minutes after the decision was made.  In reality, the police chief 
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was correct when he announced at about 11:19 a.m. that schools were to be dismissed on 
time and noted: “We’ve been in constant contact with Dr. Weast and his staff” 
("Montgomery police," 2002).  That contact, as reconstructed later, had already resulted 
in the initiation of planning by school district staff and police officials for the deployment 
of officers and security staff to schools to handle the expected onslaught of traffic from 
worried parents.  Being correct, however, was not the problem for the police chief.  
Preempting the superintendent’s announcement of his decision was a problem, and the 
resolution involved concessions regarding the number of police deployed to schools and a 
mea culpa, of sorts, by a police spokeswoman who later announced: “…in terms of the 
schools, Chief Moose has been in consultation with Superintendent Weast.  They will be 
announcing how the schools will be released shortly” ("Maryland authorities," 2002b).    
At the heart of both episodes were power issues.  The first one was rooted in 
perceptions of appropriate dominion over the school district.  The second one reflected a 
demonstration of authority by withholding it.  Neither one was necessary, in light of what 
happened later.  More than likely, the second one occurred because of the first one.  The 
first one was tantamount to insider baseball discussions and had little effect on the work 
of others from the school district, except possibly as a distraction.  The second one, 
however, delayed the sharing of important operational information with members of the 
team, including me, and delayed communications to principals until just a few minutes 
before a promised deadline, a little more than an hour before the first dismissals of 
schools were to begin.  
Both episodes reflect what Hoy and Miskel (2008) describe as “power” 
relationships within “social system model” of school organizations—one legitimate and 
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the other illegitimate (pp. 28-29).  The first episode was more related to the structural 
aspects of authority and positional power of one agency versus another, reflecting a 
legitimate area of concern and legal interpretation of agency authority in a crisis.  The 
second one was more related to informal “political” aspects of authority and power 
relationships, which Hoy and Miskel (2008) suggest are “frequently illegitimate,” in the 
sense that they reflect “behavior usually designed to benefit the individual or group at the 
expense of the organization” (p. 29). 
In contrast to these episodes of power-driven stances, the eventual swing in the 
opposite direction and the subordination of the school district under the preferences of the 
county and police occurred not long after the tussles on the first day.  There were a 
multitude of examples in which the decisions of the county government and police took 
precedence over the school district, and rightly so.  These included the release of 
information about school operations, the avoidance of referring to schools as safe, and the 
continuation of restrictions on outside activities, among others.   It also included 
situations in which the county executive and police chief appear to have had free reign on 
their activities involving schools.  This does not mean they acted without input or 
agreement by the superintendent.  Indeed, the superintendent was closely involved with 
them.  But he was alone in this collaboration and schools were caught blind by the 
repercussions. 
The first such incident happened on the morning of the second day, Friday, 
October 4, when police officers from multiple federal, state, and local departments and 
agencies were assigned to stand guard at schools for the arrival of students.  Principals 
were not told of this in advance, nor were letters sent home to parents to explain why the 
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police were there and what should be expected the following week.  Principals were left 
on their own to explain things.  In fact, within a few hours of schools opening up under 
police protection, the district changed course completely and principals were told that 
outside activities were to resume that afternoon. 
The second incident happened on the following Monday morning, October 7, a 
few hours before the student shooting.  During a televised press conference and 
interview, the county executive announced that parents who did not want their children to 
participate in outdoor recess could request an indoor accommodation, and he identified 
the superintendent as having originated the idea.  The student shooting later that morning 
ended any need for the accommodations, but principals again were not informed of the 
public offer in advance and would have had to address the issue on their own. 
The culmination of the subordination was starkly evident two weeks later, at the 
beginning of the last week of the crisis and after the second to the last shooting.  At that 
time, the superintendent kept police information confidential while making decisions 
about school operations.  He was informed by the county executive of a letter found at  
the site of a shooting, the note that contained a generalized threat against students.  The 
school safety and security director also found out about the letter.   
The existence of the letter and its contents were withheld from the team, on the 
basis that it constituted confidential investigative evidence.  However, at the same time,  
the superintendent encouraged a team member to share a story about an elected official 
who warned a private school on the basis of the note. And, while the team did not know, 
elected officials from around the region were briefed, prior to the letter being released 
publicly the next day.  During this time, the superintendent and the county executive 
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reached an agreement, as did the other elected officials, that no change in school 
operations was necessary.  A different scenario occurred with a group of superintendents 
in Virginia, but they also kept the note confidential. 
The entire episode underscored the dilemma of crisis management and the control 
of information, particularly police evidentiary information that school district leaders 
may know but cannot act upon.  It reflects the tradeoffs that political leaders make as part 
of a balance of responsibilities and opportunities.  In the end, these are political 
calculations.  The literature on crisis management suggests that crises often provide 
leaders with an “opportunity to innovate” (Mintzberg, et al., 1976, p. 251).  Often the 
idea of innovation suggests some larger organizational or strategic change (McCarthy, 
2003; Papadakis, et al., 1999) or an event that prompts support for a policy solution 
(Burns, 1978; Kingdon, 1995) or a reform initiative (Brock, et al., 2002).   
In this instance, the opportunity identified by the superintendent was access to 
information, stature, and authority held by the county executive. The superintendent 
sought the behind-the-scenes status by subordinating his role and the role of the school 
district.  In return, he gained both political rewards of insider status and subordinate 
rewards of membership and participation.  Both emerged as a motivational factor 
unanticipated at the outset of the study.  It suggests that school district leadership during a 
community-based crisis is highly political, involving personal choices about external 
alliances, exclusive of perceptions of internal loyalties.   
At the same time, members of the superintendent’s team sought the attention and 
exclusivity their membership presented, working within the heady atmosphere of crisis 
management and the often concurrent adrenaline rush.  I was not immune to those same 
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feelings.  Indeed, the benefits of insider status apply to the conduct of this study, in which 
my role as a participant researcher is based on my experiences as a senior member of 
superintendent’s team and a witness to or participant in the events of this case.   
Two-Phase Crisis 
The swing in political perspective is similar to a change in the pattern of crisis 
management and decision making that occurred over time.  Initially, the school district 
planned for and implemented crisis management strategies that emphasized a short-term 
approach, based on responses to present (or past), not future, threats.  When the student 
was shot, the pattern changed, and more effort was given to long-term crisis management. 
In a sense, there was not one crisis, but two.  The first involved the initial 
shootings, which were seen as having limited lasting influence on school district 
operations.  Indeed, the team did not meet on the second day, there was no letter home to 
parents, and schools resumed outdoor activities for the weekend.  The second involved 
the shooting of a student, and that changed everything.  After the student shooting, the 
functions of the team changed, the focus on mental health grew, and the expansion of the 
superintendent’s communications with parents was underscored by a letter-a-day 
schedule and extensive related communications.  At the same time, the decisions by the 
superintendent changed, became more conservative and reluctant to move too fast in any 
direction other than an incremental approach in response to the events of the day.  The 
major reason for this was the obvious uncertainty about the crisis’ duration and what 
might happen next.  This was very different than the first phase, and it underscores the 
need to recognize crises as more complex than they initially appear.  All crises need to be 
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managed as long-term threats until they are not—especially in terms of the emotional 
well being (resiliency) of students and staff. 
The extensive mental health and communications occurred because threats to 
student and staff resiliency grew over time as a combination of the cumulative effects of 
the shootings and the disruption to typical instructional and physical activities in schools.  
Both the mental health initiatives and the superintendent’s letters were reflections of an 
aggressive communications effort.  They underscored the point that leadership in a crisis 
requires substantial personal communications, including symbolic gestures, to shape 
perceptions of the crisis and its resolution, provide a way for others to understand for 
themselves, and mark the path back to normalcy. 
Targeted Objectives 
The study identified crisis management decisions that focused on a group of 
primary objectives, which also evolved over time.  The overriding objective was safety 
and security of students and staff.  Safety and security stood out against a backdrop of 
two other objectives:  keeping schools open and functioning, and maintaining parent and 
employee support and cooperation.  These latter objectives were the focus of two major 
initiatives, provision of mental health services through an array of delivery processes and 
direct communications with parents and staff by the superintendent via his letters. 
The emphasis and resources placed on mental health represented real concern for the 
emotional well being of students and staff, a recognition that grew over time from initial 
apprehension about the stability of principals to personal empathy for the cumulative fear 
that became increasingly obvious.  A similar emphasis was evident in communications 
with parents and the public, especially in the superintendent’s letters.  The letters 
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mirrored the transition in mental health from clinical observations of seemingly detached 
epistles to highly personal insights about impact of fatigue and stress.  Both initiatives 
brought considerable attention to the school district and its staff and the superintendent, 
serving to enhance both the district’s efforts and to achieve public recognition otherwise 
blocked by an ongoing police investigation and government agenda that took center 
stage.  
Mental Health 
The school district’s management of the crisis by including mental health 
professionals on the leadership team and initiating a districtwide effort to address the 
mental health implications of the crisis adds a unique element to the research in this area 
(A. H. Fein, et al., 2008; Jimerson, et al., 2005; Knox & Roberts, 2005; Nickerson, et al., 
2006; Poland, 1994; Reeves, et al., 2008).   
The study’s identification of interpretive survey data about the impact of the crisis 
on students and school-based staff also provide additional insights for the research on this 
topic (Brock & Cowan, 2004; Greene, et al., 2004; Lindle, 2008; McGiboney & Fretwell, 
2007; Vossekuil, et al., 2002; Wendell, 2002) 
A significant dimension of the leadership of school districts during times of crisis 
is the management of a large group of people to the effects of the crisis, whatever it may 
be and entail.  Psychology, counseling, and other professions within the mental health 
field have a variety of insights, expertise, and established protocols for addressing the 
very human and cognitive elements of crisis behavior.  Crisis teams should include 
mental health professionals at the leadership level, as equally important as 
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communications and operations, as now designated on typical incident command team 
models. 
Implications  
The study of crisis management and decision making by school district leaders in 
Montgomery County during the sniper shootings of October 2002 provided a rare 
opportunity to look behind the scenes and describe the often complex activities involved 
in managing a large school district.  The study was designed as a non-evaluative 
exploration of a specific case of crisis management and decision making.    
Nonetheless, just as conclusions can be drawn from the study, so too can 
implications. Both reflect interpretations of the study's findings and the relationship of 
these findings to literature on crisis management and decision making.  They are drawn 
from the perspective of the author, who participated in the events of the case and who
researched them under accepted standards and methodologies of qualitative research. 
The portrait comprises a narrative view of a single case, in which a highly unusual 
set of circumstances propelled a group of school district leaders into roles previously 
unimagined.  The circumstances may change from crisis to crisis, but the essential truth 
of the portrait is that crisis management and decision making are difficult to accomplish 
and accomplish well.  To the extent that the Montgomery County Public Schools rode 
through the sniper crisis relatively unscathed is a credit to its leadership.  To the extent 
that such luck might happen again is to engage in a risk calculation no school district 






School district leaders and leaders of schools should have the knowledge and 
understanding necessary to manage a crisis, make decisions under crisis circumstances, 
and improve their performance through practice sessions, similar to learning any other 
skill (such as teaching).  It is not sufficient to rely on past practices that were developed 
through experience.  The reality of managing educational organizations at a time of 
unknown but inescapable risks of terrorism and violence make such skills necessary and 
essentially fundamental to quality management under any circumstances. 
The study provides the first known exploration and description of an event-to-
event case of school district crisis management and crisis decision making.  As such, the 
study brings attention to a long-ignored area within the dynamics of educational 
leadership.  It was an unusual case to begin with, given that events occurred over an 
extended period of time and that management strategies and decision making changed as 
a result.   The study illustrated the application of the “critical tasks,” as identified by 
Boin, et al. (2005), regarding the dynamics of political leadership by public officials 
during a crisis.  While not specifically identified with school leadership, the work by 
Boin, et al., addressed other similar functions within government leadership to warrant an 
analogous comparison.   
Chief among the identified tasks is “making sense of the crisis” and “meaning 
making for others” (Boin, et al., 2005, p. 10), and these are related to elements of group 
leadership (Bolman & Deal, 1997), social trust (Smylie & Hart, 1999), and crisis 
communications (Ulmer, et al., 2007).  The study identified extensive efforts to 
understand the dynamics of the crisis and its implications, through informal sources of 
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information to regular reports of student and employee absenteeism.  The study also 
identified the two major initiatives that reflected overt decisions to interpret and give 
meaning to what was happening—the mental health strategies and the superintendent’s 
communications.  Both sought to shape the understanding of the crisis, and the steps 
being taken to address its effects, from the school district’s perspective.   
These were also political acts, in the sense that they were designed to influence 
group opinion and support, specifically the support of employees and parents and 
government authorities.  The research of Boin, et al. (2005) describes this as the absolute 
necessity in the public management of a crisis.  Others, such as Hoy and Miskel (2008) 
and Bolman and Deal (1997) characterize such acts less than approvingly.   
Boin, et al. (2005) also note that among the main tasks of public leadership in a 
crisis is “making crisis decisions and taking action” (p. 10).  There was no shortage of 
either in this case, and these decisions and actions became part of the context of the crisis 
and the perception of the crisis; they were not separate and apart of what was occurring.   
This is the effect of actions on reality and perception that Weick (2001) termed “enacted 
sensemaking” (p. 224), in which actions taken to address a crisis change the crisis and a 
person’s sense of what is occurring.  In the study, for example, there were shootings on 
the first day that created the perception of a threat, possibly against children playing 
outdoors at schools.  In order to protect the children, a Code Blue was ordered and 
implemented.  That decision and action changed the context of the crisis, and probably its 
interpretation by others, by moving part of the focus of the shootings from police at the 
scenes to children at schools.  On the one hand, the decision was seen as prudent and 
responsible; on the other, it probably accelerated the parent rush on schools.  
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Managing a large organization during a crisis is difficult.  The act of making a 
decision under crisis conditions is exceedingly difficult.  The entire process is fraught 
with complications.  Corporations, fire fighting and rescue services, the military, and 
highly volatile industries, among a host of others, expect such occasions and plan ahead.  
They train whoever is involved to know what to do and when and how and with whom 
and for what purpose.  Qualification for educational leadership positions does not require 
expertise in decision making, much less crisis decision making.  Understanding the 
normal dynamics of crisis behavior is not part of the curriculum.  It should be, on the off 
chance that the person administering a school might someday need to know to the lessons 
learned at Columbine. 
Policy 
Licensure in the preparation of school district leaders and leaders of schools 
should include requirements for attaining a standardized level of competency in crisis 
management and crisis decision making skills, including an understanding of their unique 
differences based on the special characteristics of crises and human behavior during a 
crisis. Leadership preparation programs at colleges and universities should be expected to 
include such requirements, regardless of licensure standards, as part of the typical 
curriculum for a graduate degree in school administration and related disciplines. 
Research 
A better understanding of the dynamics of crisis management and decision 
making in educational settings is important to the development of qualified school district 
leaders and leaders of schools.  The absence of research on this topic in the education 
literature should not be an indication that this research is unimportant.  On the contrary, 
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the extensive literature available in fields other than education—including widely 
referenced research in field of organizational management, decision making, and human 
behavior—indicate the substantial interest and importance and the strong foundation from 
which to initiate a new field of inquiry. 
The study also identified an implication for research focused on the 
implementation of crisis-type decisions, in which the reliability of others to perform their 
tasks and uphold their responsibilities in highly volatile and unusual situations results 
from training and preparation and an environment that encourages mindfulness about the 
larger implications of dangerous work (Weick, 2004; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007; 
Weick, et al., 2008).  Hoy and Miskel (2008) applied that research to the context of 
schools (non-crisis, however).   
The participants on the command team were expected to know their 
responsibilities and do their jobs, and there was great reliance on them to do just that.  
But the lack of training in the broader context of crisis management—and the 
superintendent’s hold on authority and command within a tight performance-based 
context—changed their basis to act.  It was a completely different environment and, 
therefore, previous levels of comfort and confidence (and possibly courage), based on 
professional expertise and experience, were changed.  They had to be relearned, as 
participants noted about the process improving over time.  There was time for 
improvement precisely because the crisis lasted for so long.  Otherwise, the lack of 
preparedness would have been much more obvious. 
The work and responsibilities of a participant researcher, particularly one whose 
participation in the case of crisis management and decision making involving highly 
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complex situations in often volatile environments, are more challenging than one might 
think from relevant literature.  The challenge, as suggested earlier in this chapter, is that 
participation in an event is not the same as knowing it, or even understanding it.  The risk 
is the assumption of knowing everything.  The reality is more akin to a quote by the 
former secretary of defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, in 2002:  “…there are also unknown 
unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know” (Pieces of intelligence, 2005, p. 2).   
The study enabled the creation of a unique narrative portrait, based on a 
comprehensive reconstruction of the case elements from extensive archival 
documentation and the thoughtful and revealing recollections of the participants.   It 
serves as an example of portraiture as a form of case study, building on the work of 
(Bloom & Erlandson, 2003; Hackmann, 2002; R. R. Hoffman, 1992; Lawrence-Lightfoot 
& Davis, 1997). 
Implications from the study about performance reliability are also related to the 
research on sensemaking in crises and other intense time-sensitive situations.  In this 
research, the demonstration of expertise through intuition and improvisation is reliant on 
pre-knowledge about the path ahead, gained by training and experience (Crozier & 
Ranyard, 1997; Grattan, 2004; Klein, 2003; Simon, 1978b; Weick, 1995, 2001a).  The 
concept of mindfulness is derived from this, as well (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007).   
The participants in the case constructed their understanding of what was 
happening largely based on their prior experiences (not necessarily training for everyone) 
and from recognizing cues in organizational activities and the behavior of others.  The 
superintendent, on the first day, for example, noticed quizzical looks from staff as he 
initiated various actions in the deputy superintendent’s office.  He later recalled their 
279 
 
reactions as a lack of support, which it may well have been.  It is also just as likely that, 
based on the sensemaking literature, they simply did not yet understand what he was 
doing.  A misunderstanding of that magnitude may very well have undermined crucial 
relationships and perceptions of trust at just the wrong time. 
Another example of the complexity of sensemaking in a crisis was the early 
understanding of the shootings from the perspective of hunting by several participants. 
They understood a dynamic that affected their perceptions of risk.  Their interpretations, 
based on personal experiences, were not immediately understood by, and may have been 
completely foreign to, other members of team.  The lack of understanding by the latter, 
reflected as uncertainty, could have easily been misinterpreted as a lack of support,
further undermining relationships and perceptions within the team. 
 Social Systems 
The work by Hoy and Miskel (2008) in developing a conceptual model of social 
systems for schools provided a way of understanding the events in a school district.  On   
a limited basis, the study identified the crisis decisions and actions on the first day of 
the crisis and the day the student was shot as largely oriented toward the structural system 
of rules and bureaucratic expectations, not culture and individual interpretations and 
needs.  Although the study did not address this, the expectation is that later development 
of the mental health and communications initiatives would have enlarged the association 
of the crisis decisions to the other components of the identified social system.  
Reflections 
Years ago, for an assignment in a course in phenomenology, I was asked to 
describe a lived experience associated with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
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It was my first course in the research methodology and I was uncomfortable, too new to 
the resumption of graduate studies, let alone the idea of pursuing a doctorate.  Even the 
nomenclature was odd and, initially, somewhat off-putting.  In that first class, in which I 
was maybe the only male, I made some wisecrack about epistemology reminding me of a 
surgical procedure to aid childbirth.  The professor was not amused, and rightfully so, but 
the episode reflects where I began my introduction to education research.  I completed 
the assignment with a narrative portrait that described driving along Wisconsin Avenue, 
in Washington, D.C., returning to the school district’s headquarters from a television 
station, watching people walking along the sidewalks unaware of the attacks being 
described through the live radio reports in my car.  It was surreal, other worldly, and 
multi-dimensional.  I heard a live report from a journalist as he tried to explain a massive 
explosion from somewhere in the Pentagon just a few miles away, while reporting from 
there about the attacks in New York.  On the sidewalks, the people knew nothing.  Their 
reality was elsewhere.   
My assignment introduced me to the notion of sensemaking, a subject I would 
return to time and again in the course of my studies on leadership, organizations, society, 
effective schools, and so on.  Perceptions of reality became a defining aspect of my 
emerging academic point of view, not only affecting my studies but also my professional 
work in educational administration.  As the communications director for the school 
district, which eventually became the site of this study, the interest in sensemaking (and 
its corollary of meaning making) was a natural fit.  At the time of the sniper incident, I 
had no idea it would become the subject of my dissertation study.  I was, frankly, 
interested in establishing a credential in other areas of education, such as teacher attitudes 
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toward race and student achievement, a topic that blended nicely with the interests of the 
school district.  One professor disabused me of that idea with the simple but frank 
question, “What do you know about teaching?”  He was right, of course.  I was a non-
teacher educator, with no school experience aside from infrequent visits.  My entire 
professional career in education was at the center of central administration, as an aide to 
five superintendents in two school districts and a college president.  My area of research 
was right under my nose, but initially it was too close to recognize.   
When the idea of the current study arose in conversations with my advisor, a 
missing piece was quickly identified.  The absence of research and instruction in crisis 
management and decision making for educational leaders became a topic inserted into 
other course work and independent readings, leading to the formation of the central 
problem identified in this study.  From there, the jump was made to this case and the 
unique opportunity it presented for exploring an experience not unlike the one described 
in my early research class. 
There is a difference, of course, in writing an essay about a personal experience 
and undertaking a doctoral study on the lived experiences of 15 other individuals in a 
case in which I was also a participant. My reflections on that are noted elsewhere in this 
report, in Chapter 3 on methodology and earlier in this chapter.   Noted throughout the 
study, too, are references to my role and participation in various aspects of the case.  In 
most instances, this was done to acknowledge participation in or responsibility for 
something that occurred in the course of events.  My own voice in the case was often 
muted, except for the multitude of documents that carry my name as author and those that 
do not.  I was very much aware that as a participant researcher, especially one whose role 
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was that of a communicator, the study risked devolving into a semi-autobiographical 
mess.  I strived for a third party perspective. 
One of the missing pieces is substantial recounting of my own recollections, 
although the narrative choices in the presentation of the case flow from a perspective that 
reflects my point of view.  It can be argued that my perspective is strongly presented,
flowing throughout, with or without explicit acknowledgement.  This is, of course, the
chief characteristic of qualitative research, and subjectivity is a natural by-product of the 
methodology.  Nonetheless, I tried my best to stay in the background wherever possible. 
I did not think, as a matter of methodological strategy or construct, that it was 
necessary to add, in the narrative report of certain events, for example, that I was scared 
and deeply anxious as the sniper events unfolded.  Even now, it is hard to acknowledge 
the emotionalism just below the surface as I spoke live on television the first day, on a 
phone at a secretary’s desk next to the conference room where the superintendent and 
staff were meeting, and said children were safe.  I did that multiple times, each time 
hearing the excitement and worry in the voice of the television news anchor and catching 
myself from going over the edge.   
Everyone I have ever spoken to about this study has their own sniper experience, 
whether they lived vicariously through events while glued to the television or actually 
met one of the assailants on a sidewalk near home when he got out of his car and asked 
for money.  We share stories about walking in a zigzag line to avoid being a target or 
buying gas and groceries at seemingly far away places.  We talk about the worries as 
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parents of children who walked to school or scurried from parking lots to front doors that 
were quickly shut and locked.  
My role in the events of the case required me to step outside of myself and be 
someone else at the time the events occurred.  I could not be the guy who cries at greeting 
card commercials.  There was no room for emotionality when others were depending on 
clear-headed thinking and doing.  There was enough of that to go around.  But there were 
moments when writing the superintendent’s letters when I was speaking for myself and to 
myself, urging people to stop and think about the needs of children.  One part of a letter 
brought me to tears while writing it:   
These are times that require courage, not bravery and heroics, but just the 
emotional strength to do what is right in the face of worry and fear… find 
encouragement in the beauty of life’s unexpected gifts, and be prepared for the 
stress of the unknown (Weast, 2002j).    
 
I also had to be in the head of the superintendent, which was no easy task under 
any circumstances.  The job of a spokesperson or a ghost writer is to dwell in the reality 
of the person being represented.  For each of the superintendents I have worked for, the 
challenge was finding a way to articulate their ideas so that it sounds like them and would
be them if they wrote it themselves.  Sometimes this fails miserably.  One former 
superintendent accused me nicely of trying to make him sound “Kennedyesque,” with too 
much rhetorical flourish; another wanted exactly that when it was obviously, if not 
painfully, apparent that it was not the right match.   
A good portion of the process involves a deep understanding of the job at hand, of 
educational administration and leadership, of instruction and accountability, of budgets 
and resource allocations, of how schools work (if only academically), of politics and 
legislative matters, of relationships with school boards, PTAs, and community groups—
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in short, the stuff superintendents know about.  Substance matters.  My initial 
professional and academic experiences and preparation were in journalism and political 
science, but a master’s degree in education leadership, policy, and planning provided a 
substantial grounding in the work of superintendents.  It meant understanding their job in 
a way that was helpful to them, as a confidential aide and advisor.  It also provided 
substantial informal power to affect policy and procedures through words. 
I learned through this case, however, that proximity does not always mean access, 
and insights do not always mean a clear field of vision.  There are always hidden things, 
some purposeful and some just the result of different realities and others, as noted earlier 
from the former secretary of defense, that remain hidden due to the limits of our own 
knowledge and understanding—the “unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we 
don’t know” (Pieces of intelligence, 2005, p. 2).   
 
 













The sheer size and complexity of the district’s enrollment presented immense 
administrative and academic challenges.  Over the previous two decades the district 
underwent an enrollment transformation.  From an enrollment with negligible racial and 
ethnic diversity in the 1970’s, the district became the most diverse in the state.  By 2002, 
it enrolled nearly half of all Asian American and Hispanic students statewide.  Asian 
American, Hispanic, and African American children accounted for the majority (53%) of 
the district’s enrollment (Maryland's report card, 2003).  There was also a greater 
diversity of languages, with the school district reporting in the fall of 2002 that more than 
10,600 students were enrolled in programs for students with limited English 
proficiency—nearly half of all such students in the state (Annual report, 2002, pp. 7, 26).   
The transformation also included increased poverty and a high reliance on schools 
by children for breakfast and lunch, as well as shelter and clothing in many cases.  The 
district reported that one in five students received free and reduced-price meals, totaling 
more than 29,800 children.  There were more students receiving meal assistance in 
Montgomery County, the school district reported, “than the total individual enrollments 
in 16 of the state’s 24 school districts” (Annual report, 2002, p. 7).   
Much of the demographic changes occurred in an identifiable core area, 
characterized in red on school district maps for 60 “highly impacted” schools needing 
intense academic interventions (Mapp, Thomas, & Clayton, 2007, p. 374).  The area 
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stretched through the center of the county, westward from the border with Washington, 
D.C., through an urban corridor straddling municipalities from Takoma Park to 
Germantown. The district reported in 2002 that the area had less than half the county’s 
elementary schools but enrolled 81% of all students in federal meal programs, 71% of all 
English language learners, 79% of all Hispanic students, 72% of all African American 
students, 48% of all Asian American students, and 29% of all white students (Annual 
report, 2002, p. 7).   
Three Schools for Every Community 
Every community had at least three schools (elementary, middle, and high), 
situated along main roadways, or nestled within tree-lined neighborhoods. The schools 
ranged in size from just over 240 students in the smallest elementary in the county’s 
western countryside to nearly 3,200 students in the largest high school in the county’s 
most densely populated community (Official report, 2002, pp. 3, 6).  Each school was led 
by a principal, supervised by one of six community superintendents in an organizational 
structure that ultimately lead to the superintendent (Figure A.1).   
The superintendent reported to an eight-member Board of Education and served as  
secretary/treasurer. The elected board operated as a semi-autonomous agency of the state, 




Figure A.1  Administrative Organization in October 2002 
From Principals Handbook 2002-2003 (2002, July). [Notebook]. Rockville, MD: Montgomery County 




the superintendent’s decisions (Bounds, et al., 2006, pp. 1-11).97  The superintendent had 
some independent authority and discretionary powers under state law and oversaw  
the executive functions of the school district ("Education article," 2006, pp. 170,185).  
The executive functions included personnel management.  The district was one of the 
county’s largest employers.   
 More than 20,400 people worked for the school district on a full- or part-time 
basis in the school year beginning July 2002, and more than half of them were teachers, 
according to district personnel data.  The typical teacher was female, 44 years old, with a 
master’s degree or equivalent and just over 13 years experience, mostly in the county.  
The typical administrator was female, 51 years old, with at least a master’s degree or 
equivalent and slightly more than two decades of total experience in education, with 
nearly 16 years in the county.  More than half of the administrators were relatively new to 
field, receiving their first position within the previous five years.  Women comprised the 
vast majority of all employees—nearly 80% of all teachers, two-thirds of all supporting 
services staff, and six of every 10 administrators (Statistical profile, 2008).   
In the fall of 2002, the school district had an annual operating budget of $1.4 
billion, but financial problems caused by projected shortfalls in revenue quickly set the 
stage for restrictions on spending.  A budget freeze was announced by Larry A. Bowers, 
the chief operating officer, in a memorandum on October 1, 2002, to executive staff.  It 
was the superintendent's decision “to impose restrictions,” he wrote, and they were 
“effective immediately and until further notice” (Bowers, 2002b, p. 1).   
                                                 
97 The school board included seven adults, two elected at large and five elected from districts to 
staggered four-year terms on a non-partisan basis, and a student member, elected to a one-year term by 
middle and high school students.  The superintendent was appointed to a four-year term. 
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The restrictions covered nearly all discretionary spending and hiring (for the 
second consecutive year), except for key school-based positions, including safety and 
security.  Funding for school security was protected in the same way as teachers and 
school administrations.  Bowers recalled student safety as one part of a very basic dual 
responsibility for the school district. “We’re an educational organization, we’re 
concerned about student success—but…if [students] don’t feel safe, if we can’t keep 
them safe in the building, then we’re not going to be able to do our job,” he said (Bowers, 
personal interview, 2007). 
The school district received most of its funding from the county government, 
which maintained some financial oversight.  The agencies of the county government were 
under the legislative authority of a nine-member elected County Council.  The county 
agencies and departments, including the police, operated under the administrative 
authority of an elected county executive (Montgomery County, 1999, p. 19).  In addition 
to the county police, there were several municipal police units, a regional park police, and 
state police on patrol.  
A ‘Child Born Every 40 Minutes’ 
 
By 2002, the county had nearly 900,000 residents, and it was growing quickly.   
There were 13,149 children born to county residents the previous year.  The school 
district reported the number of births as “an all-time high” and the equivalent of “one 
child born every 40 minutes” (Annual report, 2002, p. 7).  County planning data indicated 
that 25% of the population was under the age of 18, with approximately 56,000 children 
under 5 years old.  The county had the second highest population density per square mile 
of any jurisdiction in the state, except Baltimore City.  The county was on its way to 
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becoming the nation’s 39th fastest growing jurisdiction and the 45th most populous the 
following year (Population data, 2008).  
County residents reflected one of the most educated and prosperous populations 
in America in 2002.  National census data indicated that 56% of adults over the age of 25 
held a bachelors degree or higher, the second highest rate in the United States, and 30% 
had a graduate or professional degree.  Nearly 75% of residents over the age of 16 were 
employed, and the majority worked in management, professional occupations, and related 
areas, particularly in the science and technical fields.  Government workers, at all levels, 
accounted for one-fifth of the entire workforce.  The median family income of $96,256 
annually at the time was nearly twice the national median and the third highest among 










The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, were unlike anything ever 
experienced by anyone among the leadership team of the Montgomery County Public 
Schools.  Jerry D. Weast, the superintendent of schools, told a conference group two 
years later that the attacks “hit us like a shock wave…we really were not prepared” (22 
days of crisis, 2003).  There was no districtwide plan to manage what occurred, including 
fear and anxiety among students, parents, and staff.  In the absence of a plan, without 
clear lines of responsibility and authority, there was initial confusion.  Some senior staff 
members were seen milling around the main offices not knowing what to do.   
Weast took command of the school district’s response, assembling an ad hoc 
group of staff to assist him with operations, transportation, security, counseling, 
communications, and other issues.  Problems multiplied as the day progressed.  The close 
proximity of the attack on the Pentagon in nearby Virginia made the events seem more 
immediate and threatening.  Telecommunications were disrupted making it difficult to 
communicate with schools and offices.  Rumors of all kinds were wild and scary.  Parents 
descended on schools in a frantic attempt to retrieve their children. Police were called to 
quell near panic at some schools.  “It was a zoo,” recalled Robert B. Hellmuth, then 
assistant director of the school safety and security department (Hellmuth, personal 
interview, 2007).  
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Schools closed early that day and remained closed the next.  By evening, Weast 
informed the Board of Education about a range of school district activities under way to 
address fear and anxiety, communicate with students, parents and staff, prepare for the 
reopening of schools, and coordinate with county and regional emergency management 
authorities (Weast, 2001b).  The attacks affected the community in highly personal ways. 
Weast directed staff, as part of a larger counseling effort, to quantify the impact of the attacks 
by determining the relationships of victims to students and employees.  A report later to the 
Board of Education at a public meeting indicated that at least 113 students and staff lost 
relatives, another 43 had friends who were dead, including a former teacher, and 13 had had 
multiple family members and friends listed as dead or missing (MCPS impact, 2001).   
On the night of the attacks, Weast told the school board that he held particular 
praise for the completion of one set of responsibilities.  “Bus operators,” he wrote, 
“demonstrated the highest level of professionalism in the timely transportation of 
students to their homes” (Weast, 2001b, p. 2).  Navigating the roadways in the midst of 
the aftershocks of the attacks was anything but a routine assignment.  Their actions 
illustrated what the initial response lacked at the districtwide level.   
New Plan Built on ‘What Worked’ 
 
In the wake of the district’s response, Weast directed Larry A. Bowers, the 
school district’s chief operating officer, and James A. Williams, the district’s deputy 
superintendent, to oversee development of a new plan.  Their task, as reported to the 
Board of Education, was to ensure the school district “will be better prepared to deal with 
future emergency/crisis situations” (Weast, 2002r, p. 1).  Bowers recalled there were 
insights gained from the experiences after the terrorist attacks that he thought were 
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helpful in formulating the new plan.  “We really had the opportunity to organize 
ourselves and determine the things that worked and what didn’t work—who needed to be 
around the table and the types of gaps that we might have,” he said (Bowers, personal 
interview, 2007).  The plan’s development involved two work groups, one to develop the 
response plan itself and another to organize supplemental efforts, including crisis 
response materials and emergency communications.98  
The effort also coincided with emergency planning outside the school district.  In 
mid-October, Bowers informed the district’s senior staff of an initiative launched by 
Douglas M. Duncan, the county executive, to increase the county government’s “capacity 
to respond to major incidents, improve communication, and increase the security of 
county employees and facilities” (Bowers, 2001).  Duncan, in forwarding the proposals to 
the County Council president, said in a letter that the initiatives reflected their 
responsibilities for public safety and well-being:  “…citizens look to their local 
governments to provide leadership on pre-emergency preparedness as well as on highly 
effective first response when crises occur” (Duncan, 2002, p. 1).   
At the same time, the Maryland State Department of Education (MSDE) also 
renewed earlier efforts to improve crisis management planning across the state.  In mid-
January, five months after the terrorist attacks, Nancy Grasmick, state superintendent of 
schools, informed all school district superintendents that crisis management plans were 
necessary for each school district and school.  She said the need for “a comprehensive 
plan” was in response to “an ever-increasing number of crisis situations” and the need to 
                                                 
98 Note: As the school district’s director of communications, I was involved with both workgroups 
and primarily the group that developed the response plan. 
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both “create and maintain safe and orderly learning environments” (Grasmick, 2002a).  
Schools were already required under Maryland law to have a Safe Schools Action Plan 
that dealt “with bullying, harassment, and discrimination prevention,” recalled Chuck 
Buckler of MSDE (personal communication, 2009).   
Montgomery County, among other school districts, assisted the state’s planning 
effort.  After the state superintendent’s announcement, Edward A. Clarke, the district’s 
school safety and security director, informed four other staff members that they were 
selected to participate in a state training session on the development of the school 
district’s “comprehensive safe schools action plan” (Clarke, 2002a).  Two months later, 
Clarke and another staff member were appointed by the state superintendent to a 
workgroup to develop the planning guide for all Maryland schools.  Their task, as 
described in a memorandum from the state superintendent, was to develop a 
“comprehensive plan that will help reduce confusion, improve communications, and 
make better use of available resources” (Grasmick, 2002b).  This plan was published as a 
guide in 2003 (see reference in Chapter 2) and took more than a year to develop. 
Plan Unfolded Amid Anthrax Attacks 
 
Clarke had been working on aspects of new school security measures since his 
transition from the police department the summer of 2000.  Circumstances changed 
quickly after September 11, 2001.  They changed again in October.  Six weeks after the 
terrorist attacks, he forwarded new emergency materials to principals as a result of a 
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threat of anthrax contaminations.99  The materials included procedures on potential 
“biological agent threats” and a federal advisory on “how to recognize a suspicious 
package” (Clarke, 2001a, p. 1).  The contamination threat and disrupted mail continued 
for weeks.  Clarke later sent principals updated guidelines for handling envelopes and 
packages at school, accompanied by a box of latex gloves. The principals were told that, 
while the "probability of potential exposure" was low, the gloves and guidelines were 
offered as "precautionary measures" (Clarke, 2001b). The new procedures underscored 
the evolving unpredictability of preparing for emergencies that were unknown only a few 
months earlier and very different from anything experienced earlier. 
New security requirements also replaced certain voluntary safety measures. 
Principals were informed by Clarke on October 25, 2001, for example, to begin 
practicing the Code Red and Code Blue security drills with students and staff, with a 
minimum of two drills during the school year. The codes represented different levels of 
response to perceived threats, with Code Red as the more serious of the two, but both 
were considered largely ineffective if they were not practiced.  “It is imperative,” 
principals were told, “that all MCPS staff and students have a clear understanding of the 
basic elements of emergency/crisis preparedness” (Clarke, 2001a, p. 2).  Within days, 
schools began practicing the security drills.  Then principal Kevin Maxwell, for example, 
later informed parents of Walter Johnson High School that students and staff conducted 
their “first Code Blue/Code Red drill” on October 29, 2001, with assistance of police and 
school security staff who assisted “us in fine tuning our procedures” (K. M. Maxwell, 
                                                 
99 In the previous few weeks, contaminations from anthrax-coated letters addressed to journalists 
and elected officials in New York and Washington, D.C., resulted in deaths and sickness, closed postal 
facilities, and fueled fears of additional terrorism (Gugliotta, 2001). 
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2001, p. 1).  The quick response suggested that security measures were well under way in 
some schools before Clarke’s directive. 
Powerful Relationships Established 
 
Douglas M. Duncan, then county executive, recalled that Weast, the 
superintendent, often collaborated with him and kept him informed about problems and 
issues.  “Any major thing, in Jerry’s mind, that happened in the school[s], he would call 
me right away, alert me, [and] we’d have a discussion about it,” he said (Duncan, 
personal interview, 2008).  Duncan said such interactions were part of an ongoing 
relationship that grew over time and enabled a high level of trust:   
We could take each other at face value and not try to figure out—are they playing 
games or what’s the real motivation here, whatever.  It was just—here’s what we 
need to do, here’s what’s happening, and let’s go do it, which was very helpful to 
me (Duncan, personal interview, 2008).   
 
Duncan made his own mark politically as an assertive, action-oriented leader 
during a highly publicized incident during his first week on the job in December 1994.  
He was described in a newspaper article as having “dispatched firefighters to snuff out” a 
noxious dump fire of tires and debris that had festered for months and annoyed nearby 
residents (Marimow, 2006).  Duncan recalled a similar willingness by Weast to solve 
problems quickly.  Duncan said, for example, that Weast was particularly helpful in 
efforts to manage the large-scale community issues following the terrorist attacks in 
September 2001.  “There was immediate communication back and forth…[and] that 
really is critical that we handle the situation like that, when…you’re not just responding 
to an incident but you are trying to keep a community calm” (Duncan, personal interview, 
2008).   
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Adaptations Made for Regional Security 
 
In the months leading up to the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year, when the 
school district was planning the table-top drill of its new plan, much had changed in the 
environment of school security.  The Maryland State Department of Education, for 
example, required all local districts to prepare and submit crisis management plans.  In 
June 2002, Weast submitted the school district’s new plan, the development of which 
coincided with the state’s new requirements.  He also included a copy of the revised 
action plan for safe schools, which included “strategies and actions designed to enhance a 
positive school environment” (Weast, 2002b).  Three months later, he submitted long-
required “assurances” that emergency preparedness procedures were in place for “utility 
related emergencies” at schools (Weast, 2002e).  
When schools reopened in August 2002, school district officials were working 
with counterparts in the county government on regional contingency plans for acts of 
terrorism.  The district was to receive upgraded communications equipment, as part of an 
improvement among all county agencies. Other improved emergency response 
capabilities for the county government were under way, including a new centralized crisis 
command center, increased supplies of medicines, improvements to emergency traffic 
management, and increased hazardous materials training (Ly, 2002).   
Principals received an array of security information.  The new handbook for 
principals, for example, grew from an already large binder to a massive array of 484 
pages—20% of which referenced new or continuing safety and security measures.  One 
document was the “Checklist of School Management Items” that identified seven 
security-related items among the top 12 reminders for the opening of school (Principals 
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handbook, 2002, p. 7).  Another was the “Key Points to Remember...” that outlined the 
steps to be taken for suspected firearms, evacuations, hazardous spills, bomb threats, 
tracing telephone calls, and using staff to visually "sweep/scan" for "suspicious  items" 
(Principals handbook, 2002, pp. 241-242). 
The security preparations extended to private and parochial schools.  Clarke and 
his department joined police officers, fire and rescue personnel, and others in evening 
programs that highlighted measures already in place by the school district.  One private 
school later lauded the joint training as “invaluable” (Building peace, 2003).  In addition 
to basic security precautions, all schools in the county were seen as potential centers for 
mass emergency healthcare, relocation sites, shelters, and hubs for community 
intervention in the event of large-scale attacks.  Hospitals were preparing for countywide 
emergency medical responses involving mass casualties, sickness, and infection.  Health 
experts, emergency medical personnel, police officers, and firefighters were practicing 
joint responses to bioterrorism among other threats (Levine, 2002).   
The Board of Education earlier endorsed a federal grant proposal to place police 
officers in schools.  The county government planned to assign them as “educational 
facilities officers” (Minutes, April 22, 2002).  The initiative represented an abrupt 
reversal for the school board, which had previously opposed the placement of school 
resource officers.  The change opened the door for police to enter schools on a regular basis, 
even to have scheduled office hours, not just as the usual instructors in drug and alcohol 
programs but as participants in school security measures and the protection of children.  
Earlier efforts to place officers in schools failed over concerns about police interaction with 













Columbine established the possibility of a similar attack in Montgomery County, 
Maryland, notwithstanding the lack of such incidents locally.  For some, the potential was 
all that mattered.  Edward W. Shirley, who was then a high school principal (and later a 
member of the school district’s incident command team during the sniper incident), 
recalled that Columbine established the basis of school vulnerability:  
There was no reason to suspect that what I was seeing at Columbine couldn’t 
happen at my school, and I think at lot of us at that point started to take school 
security a lot more seriously than we ever had (Shirley, personal interview, 2007). 
 
In Montgomery County, the Columbine incident prompted then superintendent of 
schools Paul L. Vance to order a review of the school district’s safety and security 
procedures, staffing, and resources by the National Alliance of Safe Schools.  The 
organization submitted a report to the Board of Education on July 13, 1999.  One of the 
recommendations was described as “imperative” and it called for “every school [to] have 
a revised Emergency Management Plan that addresses a variety of emergency/crisis 
situations” (Safety and security, 1999, p. 31).   
The recommendation implied that there was little accountability among schools 
for having or maintaining updated plans.  The follow-up to the report’s recommendations 
was left to Vance’s replacement, Jerry D. Weast, who assumed office later that summer. On 
September 2, 1999, Weast provided the Board of Education with an update on steps taken.  
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The reported actions included a suggestion of broader thinking about crisis management 
capabilities at the district level: “Current efforts have concentrated on a comprehensive, 
systemwide security plan” (Weast, 1999, p. 1).  
The Columbine incident also fostered changes in collaboration with police on 
school assault strategies.  In Montgomery County, Douglas M. Duncan, who was then 
county executive, recalled that the incident prompted county police to change procedures 
“in terms of how they would respond to a school crisis” (Duncan, personal interview, 
2008). One of the changes was tested three months after the Columbine incident when 
police and school officials staged an exercise of coordinated responses to multiple 
schools in early July 1999, as police practiced new rescue and pursuit tactics with 
blueprints of school buildings and revised operational procedures.  Officers had 
directions to enter schools quickly with simulated lethal authority.  A newspaper article 
describing the exercise said officers first on the scene had the leeway to “act immediately 
in a crisis rather than wait for special tactics officers” (Wilgoren, 1999).   
The new Code Red procedures advised students and staff to “stay in classroom or 
get to a classroom as quickly as possible” (Emergency flip cards, 1999, p. 3).  The 
measure was intended to secure students in classrooms away from an intruder.  It also 
removed innocent bystanders from obscuring lines of sight and potential gunfire when 
police entered schools rapidly. One of the items in the new emergency kits was a brightly 
colored vest to be worn by the person managing a school crisis, typically the principal, to 
assist in quickly identifying the person in charge.  The inclusion of the vest coincided 
with another new measure—the Code Red and Code Blue strategies (Figure C.1).  
The new measures, particularly the Code Red, were designed, in collaboration with 
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police, to protect students and staff from real or potential intruders.  New police strategies 
accompanied the security measures and, in part, underscored the need for the principals’ 
vests.  I was later quoted in a newspaper article saying:  “Everyone had to know their 
roles and responsibilities in case of a crisis, especially if it required tactical response by 
the police" (Bowler, 2002).  At the time, as I recalled later, the thought left unsaid was 




Figure C.1  Instructions on Original Safety Measures 
Excerpt from Emergency flip cards (1999). Department of School Safety and Security. Copyright 











In January 2002, when the initial draft of the new emergency response plan for 
the school district was distributed, its main feature was a new Incident Command System 
(ICS).  The ICS was a hierarchal leadership structure intended to guide school district 
efforts in “identifying and coordinating organizational responsibilities in response to an 
emergency or crisis” (Emergency plan, 2002, pp. A-1).  Principals were required to 
implement a similar feature in their schools, in order to streamline emergency 
management among schools and the central office.  The ICS was an organizational 
management perspective typically associated with the military and law enforcement.  It 
was a novel concept for the school district.   
The district’s version was an adaptation that aligned existing management 
positions with typical ICS components and incorporated new elements that reflected the 
district’s organization (Figure D.1).  It was intended be aligned with “the leadership 
structure” of local police, fire and rescue, and other agencies responsible for managing 
large-scale emergency responses in Montgomery County (Emergency plan, 2002, pp. A-
1).  Jerry D. Weast, superintendent of schools, viewed the inter-agency leadership 
alignment as one of the key features.  He informed the Board of Education that it was 
designed to create “a seamless integration” with these external agencies in the event of an 
emergency (Weast, 2002t, p. 1).  The new system symbolized a change.  It provided 
official nomenclature and responsibilities for  
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school officials in a realm otherwise dominated by non-educators. It conveyed 
legitimacy, as well as an actual role, for emergency management that was lacking at a bus 
accident two years earlier.  
 
 
Figure D.1  Incident Command Team Organization 
Reprinted from Emergency Response Plan (2002), p. A-2. Copyright 2002, Montgomery 





The new plan’s primary decision-making authority in an emergency rested with 
the person designated as the incident commander, reporting directly to the 
superintendent.  The incident commander had primary responsibility for “systemwide 
leadership, oversight, and decision-making,” a position of relative supreme authority in 
managing an emergency in the school district, with only the superintendent able to 
“override a decision made by the incident commander” (Emergency plan, 2002, p. A-1).  
This concept of highly centralized crisis management was emphasized at the local school 
level, as well.  Principals were informed that “every incident, emergency, or crisis 
requires that one person be designated as the incident commander who has overall 
managerial responsibility and decision making authority for responding to the  
emergency/crisis” (Approval form, 2002, p. 1).  For individual schools, the incident 
commander was typically the principal.  For the school district’s plan, from the outset of 
its development and initial implementation, the person identified as the incident 
commander was Bowers, the chief operating officer.    
There was no detailed guidebook for how to be an incident commander.  The list of 
responsibilities in the districtwide plan included such items as “assembles the emergency 
response team” (Emergency plan, 2002, p. B-3).   It was more of a generalized list of things 
to do, not a description of specialized responses to pre-identified events (such as another 
terrorist attack).  The plan relied on content expertise and skills of the command team 
participants assisting the commander.  But, their responsibilities were broadly defined, as 
well.  Strategic decisions were listed as a responsibility of the incident commander.  











Jerry D. Weast left little question about who was in command when he became 
superintendent of schools in Montgomery County in the summer of 1999.  He brought a 
reputation for being energetic, charismatic, decisive, and controversial in managing 
difficult and challenging situations.  One newspaper, The Washington Post, introduced 
him as a leader in the mold of “Gen. Patton” (Schulte & Argetsinger, 1999), in reference 
to the famed World War II commander.  Another, The Washington Times, characterized 
him as “an innovator who was not afraid to shake up the school system and fire 
incompetent teachers” (Ferrechio, 1999).  Weast quickly lived up to the descriptions.   
Shortly after the beginning of school, for example, Weast fired the information 
technology officer over the failed implementation of a new software program intended to 
streamline student records.  The decision was a stunning event.  A newspaper article 
described it as Weast’s first major decision as the county’s superintendent and said his 
actions were viewed by some, including members of the Board of Education, as setting 
an example of the temperament and direction of the new administration.  It was a 
perspective, the article noted, that Weast disputed:  “I'm not trying to send any messages. 
I'm just trying to get service to children” (Schulte, 1999). 
The decision set the tone for how Weast’s administration was viewed within the 
school district.  “By the time he walked in and nailed [the technology officer], it was 
clear to everybody in the schools there was a new sheriff in town,” recalled Edward W. 
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Shirley, who was then a high school principal and later became the president of the 
principals union, the Montgomery County Association of Administrative and Supervisory 
Personnel (Shirley, personal interview, 2007).   
‘A Mandate for Reform’  
 
Weast often told his staff that he valued hard work, productivity, and, most of all, 
commitment, and expected the same from others, particularly members of his leadership 
team.  He recalled later that commitment, in the form of dedication to a common mission, 
was often difficult to achieve, particularly for a superintendent in a new school district.  
“It takes such a long time to build capacity to get the level of commitment where the 
team becomes of one mind,” he said (Weast, personal interview, 2007).  He jump-started 
the process in Montgomery County by igniting a long-simmering academic crisis about 
educational inequities by race, ethnicity, family income, and geography.  The problems 
were decades old and lingered through multiple, frustrating attempted remedies.  A later 
study by researchers from Harvard University, which focused on the school district’s 
initiatives concerning race and the achievement gap, described the Board of Education’s 
support for the new superintendent as “a mandate for reform” (Mapp, et al., 2007, p. 
374).  Weast made the most of the opportunity.  He and his senior staff highlighted the 
problems relentlessly, dusting off old reports, bringing in new data and fresh insights, and 
convening community meetings, forums, and task groups.  The efforts were designed “to 
build a sense of urgency in the community” (Mapp, et al., 2007, p. 374).  The community 
urgency was intended to breathe life into the school district and provide political 
backbone for far-reaching academic and organizational change. 
307 
 
Weast presented the initiatives under a title that mimicked a rallying cry, “Our 
Call to Action,” and in the opening letter of the document, he raised a rhetorical saber and 
revealed the scope of the campaign: “Our intention is to empower the entire educational 
community…and to amass our collective will…” (Our call, 1999, p. 3).  He successfully 
gained repeated approval for the reforms and massive, long-term funding.  A book by a 
Columbia University researcher later chronicled the school district’s early child 
components of the reforms and characterized Weast’s actions as those of “an impertinent 
new superintendent” who advocated for change “by rubbing the noses of residents in the 
egregious situation they had chosen to overlook” (Maeroff, 2006, p. 7).   
Centralized Decision Making 
 
The strategy holding the implementation of the reforms together emphasized 
centralized control and decision making.  A later analysis of the reforms by another group 
of Harvard University researchers said Weast established “a powerful lead role” for the 
central office and used that leverage to achieve the organizational changes in districtwide 
curriculum, training, assessments, data collection, and supervision (Childress, Elmore, & 
Grossman, 2006, p. 64).  Weast often told his staff that the management of different 
schools required degrees of differentiated supervision depending on performance—with 
tight supervision and guidance initially, until performance achieved a level in which the 
reins could be loosened and less guidance provided.  Weast later recalled that he viewed 
the balance of tight and loose supervision as essentially “a contingency model” of 
leadership in which supervisory actions can be shifted “depending on your management 
situation” (Weast, personal interview, 2007). Weast said his view was based on an 
expectation of collaboration with subordinates, but he acknowledged that less 
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collaboration also was an option in certain situations involving challenging organizational 
and behavioral changes.  “Sometimes you may have to use more coercive power to get it 
started…to get the ball rolling,” he said (Weast, personal interview, 2007).   
The district’s version of tight and loose supervision was illustrated in a document 
distributed to principals in February 2000, three months after the announcement of the 
new reforms (Figure E-1).  The illustration depicted two extremes of managerial 
oversight based on performance, with suggestions of punishment and reward.  The 
document also featured an unusual demonstration of solidarity by all eight members of 
Weast’s executive staff.  Their signatures were printed after a 317-word statement on the 
importance of accountability for student performance.  In the statement, they said: “We 
will be accountable not only for the past but also for the future” (Our call, 2000, p. 2).  
The statement presented a view of managerial responsibility as proactive, with the 
suggestion of nipping problems in the bud. Shortly after the document’s release, an 
extraordinary preemptive move was taken to transfer a principal of a low-performing 
elementary school just prior to spring break.  A newspaper article said there were more 
such moves after an expected analysis of school data and performance and quoted an 
unnamed senior staff member describing the principal’s transfer as “the tip of the 
iceberg” (Schulte, 2000).   
Aggressive Intervention 
 
Aggressive intervention was an important tool for Weast not only to manage a 
problem but also to avert one.  In September 2000, four months after the bus accident, for 
example, he called an unusual evening press conference in the dimly lit ruins of a burned-





Figure E.1  Suggestions of Punishment and Reward 
Illustration from Our call to action: Building a system of shared accountability (2000), p. 19. 
Copyright 2000, Montgomery County Public Schools.  Reprinted with permission. 
gathered news media the charred remains of a ceiling light ballast.  The subsequent 
announcement by the school district said the “aging ceiling light fixture in a classroom” 
was the likely cause of the fire and called for fire safety checks of all schools with similar  
fixtures (Fire safety, 2000).   
The government reaction was quick.  Within four days, a newspaper article 
described the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission announcing “an investigation 
into dangers posed by old lighting fixtures like one suspected of causing a fire at a school 
in Montgomery County” and the Maryland Department of Education alerting school 
districts across the state “about the fixtures” ("Product safety," 2000).   
The incident demonstrated Weast’s use of the news media to facilitate an agenda.  
Weast recalled that just being in the position of wielding public influence was sometimes 
sufficient enough to avoid larger problems:  
There tends to be better bureaucratic response…and people then are more open to 
communication, because they know that they have to communicate…or you’re 
going to say something. Because, one, you’re going to have more access to the 
press and, if you’re unafraid you’re going to tarnish yourself, you’re going to say 




Weast was typically not shy around his staff.  He quickly became one of the more 
prominent public figures in Montgomery County.  In his first year, for example, there 
were more than twice as many press announcements issued by the school district that 
named him in some way, compared to the year before under the previous 
superintendent.100 His references by name in the region’s two daily newspapers were 
second only to the county executive and twice as often as the president of the County 
Council.101 
 
                                                 
100 References were compiled from the public announcements database of the Montgomery 
County Public Schools for the school years 1998-1999 and 1999-2000, accessed September 1, 2008, at 
www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org.   
101 References were compiled from articles in The Washington Post and The Washington Times 











On May 19, 2000, a horrific accident on Muncaster Mill Road in Rockville, 
Maryland, killed an elementary school bus driver and critically injured several students. 
Dozens of the young students huddled in the open garage of a nearby house when the 
superintendent of schools, Jerry D. Weast, arrived on the accident scene with James A. 
Williams, then deputy superintendent, and Edward A. Clarke, the new director of school 
safety and security.   
Williams recalled there was little question about whether to accompany Weast.  
“The rule was, whenever there is a crisis, James, stop what you’re doing, find me, let’s 
get in the car and go,” he said (Williams, personal interview, 2007).  It was an 
expectation that others who also worked closely with Weast understood well.  Donald H. 
Kress, then the coordinating community superintendent, recalled that Weast was “pretty 
open in saying, if there’s something going on in a school, I’m going, I’m going to the 
site” (Kress, personal interview, 2007). 
The bus accident occurred nine months after Weast’s appointment and he had 
little relationship with the county police officials at the accident scene.  Clarke had just 
retired as a police captain and knew everyone there.  He obtained the necessary access 
inside the police-secured area, where the students in the garage were located, and this led 
to an unprecedented involvement of a school superintendent at a county police accident 
scene.  Williams recalled the interaction as less than harmonious: 
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There were certain things that we wanted to do, because there were children, that 
the police didn’t want us to do, and there was friction. And, knowing Jerry West’s 
style, we just took over—because we focused on the children. The police focused 
on the incident (Williams, personal interview, 2007).   
 
Clarke experienced the friction, too.  He recalled the negative feedback directed at 
Weast for being inside the restricted area and involving himself unilaterally in the care of 
the students and communication with their families, which the police considered their 
purview.  Clarke said “certain high-level police officials felt that maybe the 
superintendent had over-stepped his boundary” (Clarke, personal interview, 2007).  The 
dispute lingered over perceived areas of responsibility.  Robert B. Hellmuth, then 
assistant director of school safety and security and also a retired police officer, recalled 
arguing the point long afterwards with his former colleagues.  “I said look, if it involves 
kids, if it involves our staff, [Weast] needs to be there,” he said (Hellmuth, personal 
interview, 2007).  
Weast’s actions quickly came to define the expectation for the school district’s 
response to emergencies—quick, onsite, and responsive.  In recalling the bus accident, 
Weast dismissed the complaint the police might have had about his expectations and 
intentions:   
Whether they understood it or not, or whether I was in the way or not, I frankly 
didn’t care. Because somebody [from the school district] who has…at their 
fingertips, a large and vast army of human beings, and access to communications, 
must be there to protect our interest, period (Weast, personal interview, 2007). 
 
Weast said that responding to the scene of a school district emergency was an 
essential part of his job.  It was also essential for others representing the school district, 
especially when immediate safety and welfare issues were involved, such as building 
fires, workplace accidents, and traffic deaths. As superintendent, he viewed such 
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situations as an opportunity to exercise great authority on behalf of students and staff and 
their parents, siblings, and families.  It was an aspect of crisis management that focused 
on the crisis aftermath.  Weast suggested it was less about emergency response and more 
about victim advocacy.   
The bus accident was instructive for Clarke.  He said the event illustrated “the 
difference in the two cultures, between public safety and public education,” in terms of 
roles, responsibilities, and expectations in an emergency (Clarke, personal interview, 
2007).  He said it provided a basis for insights into the political dynamics of the 
superintendency and the issues facing school officials in responding to a crisis.  
The bus accident involved many more people than just police and the school 
officials at the accident scene.  The extensive resources of the school district were 
activated by news of the accident, including transportation, counseling, safety and 
security, and communications.  Each group swung into its own response on the basis of 
initial directions and later updates.  The results included some amount of disorganization, 
confusion, and miscommunication.  Different people were sometimes trying to manage the 
same aspects of the response.  The lack of consistent coordination frustrated Larry A. 
Bowers, the school district’s chief operating officer, who remained at the central office to 
manage activities there.  For him, the problems were heightened by the many people who 
were well-intentioned but largely unsupervised or independent and who took matters into 
their own hands.  There was also the anguish over an employee’s death and the student 
injuries.  He said it was difficult to accomplish even the simplest of things.   
Just trying to find out…who was actually on the bus that day—I remember it was 
a great challenge. We had several people doing it, we had several lists, and we’re 
trying to get them to the hospital to make sure we knew where all the kids were 







Appendix G:  Montgomery School Security 
 
 
In October 1999, the Montgomery County school district revised its 
administrative regulation on emergency and disaster preparedness.  The change was the 
first revision of the regulation in 18 years, as noted in the document’s “administrative 
history” (EKA-RA, 1999, p. 3).  The revision came six months after Columbine and 
included a core definition of an emergency that was noteworthy for what it omitted:   
Emergencies and/or disasters can result from fire, gas leak, power failure, boiler 
explosion, toxic fumes from within; or such an emergency could be the result of a 
train or truck accident. Natural disasters likely to occur in certain areas include 
such things as floods, storms, or blizzards (EKA-RA, 1999, p. 2). 
 
The definition did not mention shootings or other life-threatening crimes at a school.  The 
tabletop drill for central office emergency response nearly three years later was similarly 
focused on natural disasters.  
The revised regulation placed the responsibility on crisis planning largely at the 
local level.  It defined the purpose of emergency and disaster preparedness as providing 
“for the safety of all persons” at school district buildings and facilities “through the 
development and maintenance of the comprehensive local crisis plans” (EKA-RA, 1999, 
p. 1).  There was no mention of districtwide crisis planning or the management of 
emergencies at the central office level.  Instead, the regulation referred to “local crisis 
plans” being “part of” the overall emergency plans of the county government (EKA-RA, 
1999, p. 2).   
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Other efforts to prepare for a crisis at the district level occurred elsewhere within 
the district.  For example, a report later described actions taken to develop a uniform 
“mental health crisis response” plan for school emergencies within the school district, in 
coordination with county agencies and professional associations (Community crisis, 
2004).  The plan served as the basis for the later deployment of school district staff and 
volunteer professionals after the terrorist attacks in 2001.  It remained in place a year later 
when the sniper attacks began.   
One of the initiatives highlighted by Jerry D. Weast, superintendent of schools, in 
September 1999 was the provision of a spiral-bound series of “flip cards” that detailed 
crisis responses “during the critical first moments of an emergency situation” (Weast, 
1999, p. 1).  The first card described new emergency kits being provided to schools with 
materials to aid in local emergency management.  The kits were to be kept handy and 
were to include a “battery-operated radio, flashlights, first aid kit, blood borne pathogen 
kit, megaphones,” and a “roll of yellow caution tape,” among other items (Emergency flip 
cards, 1999, p. 2).   
District Relied on Schools 
 
The management of serious incidents remained largely a local matter, a reflection 
of the far-flung size of the school district and the comparatively independent day-to-day 
management of schools.  In the update to the Principals Handbook provided to principals 
in the summer of 2002, all regulations having to do with various safety and security 
matters at schools (such as arrests, bomb threats, weapons, etc.) conferred the initial 
decision on the principal.  The matter rose to the central office in only the most serious of 
circumstances.  For example, the principal was responsible “for determining the 
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appropriate course of action” regarding how to respond to a serious incident, “including 
requests for outside (non-school) assistance in accordance with the comprehensive local 
crisis plans” (Reporting, 2000, p. 253).  If a weapon was found on school property, the 
principal was responsible for using “discretion in confiscating” the item from a student, 
depending on the student’s age, circumstances, “and the potential for resulting danger” 
(Weapons, 2000, p. 257).  Principals were responsible for safeguarding students near bus 
loading zones and “enforcing safe traffic regulations on school property” 
(Transportation, 1998, pp. 8-9).   
Regulatory references to central office involvement in serious incidents were 
episodic and splintered depending on the type of incident.  For bomb threats, for 
example, principals were required to initiate local safety measures with police and fire 
officials and to “inform…as soon as it is practical” one of four executive staff offices, 
depending on whether the incident happened in “regular schools…special education 
schools…alternative programs…[or] all other sites” (Bomb threats, 2000, pp. 248-249).   
Crisis management decisions by principals largely occurred out of public view.  
Principals had the discretion to disclose details of a serious incident to parents and the 
public, based on whether there was a safety issue or “the likelihood of community 
concern” (Reporting, 2000, p. 254).  In 2002, the district did not publicly report data on 
the occurrence of serious incidents in schools, including crimes.102  However, 
disciplinary decisions were disclosed.  Student suspension data were reported statewide 
by the Maryland State Department of Education.  The state report noted that, while such 
                                                 
102 Serious incidents in 2002 potentially spanned more than 30 categories, including criminal acts 
from arson to weapons, based on procedures later initiated for reporting such data ("School safety," 2008). 
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data were imprecise and limited, “suspensions can be indicators of the most serious 
student misbehavior in the school” (Suspensions, 2002, p. 1).  The report included the 
number of students suspended and the number and type of suspensions, providing the 
relative scale and scope of the local incidents and the decisions that accompanied them.   
For Montgomery County, the state reported 5,577 students suspended at least 
once during the 2001-2002 school year, representing just over 4% of the student 
enrollment, the lowest in the state.  Most (88%) were middle and high school students.  
This meant, on average, that about 85 students per secondary school were suspended 
during the year—or about one every other school day.  There were 7,934 suspensions 
overall.  The higher number for suspensions indicated that nearly 30% were for repeat 
offenders.  Nearly half of the suspensions (46%) resulted from physical and verbal 
attacks against teachers, staff, and students, as well as fighting and extortion. Little more 
than 3% were for weapons, including one suspension involving a firearm (Suspensions, 
2002, pp. 3-11).    
Weather Plan Guide 
 
The district had a well-worn plan for managing the most common districtwide 
emergencies—snow storms, icy roads, and other hazardous weather conditions.  Each 
fall, just prior to the onset of winter, an updated version of the “Management Plan for 
Inclement Weather” was distributed.  The plan was a highly detailed document of more 
than 40 pages.  It included a flow chart that illustrated the steps in the “inclement weather 
assessment process” leading to a decision by the superintendent (Management plan, 
2001, pp. 32-34).  The final steps in the decision process essentially involved Weast 




Figure F.1  Decision Sequence for Weather Emergencies  
From Management plan for inclement weather and other emergencies (2001, November), 
p. 32.  Copyright 2001 Montgomery County Public Schools.  Reprinted with permission. 
 
 
morning decision, for example, the plan’s timeline specified a “recommendation to the 
superintendent by 4:45 a.m.” by the chief operating officer and a decision fifteen minutes 
later by the superintendent (Management plan, 2001, p. 32).  In a sense, this was also the 
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essence of the new plan.  It had a prescribed process, the specific staff identified, and the 
fidelity to a final decision by the superintendent.  The weather emergencies plan was the 
incident command system without the glamour. 
In the school district, emergency decisions for transportation were a proxy for 
decisions affecting schools, such as closures, delayed openings, and early dismissals.   
The decisions were made for “all schools” at one time and were “based on the most 
severe condition within the county” (Management plan, 2001, p. 5).  This occurred 
regardless of weather conditions elsewhere and depended largely on road conditions and 
vehicle safety.  It was, as described later, “a uniform procedure” designed to enable the 
school district to “respond quickly to emergency weather conditions and protect the 
safety and well being of students and staff” (About weather, 2007).   
Daily school operations were defined by bus schedules at three critical 
junctures—morning arrivals, afternoon dismissals, and the mid-day comings and goings 
of pre-school and kindergarten students in half-day programs.  The bus schedules were a 
function of economics, designed to maximize the use of the fewest number of buses 
transporting the largest number of students.103  The schedules involved highly calibrated 
bus routes in an operational ballet of more than 1,100 vehicles.  The fleet was described 
by the school district as 11th largest in the nation, transporting an average of 95,000 
students each day (Annual report, 2002, p. 26).  The operation included bus drivers, 
aides, and mechanics at five depots around the county.  More money was budgeted for 
                                                 
103 The school start times in Montgomery were reportedly set in 1993, when the district sought to 
save money by opening schools earlier and using fewer buses to transport more children (Kaufman, 2001).   
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transportation ($58 million) than textbooks ($42 million) or building maintenance ($24 
million) in Fiscal Year 2002 (Citizens budget, 2002, p. 26).   
In the fall of 2001, the weather emergency plan was untouched by improvements 
sought for overall crisis management.  Weast sent a copy of the plan to the Board of 
Education in November in preparation for the upcoming winter season.  He told the 
board:  “I have reviewed the plan with my staff, and I am confident that everyone is 









The issues of volunteers and mental health were linked to the same basic problem 
facing the school district—keeping the schools open meant helping people cope with a 
new set of issues and problems.  There was an inherent limit in the resources of the 
school district, even with volunteer assistance from community mental health 
professionals, to address potential emotional issues facing tens of thousands of students, 
parents, and staff.  Jerry D. Weast, superintendent of schools, later acknowledged that his 
understanding of the dynamics of the problem evolved, as it did for others, as the crisis 
continued and worsened.  He recalled that the district “had to escalate the level of care 
and comprehensiveness of the program, based on the intensity and the length or duration” 
of the crisis (Weast, personal interview, 2007).  
The district’s response, as drawn from the archival record and interviews with 
participants, was focused on four basic methods of providing support for students, staff, 
and parents and, by extension, the public.  These methods involved four inter-connected 
strategies based on two delivery methods—people and media (Figure H.1).  All four 
strategies were based on providing information that people could use to help themselves 
or console others.  “Information was almost our only weapon,” recalled Judith Madden, 
then supervisor of guidance services (Madden, personal interview, 2007).   
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Part of the response built on the experiences of a year earlier, after the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001.  The bulk of the response dealt with an entirely new kind 
of problem—one involving despair because of the length of the crisis and continued 
attacks and anxiety because of the randomness of the shootings.  Mathew Kamins, then 
supervisor of psychological services, recalled the themes boiled down to two ideas as 
counter-suggestions for people to cling to—hope and resiliency.  He credits Weast for 
initiating the work that led to the development of the initial mental health guides.  “I 
remember him saying, almost to day one…you need to write something about random 
acts of violence, and you need to take into consideration exposure to repeated stress” 
(Kamins, personal interview, 2007).  After the student shooting, Weast asked the mental 
health staff to research the literature on anticipated mental health needs for long-term 





crises, in case different strategies were needed for “the next four or five days” (Meeting 
notes October 9, ¶ 5:00).   
Nearly two weeks into the crisis, Weast told parents and staff in a letter on 
October 15 that the continued “effort to address mental health issues—emotional, 
intellectual, physical, and behavior reactions to stress—has emerged as a major priority 
for the school system” (Weast, 2002h).  A school district media announcement, three 
days prior to the letter, described the initiatives as necessary “to stabilize and maintain 
school system instructional programs at a time when stress and distractions are disrupting 
the expected processes of teaching and learning” (Ongoing mental health, 2002).   
Weast also framed the school district’s response, in comments before the Board of 
Education on October 15, as “an educational issue” for the school district in terms being 
able “to reach out and communicate…to establish those relationships where they may 
have been frayed or didn’t exist” with employees and parents ("Dialogue," 2002).  He 
said that, while he wanted the crisis to end, the emergency presented opportunities for 
organizational improvements. 
This is an opportunity to hone our professional skills.  This is an opportunity to 
show our staff how much we care about them.  How much we are concerned for 
them. It’s an opportunity to show our parents that they’re part of the 
equation…We are seizing upon those opportunities in this particular crisis 
situation for us to become a better organization ("Dialogue," 2002).  
 
 The school district’s efforts drew praise from the outset, including offers of 
collaboration, and notoriety for the school district.  The National Education Association 
(NEA) informed staff that it was considering a national award for the school system’s 
work (Leong, 2002).  Other groups offered assistance, including KidsPeace, a national 
center “for kids overcoming crisis,” which provided free materials to be shared with 
324 
 
parents and staff (Dries, 2002).  CNN highlighted the efforts in its online reporting of the 
day’s events and posted a link to the district’s website (Oglesby, 2002).  The day after the 
student shooting, the NBC Dateline program concluded its report on the sniper incident 
by sharing “some good advice” from the district’s suggestions for parents ("7 days," 
2002).104  
Materials were sent to Prince George’s County to assist that district’s efforts after 
the student shooting.  Kamins became the district’s expert for news media inquiries about 
the effect of fear on parents and students.  In an appearance on MSNBC, for example, he 
tried to place the parent reactions in context and said, “…it’s almost impossible for 
parents to overreact in this kind of situation” ("Lester Holt," 2002).  The media demand 
became so heavy that Madden also became a spokesperson on mental health.  She 
provided detailed tips for addressing stress and anxiety in interviews on CNN, including 
one headlined “Interview with Judy Madden” ("Interview," 2002).     
Services Mobilized 
Major efforts regarding mental health were mobilized in the days following the 
student shooting.  On October 11, Lacey updated the command team regarding the status 
of the ongoing mobilization of mental health personnel and resources, noting that staff 
recruited 82 licensed mental health professionals, in addition to 186 other volunteers 
through the Montgomery County Mental Health Association, to be available to assist 
                                                 
104 The county government released its own “Tips for Coping for Tragic Shootings” in a press 
statement on its website, in which Duncan urged residents to seek assistance if necessary from a crisis 
hotline staffed with mental health counselors ("Montgomery County offers," 2002).  At the same time, the 
county also engaged in community-based mental health services, including personal assistance.  In one 
instance, county staff drove people from a clinic to the nearest Metro rail station because “they were afraid 
to wait at [the] bus stop” (Romer, 2002, p. 4).   
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schools as needed.  These were in addition to 60 psychologists and other staff, who 
Kamins reported also were ready (Meeting notes October 11, ¶ 5:00). 
The mobilization created 12 fact sheets and brief guides on various mental health 
issues already in schools and on the website by that Friday, with another four on the way 
that focused on stress and anxiety issues.  The effort involved support from the school 
district’s multimedia efforts led by Alvez, the superintendent’s director of special 
projects, which included the launch of a new website and new television programs that 
were being frequently replayed every day.  The efforts included a live call-in program, 
“Coping with Stress: Answers to Your Questions,” featuring school district staff and 
others with mental health expertise answering questions  
from a studio audience and telephone calls (Meeting notes October 11, ¶ 5:00). These 
efforts, such as the website, essentially offered the information and resources as a form of 
self-help.  There was little other alternative. 
Members of the Board of Education praised the efforts during a discussion about 
the school district’s response on October 15.  Patricia O’Neill, for example, said she felt 
“proud” knowing that materials prepared by the school district were being used by others,  
including the news media, as a resource ("Dialogue," 2002):  She said it was an 
unprecedented effort and “a prime source of relief for families and children and 
obviously staff” ("Dialogue," 2002).   
The student services team developed plans for responding to an incident at 
schools.  The detailed “crisis response” plan described the steps and procedures for 
deploying staff and outside mental health support during an “isolated incident” outside of  
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a school, a school-based incident, and a “systemwide or regional incident” in conjunction 
with the Incident Command Team structure (Crisis response, 2002, p. ).  The team also 
developed an outline of immediate and ongoing “tasks” for student services personnel 










Appendix I:  Letters from the Superintendent 
 
 
The letters from the superintendent to parents and staff, which eventually 
numbered 14 by the end of the crisis, were formalized as a daily plan two days after the 
student was shot.  Prior to that, the letters were prepared as if each letter might be the last.  
Principals were told that, with the new plan, the superintendent intended “to maintain 
daily communication with parents and staff...for as long as the current crisis continues” 
(Porter, 2002i).  The first letter carried the label “Update #4” in anticipation of a 
continuing series, given that another shooting occurred the night before.105  
Superintendent Jerry D. Weast told the team he wanted the letters to focus on a 
central topic that would convey the day’s most important information (Meeting notes 
October 9, ¶ 7:30).106  Most of the letters over the course of the crisis dealt with security 
and mental health issues, providing advice and guidance (Figure I.1).  The distribution 
included more than 150,000 copies each time, with printing and distribution handled 
independently by each school and office, plus distribution through the district’s website.  
                                                 
105 On Wednesday night, October 9, a man was shot in the head while pumping gas at 8:10 p.m. in 
Manassas, Virginia ("John Muhammad v. Maryland," 2007, p. 13).  The attack was later linked to the other 
shootings, bringing the total to seven dead and two wounded. 
106 Note:  I prepared the initial drafts of the letters, based on direction and guidance from the 
superintendent and input from others who reviewed initial drafts and made suggestions. The preparation 
involved translating the letters (into Spanish initially and later other languages) and sending it by e-mail in 
time for local school staff to copy and distribute before dismissal.  It was a deadline-driven process.   
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The tone and substance of the letters were affected by the days’ events.  The 
second letter of the new plan, for example, came the day of another shooting.107  The 
letter reflected the lessons from the mental health materials to create a simple message:  
“These are times that require courage, not bravery and heroics, but just the emotional 
strength to do what is right in the face of worry and fear…” (Weast, 2002j).   The letter 
urged staff and parents to take appropriate precautions against stress and anxiety, and 
offered self-help strategies that built comments Weast had made earlier to the command 
staff that same day: 
                                                 
107 At 9:28 a.m. on Friday, October 11, a man was shot and killed while standing next to his car at 
a gas station in Spotsylvania County, Virginia, 70 miles south of Rockville ("John Muhammad v. 
Maryland," 2007, pp. 14-15). It was the tenth shooting, with eight people dead and two wounded. 
 
Figure I.1:  Excerpt of One of the Superintendent’s 14 Letters  
From “Letter from the Superintendent” (2002, October 10). Sniper crisis: Superintendent’s crisis 
management communications. Week 1 [Notebook]. Rockville, MD: Copyright 2002 by 
Montgomery County Public Schools.  Used with permission. 
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I ask my staff to do the same things I expect of myself—get plenty of rest each 
night, stay close to family and friends, find encouragement in the beauty of life’s 
unexpected gifts, and be prepared for the stress of the unknown (Weast, 2002j). 
  
That letter drew favorable responses.  A parent wrote to Weast saying, “I am 
seldom touched by the usual rhetoric that comes from your office…[but this letter] makes 
me feel better” (Smith, 2002).  An elementary principal intern sent an e-mail thanking 
him saying, “…as an administrator but especially as a parent…I take solace in the 
beautifully crafted words” (Johnson-Riley, 2002).  That evening, a report on a news 
segment of National Public Radio quoted from the letter to address the concerns of 
people who “say they’re on the edge and are clinging to comfort where they can find it” 
("Feelings of residents," 2002). 
A teacher later wrote in her daily journal, which was subsequently excerpted as a 
newspaper article, “The superintendent's letter (always on yellow paper) coming at the 
end of every day now. I look for it, I wait for it. I'm not the only one. I start to think of 
these days as ‘waiting for the yellow sheet.’” (Ochs, 2002).  There were anecdotal reports 
of parents and staff expressing appreciation.  Clarke, for example, reported to the team 
that at a PTA meeting on school security, parents said they liked being kept informed 
(Meeting notes October 16, ¶ 7:30).  Lacey later recalled hearing about the letters from 
her sister who was on the board of a college in Massachusetts. She said one of other 
board members had grandchildren in Montgomery County and told Lacey’s sister, in 
response to a question, that the situation was “really scary” but she felt better because 
“her family knew every day” about the school district’s efforts (Lacey, personal 
interview, 2007).  Reginald Felton, president of the Board of Education, also praised the 
letters during a discussion on the school district’s response to the crisis.  They were 
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important, he said, because “there are so many parents who do not necessarily have 
access [to other media sources], and they need to know” ("Dialogue," 2002). 
Not everyone was as positive.  An elementary school parent, for example, called 
the superintendent’s office, complaining that the “daily updates are a waste of trees” 
(Sloan, 2002b). An elementary school secretary responsible for duplicating and 
distributing the letters sent an e-mail to the Weast’s office, saying the “daily letters might 
be adding to everyone’s stress and that possibly less frequent communications might be 
more helpful” (Sloan, 2002a).  Shirley, the principals’ union president and who later 
became a superintendent himself, recalled the letters as the “daily epistles” (Shirley, 
personal interview, 2007).  He said they were not well received: 
I guess he thought—this is really important that the flocks know that I care about 
them.  And at the school offices, it’s just pissing people off, when they had to 
print them every day. I don’t think the schools looked forward to the epistles 
nearly as nearly as much as [Weast] thought they needed to have them. There was 
a pretty big gap (Shirley interview, 2007). 
 
Alvez, director of special projects in the superintendent’s office, also assisted in 
preparing the letters.  She recalled hearing both positive and negative feedback, both as a 
parent and as a staff member.  She supported the letters as a form of message redundancy 
in order to reach as many people as often as possible in a large organization. “I’d rather 
err on the side of over communicating than under communicating, especially in a 
situation like this,” she said (Alvez, personal interview, 2007). There was no effort by the  
school district to evaluate the letters beyond the anecdotal feedback.  
All of the letters were released to the public and news media, and they were 
quoted as a source of information and statements from the superintendent. Excerpts 
appeared in various media, including The Boston Globe, The Los Angeles Times, The 
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New York Times, The San Francisco Chronicle, USA Today, and The Washington Post, 
along with references on National Public Radio.  NBC4, the local network affiliate, 
posted an entire letter online following the student shooting ("Afternoon activities," 
2002).  An article in The Baltimore Sun characterized the correspondence as an example 
of new crisis management techniques for school districts, in which frequent 
communication was important for parents and staff over an extended period of time 
(Bowler, 2002). A television program on school safety later described the letters as an 
attempt “to try and keep parents and students calm” ("Safety lesson," 2003).108   
Duncan, who acknowledged reading some but not all of the letters, said the 
correspondence was important in the overall management of the crisis:  
I liked the idea that he was sending letters out on a regular basis…reassuring the 
parents, keeping the message, we’re going to get through this, we’re going to stay 
in school, we’re going to keep teaching your children and we’re going to keep 
them safe.  I thought that was very, very helpful, I really do.  It was that constant 
advice, that constant touch he had, with his constituency that was extraordinarily 
helpful (Duncan, personal interview, 2008).   
 
 Weast also used letters in targeting specific groups of employees to convey 
appreciation for their work and highlighted specific job functions that were helpful in 
managing the crisis.  In a massive distribution two days after the student shooting, Weast 
sent letters to all school secretaries and office personnel, building service workers, and 
student services staff, including school psychologists, pupil personnel workers, and 
guidance counselors.  Cafeteria and transportation staff received a second round of 
letters, following the ones sent the week before after the initial shootings.  The recipients 
                                                 
108 Weast was not alone in sending letters.  A study of the police investigation noted that “many 
superintendents communicated directly with students and parents” throughout the crisis (G. R. Murphy & 
Wexler, 2004, p. 108).  The study cited a letter from a Virginia school superintendent as an example.  None 
were known to have sent letters home on a daily basis.   
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in transportation alone numbered more than a thousand.  Each letter was tailored 
specifically to the employee group.  School secretaries were told, for example, they were 
“truly on the front line” during emergencies and the school district appreciated the “calm 
and understanding manner in which you have responded to questions and concerns from 
parents” (Weast, 2002o).  Building service workers were told: “The security of your 
school building is your daily responsibility” (Weast, 2002a).  
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Appendix J:  Tables 
 
 Table J.1   Distribution of Crisis Actions and Crisis Decisions, October 3 
 
 













Total 70  32  
Critical Leadership Tasks 
• Making crisis decisions, taking action 70 100% 32 100% 
• Making sense of the crisis 36 51% 11 32% 
• Meaning making for others 25 36% 12 38% 
• Terminating the crisis 1 1% 1 3% 
• Learning from the crisis 0 0 0 0 
 
Principals of High Reliability 
• Deference to Expertise 21 30% 15 47% 
• Sensitivity to Operations 58 83% 26 81% 
• Preoccupation with Failure 16 23% 10 31% 
• Reluctance to Simplify Interpretations 21 30% 12 38% 
• Commitment to Resilience 12 17% 5 16% 
 
Social Systems 
    
• Structural System 56 80% 27 84% 
• Political System 12 17% 8 25% 
• Individual System 10 14% 4 13% 
• Cultural System 6 9% 4 13% 
• Teaching and Learning 0 0 0 0 
• External Crisis Environment 32 46% 13 41% 
• Feedback 10 14% 2 6% 
 
Crisis Management Targets 
• Students and staff safety 38 54% 18 56% 
• Schools open for teaching and learning 2 3% 2 6% 
• Students and staff attendance 0 0 0 0 
• Mental health support 15 21% 5 16% 
• Staff implements district decisions 18 26% 10 31% 
• Parents and public support  16 23% 6 19% 
• Agencies support  9 13% 5 16% 
• District operations continue 4 6% 4 13% 
 
Data compiled from coding analysis of identified crisis activities and crisis decisions of school 
district leaders, Montgomery County Public Schools, October 3, 2002, and associated conceptual 
framework components. Data overlap. Percentages rounded. Crisis actions include crisis decisions.. 
Conceptual framework components adapted from “critical tasks” by Boin, et al. (2005); “social systems 





Table J.2   Distribution of Crisis Actions and Crisis Decisions, October 7  
 
 













Total 73  33  
Critical Leadership Tasks 
• Making crisis decisions, taking action 73 100% 33 100% 
• Making sense of the crisis 23 32% 8 24% 
• Meaning making for others 44 60% 18 55% 
• Terminating the crisis 0 0 0 0 
• Learning from the crisis 0 0 0 0 
 
Principals of High Reliability 
• Deference to Expertise 25 34% 12 36% 
• Sensitivity to Operations 45 62% 20 61% 
• Preoccupation with Failure 19 26% 13 39% 
• Reluctance to Simplify Interpretations 14 19% 9 27% 
• Commitment to Resilience 15 21% 6 18% 
 
Social Systems 
    
• Structural System 48 66% 23 70% 
• Political System 5 7% 3 9% 
• Individual System 9 12% 3 9% 
• Cultural System 9 12% 6 18% 
• Teaching and Learning 1 1% 0 0 
• External Crisis Environment 45 62% 17 52% 
• Feedback 12 16% 5 15% 
 
Crisis Management Targets 
• Students and staff safety 33 45% 13 39% 
• Schools open for teaching and learning 3 4% 1 3% 
• Students and staff attendance 2 5% 2 6% 
• Mental health support 15 21% 6 18% 
• Staff implements district decisions 22 30% 12 36% 
• Parents and public support  16 22% 9 27% 
• Agencies support  14 19% 6 18% 
• District operations continue 0 0 0 0 
 
Data compiled from coding analysis of identified crisis activities and crisis decisions of school district 
leaders, Montgomery County Public Schools, October 7, 2002, and associated conceptual framework 
components. Data overlap. Percentages rounded. Crisis actions include crisis decisions. 
Conceptual framework components adapted from “critical tasks” by Boin, et al. (2005); “social systems 
model” by Hoy & Miskel (2008); and “high reliability” principles by Weick & Sutcliffe (2001).
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